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2Abstract
The study of labour markets is often limited to labour market institutions themselves 
and the link to other areas in economics, in particular product markets, is scarce. The 
purpose of this thesis is to shed light on the interaction between economic conditions and 
explicit contracting in labour markets. Chapters One and Two investigate how wages 
change in the face of changes in product market competition and propose a hypothesis 
for recent increases in wage inequality.
In Chapter One I explain why firms competing in an oligopolistic market alter how 
much they are willing to pay to attract good workers and how wage inequality within 
industries (and observed skill groups) may arise from these changes in product market 
competition. I then look at the actual impact of product market competition using 
a panel of individuals for the UiK. and concentration measures and two natural ex­
periments as measures of competitiQn. The results point to the fact that increased 
competition raises the returns to skills and hence wage inequality.
Chapter Two takes investigates the impact of product market competition on per­
formance related pay. I analyse compensation equations of US managers and obtain that 
increased competition implies increased steepness of the performance pay relationship 
that raises the variance of wages.
Chapter Three assesses whether there is a systematic relationship between the type 
of contract held and an aspect of workers welfare. I analyse whether the large difference 
between the work accident rates of fixed-term and permanent contract workers in Spain is 
not just the result of a compositional effect but that a pure contractual effect exists. The 
results indicate there is a pure contractual effect that increases the individual accident 
probability by 5 percentage points.
Finally Chapter Four is an analysis of the relative impact of household income and 
unemployment benefit on unemployment duration, with a particular focus on female 
behaviour.
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0.1 Introduction and main results
10
The study of labour markets is today at the centre of modem applied economics and 
it is still of great practical relevance given the subject of study has a direct bearing on 
individuals lives and economic productivity. However, the area of study is often limited 
to labour market institutions themselves and what as economists we typically perceive 
as labour market variables. The link to other areas in economics, in particular product 
markets, is scarce and there has typically been what I would argue is an artificial dicho­
tomy between the behaviour of individuals as workers or employers and their behaviour 
as consumers or sellers. It is the purpose of this enquiry to relate explicitly those two 
worlds, namely the impact of changes in economic conditions that are outside what we 
traditionally think as being the labour market variables in a strict and restrictive sense 
and labour market outcomes.
The major effort in this investigation is devoted to explore the impact of changes in 
product market competition on the wage structure and by extension on wage inequality. 
This will be the subject of Chapters One and Two. I will argue that increased competition 
in goods and services markets feeds back into labour markets in the form of increased 
polarisation of wages. Chapters Three and Four take on a different perspective and are 
an analysis, respectively, of the effect of the type of contract on the probability of work 
accidents and an analysis of the effect of the relative impact of household income and 
unemployment benefit in determining unemployment duration.
Chapter One starts by illustrating the theoretical fink between increased competition 
in product markets and the wage structure when workers are heterogeneous in skills and 
there is imperfect competition in product markets. What characterises product market 
competition in a number of parameterisations is that the sensitivity of profits to unit 
costs is higher as competition increases. If skilled workers are able to produce at lower 
costs then firms will be willing to pay relatively more for a skilled worker in a competitive 
product market than in a non competitive one. This implies that the sensitivity of wages
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to costs (given by the skill level) is also higher in more competitive sectors. Note that this 
is not a statement about average wages but about within sector wage differentials between 
high and low skilled workers. It is shown that the defining property of competition is 
true under a number of parameterisations of competition (also see Boone 2002). A 
maintained hypothesis throughout the chapter is that firms are homogeneous ex ante; 
they only differ ex post by the type of worker they hire.
The immediate implication of the model is that as product market competition in­
creases returns to skill are larger. I test this empirically using a panel of UK workers 
(males in the manufacturing sector for the period 1982-1999). The identification ex­
ploits the within sector variation in competition to estimates wage equations based on 
an individual panel. As measures of skill at work I use education and tenure. I also use 
wages as direct proxy for skill in a part of the analysis. The first competition measures 
used are sectoral concentration ratios. Even in the fully saturated specification with 
individual fixed effects I obtain that as concentration falls the returns to skill increase, 
ceteris paribus. The problem with these concentration ratios is that they may be criti­
cised as imperfect measures of competition and also that they may be correlated with 
an omitted variable. To address these issues I use two natural experiments that I argue 
imply exogenous changes in product market competition.
First, I use the introduction of the European Single Market Programme in 1992 that 
implied that competition increased more for sectors with high non-tariff barriers before 
1992. Second I exploit the strong appreciation of the British pound that took place in 
1996 and that meant a bigger increase in competition for sectors that were highly exposed 
to international trade. The difference in differences results of these specifications confirm 
again that as competition increases, the ratio of high to low skill wages becomes larger and 
the magnitudes of the effects are sizeable. I also provide instrumental variable estimates 
for the effect of concentration with similar results. I argue that this is strong evidence in 
favour of the type of mechanism outlined and provides an additional explanation of the
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large increase in wage inequality that took place in the UK over the past twenty years.
One of the difficulties of the exercise is to find a convincing measure of competition, 
the use of natural experiments overcomes that difficulty. The second difficulty lies in 
the fact that my hypothesis emerges in a field of literature within labour economics 
that has received enormous attention and where a number of hypothesis for the reasons 
of increased inequality have already been advanced and repeatedly tested, such as skill 
biased technical change, de-unionisation, trade liberalisation and workplace reorganisa­
tion. I argue that my hypothesis is distinct from all these, that it is able to answer why 
“within” inequality has increased and that in the empirical analysis I identify the direct 
causal effect of competition on changes in the returns to skill. However, it is possible 
that the alternative explanations of the increase in inequality such as de-unionisation 
and organisational change may be thought of as a response themselves to changes in 
product market competition. Competition may then have an indirect effect through 
these mechanisms, but this is beyond the scope of this chapter.
The analysis in chapter one mainly concerns workers and wages when we take skills 
as given at a point in time. It would be interesting in future research to endogeneise 
skill accumulation and effort (and allow firms to differ ex ante through technological 
innovation and workplace reorganisation) to assess to what extent an exogenous increase 
in product market competition leads firms to reorganise themselves to reduce costs just 
as we outline it occurs with wages. In other words, skills/effort and cost reduction 
abilities axe not necessarily given but may be altered forcefully. A step in this direction 
is developed in Chapter Two where I allow for firms to alter the effort required from 
their workers in response to changes in product market competition.
Chapter Two is a study of the effect of product market competition on the structure 
of managerial compensation2. In a standard principal agent setting, part of the managers 
compensation is in the form of performance related pay. This type of compensation has
2 It is based on joint work with Vicente Cunat from Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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the purpose of generating effort in managers in the presence of asymmetric information. 
This Chapter is an empirical assessment of whether as product market competition in­
creases, the sensitivity of pay to performance is increased. This would actually generate 
an additional source of increased wage inequality in response to increased competition 
since higher performance pay sensitivities imply a higher variance in total compensa­
tion for a given distribution of performance. Prom a theoretical point of view Schmidt 
(1997)' outlines two effects of product market competition. On the one hand increased 
competition reduces profits and provides implicit incentives to managers that fear bank­
ruptcy, implying a lower sensitivity of pay to performance. On the other hand, increased 
competition means that it is easier to capture market share and hence firms are going 
to incentivate managers through higher performance pay sensitivities to induce higher 
effort. As always, the story is that changes in product market competition later what 
firms and employers are willing to pay for workers/how much they want to incentivate 
them. The mechanism in this chapter is that competition changes the returns to effort, 
while it changed the returns to hiring a skilled worker in the previous chapter.
I investigate the relationship between competition and the sensitivity of performance 
related pay (PRP) using a panel of managers in the largest US firms. I estimate wage 
equations that include the PRP component using first concentration ratios as a measure 
of product market competition and measuring performance by both stock market returns 
to shareholders and accounting profits. Controls are included for a number of firm 
characteristics, in particular the risk of the firm (that carries a high bearing on the 
shape of the PRP contract) and rents accruing in the firm (that are closely related to 
competition and allow us to say something on rent extraction by managers). The results 
confirm that PRP sensitivities are higher in more competitive sectors. However the 
same criticisms to using concentration ratios apply. Hence to confirm the robustness 
of the results we exploit two deregulation episodes of the financial sector in the US in 
the 1990s (1994 and 1999) as quasi-natural experiments for an increase in competition.
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Again the difference in differences estimates indicate that after the deregulation episode 
sensitivities were higher in the financial sector (even controlling for sector specific time 
trends and individual fixed effects).
Chapters One and Two explain and provide empirical support for the idea of a direct 
impact of product market competition on various forms of explicit contracting in labour 
markets. They also open the way for further research in the area, in particular with the 
view to relate these basic mechanisms to others already present in the literature and 
that seem closely tied to the one advocated here. They also provide a supplementary 
hypothesis that has not received attention previously in the literature, for the increase 
in wage inequality that has taken place in Anglo Saxon countries over the past decades.
After the analysis of the effect of product market competition on explicit contracting 
and the wage structure I turn on to a different aspect of the interaction between economic 
conditions and labour market outcomes.
Chapter Three investigates the effect of allowing for different types of contractual 
arrangements in an economy on an aspect of labour productivity and workers welfare, 
namely the probability of having an accident at the workplace. In particular I investigate 
whether the use of fixed term contracts in Spain increases accident rates with respect 
to permanent contracts. The unconditional probability of a workplace accident is three 
times higher for fixed term than for permanent contract workers. This may be due to a 
number of reasons that are controlled for in the econometric analysis, such as differences 
in tenure, demographic characteristics or riskiness of the sector. However I argue that the 
types of contract in existence in the economy alters incentives and behaviour beyond this. 
In particular human capital accumulation is likely to be lower for fixed term contracts, 
effort will be higher to increase reemployment probabilities and there may be some type 
of systematic reporting bias. In addition it is possible there is selection of workers on 
ability into the different types of contracts. If this is so, and less able workers are hired 
on fixed term contracts, this will be reflected in differential accident probabilities. To
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control for this I use accidents on the way to work. The maintained assumption is that 
accidents on the way to work are correlated with ability but independent of the type of 
contract at work. Once I control for all these effects I find that the effect of the type of 
contract is reduced but it is still the case that those on fixed term contracts are twice as 
likely to have an accident at the workplace.
Here again I find an important interaction between explicit contracting and labour 
market outcomes that is given by the contractual institutional setting and the incentives 
generated by the different types on contracts.
Finally, Chapter Four takes on a different perspective as it is an analysis of unemploy­
ment duration. I study the differential impact of household income and unemployment 
benefit in determining the probability that an unemployed person exits unemployment. 
Income and benefit, variables are important in determining unemployment behaviour. In 
particular, household income is said to be a disincentive for job search in the Mediter­
ranean countries. However, no paper has addressed this issue directly for the case of 
Spain because Spanish datasets with detailed unemployment information do not contain 
income or benefit variables. To solve this problem I use the Encuesta Continua de Pre- 
supuestos Familiares, a dataset with detailed income data but an imperfect measure of 
unemployment. To overcome the limitations of the data I develop a hazard model to 
estimate the determinants of spell durations when the full duration of the spell is not 
available (one only knows whether a change in unemployment status has occurred within 
a three month interval). I find that household structure is very important, in understand­
ing unemployment behaviour in Spain. Household income does have a negative effect on 
transitions to employment and its effect is larger for women than for men. However the 
impact is much smaller than that of unemployment benefit. I am able to compute the 
elasticity of duration to benefit conditional on being entitled as 0.47. The results thus 
point to the importance of household and economic conditions in determining labour 
market behaviour.
LIST OF TABLES 16
Each of the chapters is to a large extent self contained in the sense that they each ask 
and answer well defined questions. They complement each other to the extent that they 
provide a better picture as to how essential constituents of the economic environment 
that are often ignored in the study of labour markets do have an impact on the behaviour 
of workers and firms.
C hapter 1
D oes product m arket com petition  
increase wage inequality?
1.1 Introduction
In recent times we have witnessed a number of economic and institutional changes leading 
to an increase in competition in goods and services markets. From economic integra­
tion of different geographic blocs, to the fall in costs of transportation and information 
transmission these are all trends leading to more competition in product markets. And 
the liberalisation rethoric is very much present at all levels of the economic and political 
debate. At the same time there has been a very sharp increase in wage inequality and in 
the returns to skills, especially in the UK and the US, that has generated a vast literature 
trying to explain its causes. However there has been little attempt to link these very 
strong trends in the economy. The question addressed in this paper is precisely how do 
changes in product market competition alter the behaviour of labour market actors and 
the wage structure?
It has been argued before that changes in product market competition will have an 
impact on the labour market because of the changes in rents they imply since sectors
17
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with more rents will be able to pay higher wages (Krueger and Summers (1988)1). This 
leads to between sector differences in wages for workers with the same skills. Here I 
will make a more subtle point: the distribution of wages within sectors will change as 
product market competition increases. In particular, the returns to skills will change 
within sectors in response to competition. Product market competition will have an 
impact on the distribution of wages within the sector that goes beyond the between 
sector rent sharing argument. As I will show below, this only relies on two fundamental 
assumptions, namely that there is imperfect competition in the product market and that 
workers are heterogeneous.
A nascent literature links product markets to labour markets (employment, wage 
levels) beyond the inter-industry wage differentials argument (Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2000), Bertrand and Kramarz (2001), Amable and Gatti (1997)) but none outlines the 
type of effect of the level of competition on the variance of wages outlined here2.
The idea in this paper is that as markets become more competitive the sensitivity of 
profits to the type of worker hired increases and firms are willing to bid more in order to 
attract the most able workers. As will be shown in what follows, this appears as a very 
robust economic mechanism: in more competitive industries, the sensitivity of profits to 
costs is higher, Since high skill workers are able to produce at lower costs competition 
-for workers will be higher and good workers will receive higher wages. It follows that 
wage dispersion will be higher in sectors with more product market competition. It is 
possible that at the same time mean wages in the sector are falling (because of the rent 
sharing argument), but within sector dispersion will increase.
1 Evidence of this rent-sharing mechanism is provided in Card (1996) for airline industry deregulation 
in the US, Revenga (1992) for international competition from import prices, Borjas and Ramey (1995) for 
international competition in durable goods markets, Abowd and Lemieux (1993) instrument quasi-rents 
with imports prices in Canadian data ane Van Reenen (1996) uses innovations as an instrument.
2 The OECD (2002) Employment Outlook actually note the lack of evidence on this subject and 
document a negative cross country relationship between the index of product market liberalization and 
wage inequality, but this can only be considered as exploratory evidence of the relationship. Card (1986) 
and (1996) shows some evidence of increased wage dispersion after airline deregulation. Fortin and 
Lemieux (1997) asses the impact of a number of institutional changes in the US on the wage distribution. 
Deregulation of major industries explains some of the effect.
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This feature of product market competition is common to most parametrisations of 
competition as will be shown and as has been found in recent economic research (Boone 
(2002)). This paper draws the implications for wage dispersion in the labour market of 
changes in product market competition.
The paper then explores empirically how product market competition relates to the 
wage structure in the light of the mechanism outlined above using UK data for males 
in the manufacturing industry. Note that the explanation in this paper is also an ex­
planation for within industry and skill wage inequality. What is rewarded are the skills 
of workers and these may be observed by the worker and the employer but not by the 
econometrician. Under my hypothesis there will be higher returns to both observed and 
unobserved skills within industries.
The hypothesis that product market competition leads to changes in wage disper­
sion, is first tested using direct measures of product market competition (concentration 
ratios) in a fully saturated model with individual fixed effects. However, these empirical 
measures can be criticised from a conceptual point of view on the grounds that they 
may not be perfect measures of competition and from an econometric point of view be­
cause they may be correlated with an omitted variable and hence the estimates do not 
capture the causal effect of competition on changes in the returns to skills. Therefore 
I turn to two additional identification strategies that are based on two quasi-natural 
experiments. One is the implementation of the European Single Market programme in 
1992, the second is the strong appreciation of the British pound in 1996. These are .used 
as exogenous sources of competition that yield instrumental variables estimates of the 
effect of competition on wage dispersion.
This paper should be thought of taking into account existing explanations that have 
been put forward for an increase in wage dispersion, in particular skill-biased technical 
change, organisational change (Caroli and Van Reenen (2001), Black et al. (2003)) and 
changes in unionisation (Machin (1997)). Pushing the argument in this paper to the
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extreme would lead us to argue that those features are to a large extent responses to 
competitive pressures and hence they may be capturing some of (and are endogenous 
to) the effect outlined in this paper.
A parallel effect of product market competition that is not dealt with here (but left to 
Chapter Two) is its impact on the use of performance related pay (PRP). Schmidt (1999) 
and Raith (forthcoming) show under which circumstances increased product market 
competition will lead to a heavier reliance on PRP as a mode of payment to increase 
effort exerted3 and a heavier weight on the use of bonuses in managerial compensation 
packages. Increased PRP will lead to increased dispersion in wages and possibly in 
returns to skills (if skilled workers are those that perform systematically better).
The effects of changes in competition on labour markets are likely to be numerous 
and sizeable4. Here I will only focus, on its impact on the variance of wages, leaving for 
future research other implications of such a link.
Next section lays out the basic theoretical mechanism for a link, section three de­
scribes the econometric specification and the identification strategies used in the empir­
ical analysis and section four discusses the results. Section five concludes.
1.2 The link between product market com petition and wages
The purpose of this section is to outline a stylised model that illustrates in a simple 
way why changes in product market competition may affect wage setting behaviour and 
the wage distribution. The argument is that as product market competition increases, 
and even in the presence of perfect labour markets, firms will be willing to pay more to 
attract good workers and hence wage dispersion will increase. The crucial ingredient for
3Nickell (1996) and Griffith (2001) find empirical evidence of increased product market competition 
leading to increased effort exertion/ efficiency.
4 Other consequences of competition that are beyond the domain of this paper are its impact on 
employment (Bertrand and Kramarz (2001)), on market value and innovation (Blundell et al. (1999), 
Aghion et al. (2002).
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this to be true is that profits5 are more sensitive to the ability of the worker hired, the 
higher is product market competition. Firms will be wilhng to bid more for their workers 
and increase the fraction of profits they share with them. This is a very robust economic 
mechanism, that follows exclusively from the two assumptions made throughout this 
paper: imperfect competition in product markets and heterogeneity of workers. The 
result is very general and does not depend on the particularities of functional forms 
assumed. I now turn to a very simple illustration that captures the thrust of the theory 
underlying the paper, then I develop a more general case with more economic structure 
(without assuming any particular competition model) and finally I check its validity for 
a number of standard product market competition models.
1 .2 .1  S im ple illu stra tion
To illustrate the fact that profits are more sensitive to costs the higher the degree of 
product market competition, consider the following simple calculation. Let profits of 
firm i be
=  ( P i  -  C i ) Y i
where in standard notation pi is the price set by firm i, Y{ is the firm’s output given 
some exogenous production function and Cj are (exogenous) unit production costs that 
are assumed to be decreasing in the ability of the worker hired. Using the envelope 
theorem one can show that
d T T i/d c i  =  —Y i  
and the elasticity of profits with respect to c* is
e = (ci/'Ki){d'Ki/dci) =  -Ci/ipi -  Ci)
5 In the model below the condition will be on what I will call gross profits (gross of bargained wages
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Note that (p—c)/c is the markup (Lerner index) that in turn reflects the level of competi­
tion. Hence the sensitivity of profits to costs is higher the higher the competition level. If 
high skill workers are those who are able to produce a lower costs, then the sensitivity of 
profits to skill increases in competition. This is a necessary basic economic mechanism to 
support the fink between competition and wage dispersion. In this situation high ability 
workers will extract more surplus in form of wages when product market competition 
increases.
1 .2 .2  Form al se ttin g
In what follows I develop a formal setting to underpin that link. This remains a very 
simple and stylised model with few assumptions that is kept at a high level of generality 
so that one can see the basic conditions that generate a fink between product market 
competition and wage dispersion. I then turn to standard Industrial Organisation models 
of product market competition (Cournot and Dixit Stiglitz monopolistic competition) 
and confirm that the basic link is present in them.
Consider N  firms selling goods in a non-competitive product market. Each firm hires 
one worker such that the number of workers employed in the monopolistic sector is given 
by the number of firms in that sector, AT6 . Those that are not hired in the sector will 
be self employed and get some exogenous reservation wage b.
Workers axe of different skill levels. This skill is innate or acquired but given at some 
point in time when the hiring decision emerges. A high skill level means that the worker 
is able to produce at lower costs, that he is more productive. A way of reflecting this is 
that the worker’s job is to set up a machine. A worker of ability di (where di is an inverse 
index of the skill level) sets the machine so that when the machine produces Y{ units 
of output, the unit costs are affected by di. A high d means that the worker produces 
at high costs and hence is of low skill, d is distributed between d\ (for the highest skill
6iV is takne as exogenous for the moment. I will later show what happens when we endogeneise it.
The qualitative results are identical.
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worker that produces at lowest costs) and cfo, and no assumption is made on whether 
there are more or fewer workers than firms in the monopolistic sector (the maximum 
number of firms in the monopolistic sector is given by the condition that no firm makes 
negative profits). Firms have a gross profit function ir(di,9)7, where 9 summarises the 
level of product market competition. 7r is such that ^  < 0 (not necessarily | |  < 0 )
Note that product markets are not competitive but labour markets are perfectly 
competitive in the sense that there are no restrictions on hiring, firing or mobility costs.
The stages of the game are as follows. In the first stage N  identical firms compete 
for workers of different abilities. They post a wage associated to each skill level. Both 
firms and workers know perfectly the ability level of all workers. When they meet, firms 
will offer workers a given wage level and each worker can accept or reject those offers8.
Once workers are allocated to firms production occurs and in the second stage firms 
compete in the product market where they sell their products and wages axe paid. The 
level of competition in the product market is also known throughout.
The game is solved backwards. In the second stage firms chose prices and/or quant­
ities (depending on the type of competition game played) that maximise gross profits 
7r(di‘ 9) given the level of competition 9. This is a function of the ability of the worker 
hired.
In the first stage firms take into account this gross profit function and post wages to 
compete for workers of different abilities. They bid for them through the wage offers. 
Firms maximise net profits n(d^ 9)g (net of wages) subject to the participation constraint 
of workers. This constraint says worker di will only accept a wage offer Wi(d{) if it is 
above the reservation wage b and the wage that any other firm may offer them Wj ( d i ) .
77r(di,9) is ’’profit” prior to paying the worker’s wages.
8 We could extend the model to allow for workers to be compensated per unit produced and the effort 
exerted. This is straightforward when we assume constant disutility of effort where the disutility of effort 
is precisely di.
9 Profits appear as a function of ability di and the competition level 9. Implicitly they are also a 
function of quantity produced q(di,9)  which is already optimised as q*(di,9) when we write the profit 
function: 7r(dt; 9) =  n(di,  q*(di, 9); 9)
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max7r( d f , 6 )  =  i t ( d i \ 9 )  -  Wi(di) (1.1)
Wi
s . t . W i ( d i )  ^  max{i£;j(cy, 6} for all j  E [1,N]
where b is the exogenous reservation wage and Wj is the wage offered by the other 
firms.
For a given N, in equilibrium the N th firm that hires the N th ability worker (if we 
ranked workers by ability level, the one at the N th position) and pay him a wage equal to 
the reservation wage. This yields profits for the N th firm given by: 7r(d#, 9) — i^(d jv )—&•
The optimal strategy for firm i  is to offer W i ( d i )  to worker i  such that in equilibrium
it could not make higher profits by paying Wi  and hiring a worker of different ability d j ,
nor by paying that i t h worker a different wage.
7r(di) — Wi(di) > n(dj) — u>i(dj), for all i , j  (1.2)
7r(di) — Wi(di) > 7r(d{) — Wj(di), for all i , j  (1.3)
Since firms are identical Wi(d{) = Wj(di) = w(di), the above conditions collapse to:
P(di) — w(di) > P(dj) — w(dj), for all i , j  (1.4)
In equilibrium we will have that:
7f(di, 9) — w(di19) =  n(dj, 9) — w(dj , 9) =  7fjv(djv5 9) — b (1.5)
w(di,9) =T (d i ,9 ) -TrN (dN,9)+  b (1.6)
This is an equilibrium because neither firms nor workers will have an incentive to
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deviate. The Ith firm paying wage w{dk) would like to pay a lower wage w' to worker i 
and make higher profits. But then the worker could threaten to go to another firm that 
would be willing to pay w' 4- £ < w(di) and make higher profits. And this goes on until 
wages are again equal to w{di). In equilibrium all firms are making equal profits and 
axe indifferent as to which worker they hire. Now let’s see if workers have an incentive 
to deviate. No firm will accept to raise wages because they can threaten workers with 
hiring the N th +1 worker and get almost the same profit. The alternative for the worker 
is then earning b that is lower. The only worker that is indifferent between working in 
the monopolistic sector or self employment is the N th worker that gets a wage equal to 
the outside option b. So wages are distributed between b for the lowest ability worker 
employed in the monopolistic sector and w{d\, 0) for the highest ability worker. The 
exact form of the wage schedule will depend on the form of 7r(dj; 0).
One can define two relevant schedules that are related as in equation (??). The gross 
profit schedule 7r(di, 0) and the optimal wage schedule w(di,Q)- These are pictured in 
figure (1.1) for an exogenous N. Note that *w ^ T h i s  was assumed to be 
negative, i.e. revenue is decreasing in costs or increasing in the ability of the worker 
hired. I will show below that different models of product market competition deliver the 
negative slope. So the wage schedule is decreasing in d and has the same slope as the 
revenue schedule but it is shifted down by 7?jv(djv, 0) +  &. It has a lower bound given by
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Figure 1.1: Equilibrium revenue and wage schedules
N
So far I have not assumed any functional form for product market competition. All 
the assumptions required are that gross profits are increasing in the ability of the worker 
hired and that each firm hires: one worker and the bidding process is as described above. 
I also took N  as given. If instead we allowed free entry, firms would enter until the last 
firm makes zero profits such that:
(1.7)
All other firms will also be making zero profits and wages axe such that w(di,9) = 
7f (d»,0).
The next step is to see what is the sufficient condition in this general setting for an 
increase in competition triggering an increase in wage dispersion. This is:
d2w(di, 9) d27r(di, 9)
< 0 (1.8)ddid9 ddid9
Which is a single crossing condition.
Figure 1.2 illustrates what happens when product market competition increases and
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the condition above is satisfied. The number of firms N  is exogenously given. As 0 
changes, the gross profit function becomes steeper. The wage schedule also shifts so 
that the vertical distance between the two curves is constant, and the wage schedule is 
anchored at b for the worker hired (assuming no free entry). The wage function 
becomes steeper and wage inequality increases. In the picture we hold N  constant. If 
we assumed free entry and the number of firms increased until all of them where making 
zero profits, then the 7f function and the wage schedule would overlap and the same 
comparative statics would result.
Figure 1.2: Comparative statics of a change in product market competition
b
N
So far we have stated that if the type of competition generates a profit function with 
the properties outlined above, an increase in competition will trigger wage dispersion 
(nothing has been said though on whether wages will increase or fall for the different 
types, this was only a relative statement (they may actually increase for the most highly 
skilled workers). The question now is under which forms of competition in the labour 
market do we obtain the result that the profit function is more sensitive to the ability of 
the worker hired the more competitive is the sector. Since it can be argued that product
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market competition can take different forms in different markets we aim to check whether 
the classical forms of competition traditionally modelled satisfy the above property and 
what it implies for relative wages.
The general problem encountered when analysing the different models is that in 
my setting even though firms are homogeneous ex ante, once they have hired a worker 
they are heterogeneous (because they hire different types, they have different costs in 
production). The models no longer have symmetric firms. It is therefore convenient 
to work with relative profits and costs. To prove that the single crossing property is 
satisfied under most forms of product market competition it will prove more convenient 
to work with the following normalised version of equation (1 .8 ):
m i d i / d j )  y ’
Where dj can be any arbitrary chosen worker. In particular the worker with highest 
skill d\. This is just a normalisation that exploits the fact that d\ will always be the 
first to be employed and then, for given 9, 7r(di; 9)/d\ can be treated as a constant. This 
normalisation will be useful when a functional form is attached to the revenue function.
In what follows I investigate two standard models of product market competition (Dixit- 
Stiglitz and Cournot) and show they satisfy the properties required for an increase in 
product market competition leading to increased wage dispersion.
C om petition a  la Dixit-Stiglitz (1977)
In the previous section I showed that firms will decide how much to offer different workers 
according to their expectations of what will occur in the product market stage but no 
functional form was attached to the final revenue function. Let’s assume now an explicit 
form of product market competition, namely horizontal product differentiation in the 
market, of the Dixit-Stiglitz type. Denote by Y{ the quantity that firms produce in the 
final stage and that they will sell at a price pi. To produce they use the worker employed
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in the first stage that can produce at costs di (that indicates the level of (dis)ability). 
Monopolistic competition10 (Dixit Stiglitz 1977) implies that
Yi = (—Y e * Y  (1.10)
P
where Y  and p are index functions and 6 > 1 (—6 is the elasticity of substitution 
between products)
Firms maximise gross profits (gross of wages) that are a function of di 
Max 7v(di) =  (pi — di)*Yi 
7r(di) = Ype{p}-e -  dipre)
First order condition yields
Hence
Odi
K - J Z i  (1 ' n )
5f(di) =  Y(pie)e{dil(9 -  I ))1' 6 (1.12)
Which is decreasing in di. The next step is to show how revenues change with 0. The 
problem is that as 6 changes the index functions Y  and p also change and it is not simple 
to solve analytically for the comparative statics. Thus I focus on how the ratio of profits 
between firms hiring high and low skilled workers changes as competition; changes. Take 
two workers i and j  such that di > dj (take j  to be the most able worker, for the 
purposes of the normalisation).
m )  = Y i p / e f i d j / i e  -  i ))1-* =  4  
5r(dj) Y{pl9)»(djl(9-  l))i-«  V
Now we can easily prove the condition on the slope of the wage function for changes 
in 9 :
10Where consumers have CES demand functions and there are N  differentiated goods in the economy.
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( I ) ( f ) -  < 0  (1.14)
Which proves condition (1.9).
The result above applies for any given number of firms (one may not want to assume 
free entry).
With free entry we would have that
Tf(dj) _  w(dj)
Tt(dj) w{dj)
Hence one can see that relative log wages are
lnu/(di), — In ,w(dj) = (1  — 0 )[lndj — lndj] (1-15)
which is clearly increasing in 6 since dj < d{, and this for any i and j.
Com petition a la Cournot
Now imagine that firms compete a la Cournot in a market with N  firms. Firms take 
product price as given and price is a function of total production in the sector P(%2jLi lj)- 
Firms are profit maximisers, but since in the two stage framework wages are paid in the 
first stage and the two stages are separable, we can solve the maximisation:
N
MaxTi(di) = { P ( ^ Y j ) . - d i)*Yi  (1.16)
n  i=i
The first order condition yields:
Yi = (1 -  (li17)
j =1
Where 77 is the elasticity of demand. Using the above one can rewrite revenues as:
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5 f ( 4 )  =  -  d i)  * ( 1  -  ( L 1 8 )
j=1 i=l
Take again two workers i and j  such that ck > dj (j is the first and most able worker 
employed).
5f(4) =  (■P - d i )2 (1 9)
*(<*#) ( ^ - di ) 2 '
( P /d t f  + j c k / d t f - p P d i / d S )
{ p - d t f / d *
Note this is positive and increasing in the difference in ability between the two work­
ers.
(ir(di) . . i(d%\ 2(dj/dj) (2P/ d j )  . .
( P / ^  +  l - ( 2 P M )  (1-20)
2dj [d{ — P] 
( P -  dj)2
Which is negative since ds < P , for any worker s employed in the sector, which is 
the condition for firms making non-negative profits.
An increase in competition in this market is equivalent to an increase imiV. One can 
prove that:
d(*(.dj)/ir(di)) = d(a(dj)/n(dj)) dP 
dNd(dj/di) dPd(dj/di) dN K ' 1
The first term of the equation is positive and the second is negative (both proofs
may be found in the appendix). So as iV increases in the Cournot setting (price falls) 
the sensitivity of gross profits to ability will increase which proves condition (1.9).
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Boone (2002) definition of com petition
Boone (2002) is an interesting reference in relation to this analysis. In his paper he looks 
at different parametrisations (models) of product market competition and investigates 
what is common to all of them. It has been noted before (especially in relation to 
the empirical analysis of competition) that the competition measures traditionally used 
are non monotone in competition, and that their validity as measures of competition 
depends highly on the competitive framework assumed, in particular when firms are not 
symmetric. For example, it is different whether the number of competitors increases 
because entry costs fall (an increase in competition) or if it is because firms interact less 
aggressively (a fall in competition).
Boone finds that competition is higher if the mapping of relative marginal costs 
to relative profits is steeper. This is common to a number of parametrisations and 
becomes his ’’definition” of competition (it is a sufficient condition to say competition 
has increased).
This is very close to the analysis in this paper. When competition increases in 
my setting what is required for an increase in competition to deliver an increase in 
wage dispersion is precisely that relative gross profits from hiring two different workers 
(before wage bargaining) are higher the higher the degree of competition. Following 
Boone’s analysis, this is exactly the characteristic of competition common to a number 
of competition models. If we add to this feature bargaining over the surplus in the way 
I have outlined we obtain the main prediction in this paper: that higher product market 
competition increases wage dispersion.
Rosen (1981): Superstars?
Rosen (1981) develops a theory of why small differences is skill can lead to large difference 
in wages as is seen with the development of the idea of superstars11. The argument is
11 This is also closely related to the idea of winner-take-all markets.
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that the production of some workers has the characteristics of a public good. This 
type of technology will imply that the Superstar gets a large part of the market and his 
earnings will increase relative to the person that is just below him in ability terms. Wage 
dispersion will be larger.
For this phenomenon to arise what is needed is that the market to which the indi­
vidual has access is larger through a fall in transportation/communication costs.
Rosen’s theory to explain increases in wage dispersion can be seen as a particular 
case of the more general case argued for in this paper. Rosen relies on a particular 
production technology (with public good features) and needs the increase in the market 
size (through fall in transport costs etc.). In my framework wage inequality increases 
without the need of the public good technology. What the public good technology (in 
my view, convincingly) delivers is the extreme polarisation of earnings. The fall in 
transportation costs can be assimilated to a fall in set up costs, and hence an increase 
in competition.
Rosen’s paper is very compelling in his account of the extreme polarisation of earnings 
in the ’’superstar” phenomenon. I argue though that it is a particular case of the setting 
described here that sheds light more precisely on a particular aspect of labour markets.
I would like to stress that the link from product market competition to relative 
wages has been outlined in very general terms and relies only on the fact that as product 
market competition increases the sensitivity of profits to the ability of the worker hired 
increases. In this situation, that seems to be a very general and robust economic result 
independent of particular parametrisations of the production functions or of the type 
of product market competition, we obtain that changes in product market competition 
increase wage dispersion.
I now turn to the empirical analysis of this economic relationship to assess its sig­
nificance and quantitative importance. The next section describes the econometric spe­
cification and identification strategy adopted.
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1.3 Specification and identification strategy
The identification of the main effect in this paper exploits the effect of changes in product 
market competition on the relative returns to skill over time based on individual wage 
equations with UK data. Most of the analysis concerns returns to observed skilled level 
as proxied by occupational distribution and tenure. However I will also say something 
on the relationship between unobserved ability, competition and wage dispersion. The 
model in the previous section predicts that the difference in wages between high and low 
skill workers will be higher in more competitive sectors. Recall that this is independent 
of whether mean wages are higher or lower in more competitive sectors as it is just 
a statement about relative wages. So the parameter of interest is the difference in the 
returns to skill between the different skill groups as product market competition changes.
As has been documented widely elsewhere inequality has been increasing markedly 
in the UK over the past 20 to 30 years (Gosling et al. (2000)). Figure 1.3 shows the 
evolution of the ratio of mean log wages for the highest skill group to the lowest skill 
group in my data (males in the manufacturing sector), with my skill group definitions. 
Inequality between skill groups has increased by 0.16 log points.
Figure 1.4 draws the evolution of top5 concentration ratios measures by output and 
employment for the period 1982-1999 in the manufacturing sector in the UK. Note that 
employment concentration has fallen more than output concentration. I will use both 
measures in the analysis. Figures 1.8 and 1.9 show the evolution of the top 5 employment 
concentration ratio for two different manufacturing sectors: prepared animal feeds and 
printing. Note that for some sectors the measures of concentration have increased while 
for other sectors they fell. This is good for the identification since it provides useful 
variation in different directions to avoid spurious relationships.
Figures 1.5 to 1.7 bring theses two trends together and show the cross sectional and 
time series relationship between competition and inequality. Figure 1.5 plots the disper­
sion of log wages by sector between 82 and 99 against average concentration by sector
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for those years. We find that more concentrated sectors have lower dispersion than more 
competitive sectors. Figure 1.7 plots dispersion by year against average concentration 
by year, which again yields a negative relationship, i.e. over time concentration fell and 
inequality increased. So there is some preliminary evidence at the aggregate level of the 
existence of a cross sectional and time series relationship between wage dispersion and 
product market competition. The purpose of the remainder of the paper is to establish 
whether there exists a causal fink between the two.
1.3 .1  B asic  m od el
Let’s suppose that the equation determining the log wage of individual i working in 
sector j  with skill level k at time t can be written as:
' "toiwijkt) = a +QkCjt +fiCjt + + dt + djg + dj + Vijkt (1’22)
Vijkt = dkt d-kj “I- TJi d* £ijkt (1.23)
Where Cjt is competition in sector j  at time £, Xijkt is a vector if individual characterist­
ics, Tji is an unobserved permanent individual component, time, sector and skill dummies 
are given by df, dj and d*,. dkt represents fully interacted skill and time dummies and dkj 
are fully interacted skill and sector dummies. Sijkt is a white noise.
The estimate of Ok will reflect how returns to different skill levels (k) vary with 
product market concentration (one skill level*competition interaction is always dropped 
to avoid collinearity with Cjt). We are interested in the differential returns to skill 
in different competitive environments. In fact it is easier to see this as an interest in 
(Oki — 0k2) where kl and k2 are two different skill levels.
The basic model estimated in equation (1.22) controls for heterogeneity at sector 
level and for between sector differences in wages. It identifies Ok out of the within sector
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variation in competition over time and will be unbiased provided sector specific trends 
in returns to skills are uncorrelated with competition.
However, the estimate of our parameter of interest will be biased if Cov(Cjt, ^ijkt) 7  ^ ’
0. Equation 1.23 identifies the potential sources of bias.
The first major source of bias is individual unobserved heterogeneity. For this purpose 
I exploit the longitudinal character of my data and estimate an individual fixed effects 
model. This takes care of omitted variable bias that would result from Cov(Cjt,r}i) 7  ^0 ,
1.e. from the individual permanent unobserved component being correlated with com­
petition levels. This could occur if more skilled workers selected themselves into sectors 
with more (less) competition implying that Cov(Cjt,T]i) > 0 (< 0 ). Note that my data, 
the NES, is ideal for this exercise because it is a longer panel than most usually available 
providing considerable ’’within” variation to identify the main effects out of individual 
behaviour.
The second source Of bias would arise from a correlation between Cjt and dkj, that 
is between sector specific returns to skill and competition. I include skill*sector specific 
dummies in the regression to capture this. If we omitted this set of interactions, the 
results would be biased only if the wage differential between two skill groups varies by 
sector and this variation is correlated with competition. This could arise through a 
-trade union effect if trade unions are stronger in sectors with less competition implying 
that wages are less compressed in those sectors. Note that a priori we would expect that 
unions are stronger in sectors with more competition (where employer’s bargaining power 
is lower) and hence the bias would in any case underestimate the effect of competition.
I also introduce fully interacted skill*year dummies that account for the term dku 
and capture any trend or time variation in returns to the different skills that might be 
correlated with competition. The most immediate example of this would be skill biased 
technical change. There is a large literature on this issue and skill biased technical 
change is thought to be one of the main culprits of the increase in wage inequality in
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the UK and the US12. If returns to skill are increasing over time (due to skill biased 
technical change or any other reason) and product market competition is increasing, we 
may capture a spurious relationship in our coefficient of interest. This is taken account 
of in the skill*year dummies interaction.
It is important to note that accounting for the terms in the error term equation in a 
fully unrestricted way leads to a fully saturated model of wages. The drawback is a loss 
in efficiency from the large number of dummy variables included in the regression and 
that the "within" variation will be lower.
Furthermore, if one wants to relate this research to previous existing literature on 
the determinants of wage inequality it is possible that some of the existing papers that 
measure returns to skills through skill biased technical change, de-unionisation, trade 
liberalisation or reorganisation are actually capturing to some extent the effect of changes 
in product market competition.
Although the variation exploited to assess the effect of product market competition 
on wage dispersion is at the level of sector and time, I exploit the individual panel for 
two main reasons. One is that in this way I can control for compositional changes in the 
sectors over time. If the tenure, skill or age structure of a particular sector varies over 
time this will be accounted for by using individual records. Second, some individuals 
will be changing jobs and sectors and this constitutes highly informative yariation since 
the fact that we have movers allows us to compare the different returns to skills of same 
individual in sectors with different levels of competition. The standard errors will be 
adjusted to account for the fact that the correlation between the measures of competition 
of two different individuals in the same sector is non-zero (Moulton (1986)).
However, even in the fully saturated specification there are a number of objections to 
the results that one could come up with. The first and simplest is whether one believes 
the measure of product market competition used. There are numerous discussions in the
12Although see Card and DiNardo (2002).
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Industrial Organisation literature on the nature of product market competition, how it 
should be measured and what different commonly used measures capture. In the main 
analysis I use the top5 concentration ratio measured by output and employment. This is 
a standard and commonly used measure of competition, however a number of criticisms 
can be raised against this measure. Since it may only be an imperfect measure of the 
true level of competition the next step in the analysis is to find some uncontroversial 
exogenous measures of changes in competition. These will be the natural experiments 
developed in what follows that will then also serve as instrumental variables for the 
concentration measures. Both concentration and the natural experiments can be thought 
of as imperfect measures of some true underlying degree of product market competition.
Since the experiments reflect exogenous changes in competition they can be used as 
instruments for concentration to obtain the true effect of competition on wage dispersion.
The second objection is that the concentration measure used, in spite of having a 
fully saturated model may still be correlated with some variable Wjt that also determines 
the level of returns to skills. The natural candidate would be trade union presence 
and since this variable is omitted the estimates may be biased (note though that the 
saturated model will capture between industry differences in unionisation). In these 
circumstances, a natural way out is again provided by the use of natural experiments 
since these are exogenous changes in product market competition that do not affect 
directly union presence.
Finally, the use of natural experiments to deal with the two previous objections will 
also prove useful insofar as it allows us to instrument directly the measure of concen­
tration. Given concentration measures are measures of competition with error and that 
differencing the data (through the fixed effects estimation) exacerbates the attenuation 
effect in the presence of measurement error, it is useful to have an instrument to deal 
with this.
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1 .3 .2  A  first natural exp erim en t: th e  E uropean  Single M arket P ro­
gram m e (S M P )
The European Single Market Programme was designed to allow for the free movement of 
goods, services, capital and labour in the European Union. The Commission devised in 
1985 in a White Paper a number of measures (300) aimed at achieving this. The actual 
implementation of the measures was staged between 1988 and 1992.
The White paper designed measures to eliminate barriers to the development of a 
unique internal market arising from: physical controls at the frontiers, technical rules, 
regulations and standards, public procurement policies, differences in fiscal structures 
and restraints on the movement of labour and capital (Burridge and Mayes (1992)). The 
channels through which the SMP was expected to operate were the following: reducing 
transaction costs, lowering barriers which enabled firms to segment markets, removing 
the means through which national governments can discriminate in favour of its firms, 
reducing costs of capital and labour (increasing mobility), assisting the process of struc­
tural change by investing in infrastructure, technology and skills (Burridge and Mayes 
(1992)).
To exploit the exogenous variation in competition generated by the introduction of 
the SMP I use the fact that different industries had different levels of non-tariff barriers 
in place before the SMP implementation. I use the same classification as Griffith (2001).
This is derived from Mayes and Hart (1994). They divide industries depending on wether 
they had low, medium or high non-tariff barriers prior to the SMP. It was expected that 
the introduction of the SMP would affect more those with medium of high barriers that 
would see these considerably reduced. The classification is at 3 digit SIC and as Griffith 
(2001) I will consider those with medium or high barriers previous to the development 
of the single market as the sectors for which competition increased more sharply. Given 
the measures were designed to be implemented between 1988 and 1992 I will consider 
two time periods -before and after 1992- and two groups of sectors -those most and least
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affected by the SMP.
Identification comes from the differential effect that the SMP had on affected and 
non affected industries depending on their level of non-tariff barriers. Since our interest 
is in the different returns to skill for different sectors 6k * Cjt, it does not require that 
the affected and non affected sectors have common time trends in wages, nor that they 
have common returns to skill ex ante. It only requires that the skill trends are constant 
within sectors (sector trends -common to all skills within a sector- can differ), in other 
words that any trend in the difference ($ki — ^ 2 ) is constant within sectors (it may differ 
across sectors).
Below, I test the validity of the SMP as an indicator of product market competition 
by looking at whether it affected differently what we call high and low sensitivity sectors 
before and after 1992.
I present the reduced forms for the experiment and then instrument the concentration 
variable in a two stage least squares regression.
The specification for the reduced form is:
In Wijkt =  ol 4 - 7 Xijkt +  dk(SMPaffectedjt) +  rS M P a f fectedjt + dt + dj + r)i + £ijkt
where X^kt is a set of individual characteristics including age, age squared, tenure, 
tenure squared, the skill levels, SMPaffectedjt is a dummy that takes value one for 
affected sectors after 1992, and the rest are defined as in section 4.
The IV specification is done in two stages and using the predicted instead of the ac­
tual value of competition in equation 1 .2 2  (standard errors are appropriately corrected).
Results for both stages are shown.
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1 .3 .3  A  second n atu ra l experim en t: trade op en n ess  and exchange rates.
The second source of exogenous variation in competition I exploit is based on the UK 
being an open economy, small enough not to be able to influence international markets 
and the fact that fluctuations in the exchange rate are largely exogenous to the wage 
setting conditions within the country. Hence, sharp and sudden changes in the pound 
Sterling can be considered as a quasi-natural experiment.
In 1996 there was a sharp appreciation of the pound sterling. Since the UK is a small 
open country this increase in the exchange rate can be used as an exogenous shock that 
will affect differently different sectors~depending on their trade opennessr-T use import"' 
penetration as my measure of openness (imports divided by the sum of imports and total 
sector product). Since openness itself may be endogenous to changes in the exchange 
rate, the measure of openness is defined as the average openness in the years before 1996 
(1993. to 1995) which is kept constant for the whole sample. The identification assumes 
that the appreciation was strictly exogenous and could not be forecasted by firms in the 
UK.
The idea is that open sectors before 1996 will face increased competition after the 
appreciation of the pound and hence the wage differential of high to low skill workers 
should increase more in those sectors after 1996 than in the least open and non-traded 
sectors. Note that a priori there are no reasons to think that a sector that exports more is 
more or less competitive than others since this may depend on the production structure 
and other factors. However, a change in the exchange rate will affect more deeply those 
sectors with higher export openness within traded sectors but also traded sectors more 
than non traded sectors.
The identification assumption here is similar to the one in the SMP case, namely 
that there are no sector specific trends in returns to skill. Different sectors may have 
different trends in wages and different returns to skills, what is crucial is that there are 
no sector specific trends in returns to skill. A test of the experiment is also provided and
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both the reduced form and two stage least squares regressions are shown.
The reduced form is specified as:
In Wijkt = (pos£96t *irapenetrj)+r(pos£96t *2m p e n e t r j ) + d t + d j +7^ +£ijkt
where Xijkt is a set of individual characteristics including age, age squared, tenure, 
tenure squared, the skill levels, post96t is a dummy variable that takes value one in the 
second period (post 96), impenetrj is import penetration (note it is computed as the 
mean import penetration measure over the years 1993 to 1995 (a period in which the 
exchange rate was stable) since openness may change endogenously with the exchange 
rate increase and therefore it only varies by jr), and the rest are defined as in section 4.
And the IV regressions axe also done in two stages as for the SMP experiment.
1 .3 .4  R etu rn s to  un observed  ab ility
In the basic specification I look estimates of the returns to observed skill interacted 
with competition. However it is also interesting to find out if there are also returns 
to unobserved ability that are higher in more competitive sectors. It is likely that the 
measure of observed skill used does not capture all the dimensions of individual ability, 
and this will be captured by the error term. An indirect way to assess this is to see wether 
the variance of the residual term of the wage equations is higher in more competitive 
sectors, i. e. if there is some type of heteroskedasticity along the competition dimension.
By regressing the variance of the residuals on the measure of competition one can 
assess if that variance is higher in more competitive sectors after removing the effect of 
all observables and the individual fixed effects. This will be evidence in favour of the 
main mechanism outlined here.
It also provides an explanation of within skill and sector changes in wage inequality.
The existing literature points out that a large fraction of the increase in overall inequality
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cannot be explained by sector and skill differences. Product market competition may be 
a potential explanatory variable for that aspect of wage inequality.
One can also argue that the best measure of the ability of a worker is the wage 
he receives (Card (1996)). We can then potentially rank workers according to their 
predicted wages. Taking different percentiles as the skill groups, quantile regressions at 
different quantiles yield a measure of the degree of heteroskedasticity as a function of 
the measure of competition. I run the following quantile regressions for a number of 
quantiles q :
In(wijkt) =  5qCjt “I- +  dfj +  dq +  Vijkt
Where the variables are defined as before. If the dispersion of wages is increasing in 
competition conditional on all the covariates included we should obtain that 5q > 6q' . 
for q > q'13. This would indicate that high skilled workers (as measured by wages) are 
relatively more highly rewarded in competitive sectors.
1.4 E stim ates o f the im pact o f com petition on th e wage 
structure
1.4 .1  T h e  D a ta
To assess the link between product market competition and wage setting I use the New 
Earnings Survey (NES) and a number of different sources for the competition measures 
and the natural experiments.
The NES is a very large sample survey of 1% of all individuals employed in the 
U.K. All those individuals whose national insurance number ends in two given digits are 
included in the sample. It has a number of characteristics that make it ideal for this
13In the case Cjt measures concetration as in the data this would be | <J9| >  \5q' \ for q >  q .
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study. Since NI numbers are issued randomly to individuals and are retained for life 
we have very long panel with complete employment histories. It contains very detailed 
data on earnings and hours worked. These data are provided directly by employers who 
are bound by law to give that information. The records correspond to a specific week in 
April for each year and are available from 1975 to 1999. The data contain information on 
weekly and hourly wages, on overtime hours worked and also on age, occupation, region, 
industry and wether or not the individual was in the same job on the previous year.
I restrict the sample to males working full time and whose pay has not been affected 
by absence in the reference week.
The advantage of using the NES over other datasets for this purpose is that it is a very 
long panel that follows individuals throughout their working lives so it provides enough 
individual variation for longitudinal analysis. It contains very accurate hourly measures 
of wages such that one can isolate the non-cyclical component of wages. Furthermore it 
is a very large sample that contains observations from all economic sectors which allows 
us to control for a large number of variables and effects.
To estimate the role played by competition in the wage equations I originally obtained 
a number of measures of competition from the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS) 
based on the ARD dataset14. This dataset has the advantage that it goes back to 1982 
but only for the manufacturing sector (sic92 from 151 to 372). The results presented 
here axe done for the top 5 employment and output concentration ratios.
To assess the effect of the single market programme (as an exogenous variation in 
competition) I define two groups of industries in the NES following the classification in 
Griffith (2001). Industries are defined by their SIC80 3-digit code.
Finally, trade data are used in the last part of the empirical section. These were 
obtained from the ’’Imports and exports data: MQ10 dataset”, elaborated by the ONS15
14The ARD is the establishment level data that is collected under the Annual Census of Production 
in the UK.
15 Available online on the ONS website.
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that provides imports and exports by three digit SIC92 code at current prices (in mil­
lion pounds) and seasonally adjusted derived from the balance of payments. The data 
are available yearly from 1990. To construct import penetration (imports divided by 
total sector product), I use total production form the ARD/ONS dataset previously 
mentioned.
The analysis is done on three slightly different subsections of the data because of 
limitations in the process of merging the datasets. I deliberately chose to keep the three 
different subgroups instead of restricting the analysis to one homogeneous subgroup by 
deliberately dropping sectors. The sample size for the basic specification contains 449551 
observations representing 83002 individuals. It contains male workers in manufacturing 
industries (SIC 151 to SIC 372) for the years 1982 to 1999. The SMP analysis is limited 
by the definition of the affected sectors and the fact that they axe defined with the SIC80 
classification. I have 415306 observations. Finally in the exchange rate experiment, the 
analysis is done on the manufacturing sector for the years 1992 to 1999. The three 
samples do no differ substantially in terms of descriptive statistics. The descriptive 
statistics for the basic specification can be found in table 1.1.
1.4 .2  E m pirical resu lts  
Basic specification
This section aims to provide a picture of how competition in the product market relates 
to the wage structure, and how the returns to skill change with changes in competition.
The central hypothesis to be tested is whether as product market competition goes up the 
wage gap between high and low skilled workers increases16. This was the main prediction 
of the model in section 2. However when we go from the theory to the empirical testing 
a number of comments are in order and a series of other mechanisms must be accounted 
for.
16Note that this does not imply anything on wether wages for either skill level will increase or decrease.
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First, one must account for the possible presence of interindustry wage differentials.
This should mean that sectors with more competition will pay lower wages on average.
This is a different problem from whether the returns to skills are higher or lower in 
more competitive sectors. But the two effects interact. Even if the returns to skill 
are higher in competitive sectors, it may well be that even for that high skilled worker 
wages are lower than in non-competitive sectors. This is important when we think about 
possible selection issues since it is not clear that even though able workers will reap 
higher rewards in competitive sectors, since their wages may be lower there, it does not 
necessarily follow that good workers will end up in competitive sectors. In any case, 
controlling for individual fixed effects should account for this.
Second, note that if skills are not fully transferable between sectors17, it will be the 
sectoral variation in competition that matters for individual wages. In a way workers 
consider their sector as the economy and only large swings in product market competition 
will make it worthwhile to change sectors. That is why sectoral variation in competition 
is exploited here.
My measure of wages is real weekly pay of workers whose pay was not affected 
by absence excluding over-time pay divided by weekly hours excluding over-time hours.
Note that the measure of wages obtained from the NES is very accurate and this measure 
is not sensitive to variations in pay due to the business cycle. This is one of the reasons 
why I use this dataset the other main reason being that it is a very long panel (with full 
employment histories since 1982) which provides a lot of information from the within 
individual variation.
The skill groups are derived from the occupational data and I obtain three skill groups 
along the lines suggested by Elias (1995) and shown in table 0. I will also use job tenure 
as a measure of skill later on.
Table 1.3 presents the results for the basic specification. The dependent variable is log
17 If there is a cost of changing sector or if the worker is less productive in another sector than in hte 
one of origin.
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real hourly wages and results for two different concentration measured by employment 
and output are presented. The coefficients of interest are those on the interaction of the 
medium and high skill variables with sectoral concentration. The results show that when 
concentration falls (competition increases) highly skilled workers see their wages go up 
more than low skill workers, ceteris paribus. So there will be more wage compression 
in sectors with low competition. For the top 5 concentration ratio on output (CR5 
output in what follows) change from the 75th to the 25th percentile in CR5 raises the 
difference between high and low skill wages by 2%. When measured by CR5 employment, 
this implies a 3.9% difference in relative wages. Note that the overall increase in wage- 
dispersion between high and low skilled workers in the sample is 0.16 log points.
The identification of the impact of competition on wage dispersion is done here 
through the within sectoral changes in competition. Note that it seems that as soon 
as one controls for sector fixed effects the level of concentration is not very powerful in 
explaining the level of: wages (the coefficient on concentration is not significant) but it 
does explain relative wages. The identification does not require that all sectors share the 
same trend in wages, since the effect is being estimated out of the within sector difference 
between two skill levels. However, if there is self selection of workers into sectors because 
of their level of competition or if competition is correlated with an omitted variable the 
estimates will be biased. This is addressed in the following tables.
The rest of the covariates behave as expected although I will comment on their 
magnitudes in the individual fixed effects specification that one expects to provide more 
accurate and reliable estimations.
Tables 1.4 for CR5 output and 1.5 for CR5 employment, are all individual fixed effects 
specifications and progressively include the year, sector dummies and the time*skill 
(standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the concentration measure). Hausman 
tests of random versus fixed effects rejected the null of absence of correlation between 
the error term and the regressors.
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The coefficients of interest on the interaction of the skill variables with sectoral con­
centration show again that when competition increases the gap between high and low 
skill wages is higher, ceteris paribus. As for the magnitude of the effect, estimated coef­
ficients are (in absolute value) lower than in the pooled observations specification. This 
may be because of a negative (positive) correlation between the individual fixed effects 
and the level of concentration (competition). The intuition would be that good work­
ers self-select into highly competitive sectors because they know they -will obtain higher 
relative wages there. The alternative explanation is that in the presence of measure­
ment error the fixed effects specification exarcebates the attenuation effect and the bias 
towards zero may be very large.
The tenure and age coefficients (and their squares) have the expected inverse U- 
shape. Wage as a function of tenure reaches a maximum at 22 years and as a function 
of age after 62 years (it basically continually increases and levels off before retirement).
Notice that in the first column of tables 1.4 and 1.5, without sector dummies, we find 
that more concentrated sectors pay higher wages as would be predicted by the inter­
industry wage differentials story. However, as soon as one includes sector dummies that 
effect becomes not significant for the levels of CR5 output, but negative and significant 
for CR5 employment.
Table 1.6 presents the fully saturated specification,-the results go through although 
now the coefficient for CR5*high skill is less negative. However, this is not statistic­
ally significantly different form the one for CR5*medium skill. So we find again wage 
inequality is increasing within sector with product market competition.
Now recall that my argument is one of skills being more highly rewarded in compet­
itive sectors. An alternative measure of the skill of a worker is given by tenure. Workers 
with more tenure have accumulated more experience and have higher skills at the job.
Table 1.7 replaces the quadratic in tenure with four tenure groups and then interacts 
these four groups with CR5. The results show that as competition increases (CR5 falls)
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tenure is more highly rewarded which again confirms the main hypothesis (the effect 
levels off at more than 10 years of tenure).
If the skill measure is not capturing all of the real skill observed to the employer and 
known to the worker and on which wages are actually set, then the error term will be 
capturing that differential reward to unobserved skill depending on sectoral competitive­
ness. An indirect look at this is to study the variance of the error term as a function of 
the competition variable. The coefficient of a regression of the variance of the error term 
on competition is reported in all tables as ’’Auxiliary regression”. Again, the variance 
of the residual is higher in highly competitive sectors (where CR5 is low). Following 
the story developed in section 3 this is possibly capturing the fact that there is some 
unobserved ability that interacts with competition and that increases the variance of 
wages in competitive sectors even after conditioning for the returns to observable skill.
A different way of assessing the greater dispersion in wages resulting from increased 
product market competition and differential returns to skills is using quantile regressions.
This assumes that wages are the best indicator of skill and we can see the effect of 
competition on wage/skills at different percentiles conditional on the covariates. Tables 
1.13 and 1.14 present the results for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th quantiles. The 
coefficient on the concentration variable has a decreasing pattern that seems to accelerate 
at the 75th and 90th quantiles. The fact that it is larger in absolute value for the for 
the high percentiles indicates again that the returns to being in a competitive sector are: 
higher for high wage/skill workers, and that returns to skill are increasing in product 
market competition once we have conditioned on individual characteristics, sector and 
year (note I have also conditioned on skill, so this is within observable skill differential 
returns).
At this point and as was mentioned above, there are a number of reasons why we 
might want to have a strictly exogenous measure of an increase in competition to test 
the basic relationship. First, concentration may be criticised as an imperfect measure of
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product market competition. Second, even though we had a fully saturated model, it is 
still possible that concentration is correlated with another variable that also varies by 
sector and time and that determines wage dispersion. To account for this I explore two 
different exogenous sources of variation. The SMP experiment and the 1996 appreciation 
of the British pound and compute two stage least squares estimates.
The 1992 Single Market Programme as an instrument
The introduction of the SMP meant a larger increase in product market competition for
sectors that had high non-tariff barriers prior to 1992. To test the impact and validity of- -
the programme as an indicator of product market competition one can look at wether it 
affected differently what we call high and low sensitivity sectors before and after 1992.
The period covered is 1982-1999. To assess the impact I regress concentration ratios 
by sector (3-digit SIC80) on a set of time and industry dummies and the interaction of 
the SMP group (a dummy variable that equals one if the sector is classified as having 
moderate or high barriers previous to SMP) and the post-92 period. This is shown on 
table 1.10 as the first stage of the IV estimation. Output top 5 concentration ratio fell 
by 1.5% more in the sensitive sectors post-SMP than in the sectors that were expected to 
be least affected. Employment top5 concentration ratios fell by 4.4% more in sensitive 
sectors. Griffith (2001) who also uses this experiment, is able to test directly (using 
the ARD database) the effect of the SMP programme on firm level rents, measured by 
the Lerner index. She finds that the Lemer index fell by 1% more in sensitive sectors.
This combined evidence indicates that the classification is a good measure for changes 
in competitive pressure in the different groups of sectors.
This ’’natural experiment” can be used in two different ways. One is that as it 
represents in itself an exogenous increase in product market competition it can be used 
as an uncontroversial right hand side variable for competition. The results for this 
reduced form specification are presented in table 1.9.
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Table 1.9 is a fixed effects regression of log wages on the same individual characterist­
ics as before and an interaction of the SMP affected variable and the skill levels defined 
by educational group.
Results confirm that in sectors more affected by the SMP, i.e. where competition 
increased most, the relative wage of high to low skilled workers increased by more. The 
difference of high skill to low skill log wages after 1992 was about 10% higher in the more 
affected than in the less affected industries. So wage differentials where higher in more 
competitive sectors.
The experiment can then be used to instrument .directly the CR5 of the previous : 
section. Both are measures with error of some underlying degree of product market 
competition and hence we can use one to instrument the other. This is indirectly what 
we think when we test the instrument by assessing the impact it had on concentration 
ratios. However, even if the variable was not highly correlated with CR5 it could still 
be used in a reduced form as a measure of competition (provided one is ready to believe 
that deregulation implies an increase in competition). The t-statistics of the first stage 
may not be very high but we can still rely on the evidence provided by the experiment 
directly. It could well be possible for a deregulation to have an impact in the degree of 
competition of a sector without it having much of an effect on the concentration structure 
of the sector. So the fact that it is not a very good instrument for concentrations (the 
correlation is significant but not very high) does not necessarily mean that it is a bad 
variable of competition. These can be seen as two somewhat different things. :
Table 1.10 presents the two stage least squares of instrumenting concentration with 
the SMP variable. The first stage has low t-statistics in the CR5 output case but a 
high and reliable one for CR5 output (above 5), so one should focus on the IV estimates 
for the latter. Note that since the instrument is a dummy variable, there is limited 
cross sectional variation to exploit. However the IV estimates without individual fixed 
effects confirm the hypothesis developed throughout the paper, but 2SLS estimates are
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insignificant when I take individual fixed effects into account (possibly because there is 
not enough within variation in the instrument).
Exchange rate changes as an instrum ent
The second natural experiment used is the strong appreciation of the British pound in 
1996. The Sterling appreciation implied an exogenous increase in competition that should 
affect more those sectors more open to foreign trade, that either export a larger fraction 
of their product (the relative price of their products went up) or that are in sectors where 
imports are already a large fraction of total sales. I exploit this exogenous increase and 
compare the behaviour of the different sectors in their wage setting behaviour before and 
after 1996 as a function of their openness. Figure 1.9 shows the evolution of the effective 
exchange rate of the British pound. Two different regimes of low and high exchange rate 
before and after 1996 are apparent. These will be the two periods exploited.
The first panel of-table 1.12 will be the first stage of the IV regressions and constitutes 
a test of the identification strategy. It presents regressions of the concentration measures 
on the openness measure (import penetration) interacted with a post 96 dummy. It 
shows that the fall in the concentration ratio was increasing in the degree of openness.
The impact of the appreciation (at mean openness and concentration) was to reduce 
output concentration by 7.2% and employment concentration by 3.8%.
The reduced form estimates in table 1.11 use the appreciation as an indicator of 
competition itself. This is a differences in differences specification (with openness a 
continuous variable).
The sample period included here is 1992 to 1999 and the two time periods considered 
are 1992 to 1995 and 1996 to 1999 as before and after the exchange rate change.
The results indicate that returns to skill increased more the more open the sector 
was after the appreciation. At average openness, the wage gap between high and low 
skill workers increased by 3.4%. I also find that after the appreciation, that reflected an
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increase in competition, the more exposed the sector was, the higher the fall in average 
wages. At average openness wages fell by 0.5%.
Again in this case IV estimates can be computed. These are presented in table 1.12.
Again, t-statistics for the first stage are significant but just between 2 and 3. For both 
measures of concentration that are instrumented I obtain that wage dispersion increases 
with competition. The estimated IV coefficient is very similar for both instrumented 
variables and larger than in the basic specification that was probably subjected to meas­
urement error.
Contribution to changes in wage inequality
The analysis above indicates that product market competition increases returns to skill 
and hence wage inequality. One would now want to have a sense of how big the effect 
is. In my sample, the ratio of wages of high to low skilled workers increased by 0.16 
log points. At the same time employment (output) concentration fell 5.5 (2) percentage 
points. This implies an increase of inequality between 0.003 and 0.0078 (0.002) log points.
That is changes in concentration can explain between 1.3% and 5% of the total increase 
in the gap between skills (2.5% in the IV specification).
But this is just the effect of changes in concentration from the basic specification.
The effects of the natural experiments from the reduced forms indicate that: the direct 
effect of the SMP on relative wages was to raise by 0.097 the gap between high and low 
skilled. Taking into account the fact that 41% of the labour force was affected by the 
programme, this implies a change in inequality of 0.039 log points. And the effect of the 
1996 appreciation yields a difference of 0.034 log points at average import penetration.
These all are non-negligible effects.
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1.5 Conclusion
This paper identified product market competition as a source of wage dispersion. The 
mechanism that feeds back from changes in competition in goods and services markets to 
changes in the wage structure is the following. As competition increases, profits are more 
sensitive to cost reductions and since high skilled workers are better at producing at low 
costs firms will be willing to pay them higher wages relative to low skilled workers. This 
will generate increased wage differentials. I developed a stylised model of that mechanism 
that does not rely on particular functional forms to deliver that link. The mechanism 
identified is actually very general and relies on two basic assumptions: that (at least 
some) product markets are imperfectly competitive and that workers are heterogeneous.
I then tested the main hypothesis: that skills are more highly rewarded (in relative 
terms) in highly competitive industries. Using an individual panel of UK male workers 
in the manufacturing sector for the period 1982-1999 the hypothesis is confirmed after 
controlling for a number of effects in the basic fixed effects specifications. Then, in order 
to account for the fact that my measure of competition may be correlated with the error 
term, I use two different quasi-natural experiments that the British economy underwent. 
The first one is the introduction of the European Single Market programme in 1992 
that developed the European internal market by reducing a number of barriers to trade. 
The second one is the strong appreciation of the British pound in 1996 that implied an 
increase in competition for traded sectors, the effect being higher in sectors with a high 
openness to trade. The results are again confirmed when these natural experiments are 
used to instrument the concentration variables.
This research only constitutes a first attempt to establish the relationship between 
product market competition and the wage structure. In the light of the evidence provided 
here there seems to be a robust relationship between the two and further investigation to 
clarify those links is required. This avenue can yield interesting insights to understand 
aspects of wage differentials like within sector and skill differences or differences between
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firms in a sector. It also calls for as study of the interaction between product market 
competition on the one hand and de-unionisation, technical change and organisational 
change as explanations of changes in the wage structure. These questions are left for 
future research.
1.6 Appendices
1 .6 .1  C ournot m od el
P a rt 1:
I prove that
<■*>
[ - ( P - d i)‘2 + 2 ( P - d i) ( P - d j )] 
dPd(dj/di) *  ( P - c k ) 4
Which is always positive since 2(P — dj) > (P — di) (actually (P — dj) > (P — di))
P a rt 2 (price is decreasing in the  num ber of com petitors)
PYi = {P — di)r]Y
N  N
Y i PYi = P Y  = N P tjY
1 = 1  1 = 1
TjNdNP  = (77J V - I )
Where dN =  ^  X)ili di-
Denote the price in an industry of size N as PJy =  ^jv-^i)
In order for the model to make sense, Y/v must be positive, so P^ > d^  since 
Yn  — vY(P-dN) £or an industry 0f size N. Now Pn  > d/v implies that > djy,
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hence
7] Ndjy — (r]N — 1) > 0
djvN  <
r}(d,N — (In )
The right hand side depends on the pattern of d.
For prices to be decreasing in N,  we need to show that ^p" 1 > 1
Pn - i _  y (N  -  l)dN- i   ^ 7](N  -  1)
Pn  v (N  — 1) — 1 r}NdN
7]( N - l ) ( N d N - d N) tj( N - 1 )— *
{ N - 1 ) ( 7 ] { N -  1) — 1) T)NdN
Since dN - 1  =  di = N=f(J2iLi di ~ ^n ) =  j ^ i (N d N  — dN)
Manipulation of 1.26 yields: . ,
TjNdN — dN(7]N — 1) > 0
(1.25)
(1.26)
which is true if and only if Pn  > dN from 1.25 above. So all that is required is that 
output is positive for all N  firms, in that case prices fall as firms enter in this case the 
heterogeneous costs. Note that I also assumed constant elasticity 77.
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1 .6 .2  D a t a  A p p e n d ix  
Skill c la ssifica tion
Table 0: Skill groups in the NES 
Skill level Major groups SOC code (minor gr.
High Managers and administrators 10,11,12,15,19
(excl. office manag. and m anag./prop. in agric.&services)
Professional occupations 20-27,29
Medium Office managers and manag./propietors in agric. and services 13,14,16,17 
Associate professional and technician occupations 30-39
Craft and relations occupations 50-59
Buyers, brokers, sales representatives 
Low Clerical, secretarial occupations 40-46,49
Personal and protective services occupations 60-67,69
Sales occupations (except buyers, browkers, sales reps) 72,73,79
Plant and machine operatives 80-89
Other occupations in agriculture, forestry, fishing 90
Other elementary occupations 91-95,99
Source: Based on Elias (1995)
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1.7 Figures and tables
1.7.1 F ig u res
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Figure 1.5: Between sector correlation CR5 output and wage dispersion
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Figure 1.6: Between sector correlation CR5 employment and wage dispersion
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Figure 1.7: Time series correlation between CR5 employment and wage dispersion





















CHAPTER 1. DOES PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION INCREASE WAGE INEQU. ?61








Figure 1.10: Effective exchange rate, Pound Sterling
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1 .7 .2  T a b le s
D esc rip tiv e  s ta tis tic s
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics 
std. deviations in parenthesis
All skill groups Low skill Med skill High skill
log real hourly wages 1.480 (0.446) 1.310 (0.344) 1.466 (0.397) 1.921 (0.478)
real hourly wages 4.910 (3.04) 3.936 (1.437) 4.709 (2.428) 7.729 (4.887)
age 39.30 (12.41) 39.213 (12.86) 38.46 (12.44) 41.42 (10.92)
age squared 1698.6 (1004.5) 1703.1 (1039.9) 1633.(7 995.9) 1834.9 (919.2)
tenure 4.874 (4.165) 4.866 (4.172) 4.964 (995.9) 4.69 (3.98)
tenure squared 41.10 (69.7) 41.08 (69.92) 42.54 (71.57) 37.9 (64.8)
low skilled 1 0
medium skilled 0.398 (0.489) 0 1 0
high skilled 0.176 (0.380) 0 0 1
CR5 output 0.248 (0.194) 0.242 (0.188) 0.244 (0.196) 0.271 (0.200)
Herfindahl output 0.0006 (0.0051) 0.0005 (0.0046) 0.0006 (0.005) 0.0007 (0.006)
CR5 employment 0.230 (0.187) 0.229 (0.186) 0.225 (0.188) 0.244 (0.185)
Import penetration 0.238 (0.141)
Observations 449551 191597 178822 79111
Table 1.2: Coeff. of correl. between different concentration measures and distributions
Correlations CR5 output Herfindahl output CR5 employment
CR5 output 1
Herfindahl output 0.312 1
CR5 employment 0.928 0.331 1
Distributions 25th perc. Median 75th perc.
CR5 output 0.136 0.240 0.408
CR5 employment 0.133 0.244 0.405
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R esults
Table 1.3: Basic specification, different concentration measures 
absolute t-values in parenthesis 
In real wages CR5 output CR5 employment
 (1) @)______________
Constant -0.128 (10.83) -0.124 (10.14)
Age 0.063 (127.9) 0.063 (172.7)
Age squared -0.0007 (123.2) -0.0007 (123.0)
Tenure 0.11 (24.5) 0.11 (24.4)
Tenure squared -0.0005 (20.2) -0.0005 (20.2)
Med. skill 0.159 (43.2) 0.167 (48.02)
High_skill 0.549 (80.4) _ 0.562 (82.9)_
Concentration -0.014 (0.95) -0.022 (0.79)
Med. skill*Conc. -0.014 (0.095) -0.053 (4.27)
High skill*Conc. -0.08 (4.0) -0.142 (7.17)
Indiv. fixed effects X X
Year dummies yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes
Year*skill X X
Sector(2 dig.)*skill X X
Auxiliary: -0.024 (13.26) -0.04 (21.1)
Observations 449551 449551
R2 0.45 0.45
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Table 1.4: Individual fixed effects and top5 output concentration ratio 
absolute t-value in parenthesis, s.e. adjusted for clustering on concentration
In real wages Ind . fixed eff. Ind . fixed eff. Ind . fixed eff.
(1) (2) (3)
Constant -0.062 (1.12) -0.087 (1.57) -0.084 (1.5)
Age 0.062 (35.5) 0.062 (35.2) 0.064 (35.9)
Age squared -0.001 (135.07) -0.0006 (134.4) -0.0007 (138.6)
Tenure 0.009 (37.26) 0.009 (36.7) 0.009 (35.47)
Tenure squared -0.0004 (30.75) -0.0004 (30.4) -0.0004 (26.96)
Med. skill 0.040 (18.28) 0.041 (18.63) 0.015 (4.36)
High skill 0.132 (40.75) 0.132 (40.61) -0.010 (2.06)
Concentration 0.085 (17.68) -0.006 (0.91) -0.002 (0.32)
Med. skill*Conc. -0.015 (2.52) -0.015 (2.57) -0.018 (2.97)
High skill*Conc. -0.025 (3.02) -0.024 (2.84) -0.038 (4.71)
Indiv. fixed effects yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies X yes yes
Year*skill X X yes
Sector*skill X X X
Auxiliary -0.007 (9.30) -0.007 (9.45) -0.007 (8.83)
Observations 449551 449551 449551
Individuals 83002 83002 83022
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Table 1.5: Individual fixed effects and top5 empl. concentration ratio 
absolute t-value in parenthesis, s.e. adjusted for clustering on concentration 
In real wages Ind . fixed eff. Ind . fixed eff. Ind . fixed eff.
_________________ (1)__________ (?)___________(3)_________
Med. skill 0.045 (20.44) 0.046 (20.87) 0.019 (5.25)
High skill 0.149 (45.45) 0.149 (45.4) -0.006 (1.24)
Concentration 0.102 (19.24) -0.099 (10.62) -0.077 (8.37)
Med. skill*Conc. -0.038 (5.93) -0.038 (6.09) -0.030 (4.7)
High skill*Conc. -0.100 (10.68) -0.101 (10.81) -0.051 (5.64)
Indiv. fixed effects yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies X yes yes
Year*skill X X yes
Sector*skill X X X
Auxiliary -0.009 (11.6) -0.009 (11.8) -0.009 (12.07)
Observations 449551 449551 449551
Individuals 83002 83002 83002
Table 1.6: Fully saturated specification 
absolute t-values in parenthesis, s.e. adjusted for clustering on concentration 
In real wages CR5 output CR5 employment
 (1) (?)______________
Med. skill 0.048 (7.39) 0.045 (7.56)
High skill 0.037 (3.95) 0.039 (4.15)
Concentration 0.001 (0.16) -0.082 (8.56)
Med. skill*Conc. -0.033 (4.47) -0.037 (4.55)
High skill*Conc. -0.023 (2.32) -0.022 (1.98)
Indiv. fixed effects yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes
Year*skill yes yes
Sector(2 dig,.)*skill yes yes
Auxiliary: -0.008 (9.75) -0.009 (12.12)
Observations 449551 449551
Individuals 83022 83022
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Table 1.7: CR5 output and tenure 
absolute t-values in parenthesis; std.errors adjusted for clustering on concentration 
In real wages Fixed effects Fixed effects
 (1) (?)__________
Constant -0.084 (1.49) -0.096 (1.71)
Tenure 3 to 5 yrs 0.033 (23.39) 0.033 (23.4)
Tenure 6 to 9 yrs 0.044 (30.10) 0.044 (29.9)
Tenure 10 plus 0.033 (16.34) 0.033 (16.3)
CR5.output 0.0156 (2.04) 0.019 (2.4)
Ten 3 to 5 yrs*CR5 . -0.021 (4.71) -0.021 (4.71)
Ten 6 to 9 yrs*CR5. -0.036 (8.16 ) -0.0359 (8.08)
Ten 10 plus*CR5 -0.020 (3.56) -0.021 (3.64)
Med. skill 0.016 (4.29) 0.037 (3.91)
High skill -0.010 (2.07) 0.047 (7.33)
Med. skill*CR5 -0.017 (2.92) -0.033 (4.45)
High skill*CR5 -0.039 (4.75) -0.024 (2.35)
Indiv. fixed effects yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
Rector dummies yes yes
Year*skm yes yes
Sector*skill X yes
Aux. Regression -0.0076 (9.71) -0.0077 9.85
Observations 449551 449551
Individuals 83022 83022
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Table 1.8: CR5 employment and tenure 
absolute t-values in parenthesis; std.errors adjusted for clustering on concentration 
In real wages Indiv.fixed effects Indiv fixed effects
 (1) (2)
Tenure 3 to 5 yrs 0.033 (23.97) 0.33 (23.95)
Tenure 6 to 9 yrs 0.044 (30.39) 0.044 (30.31 )
Tenure 10 plus 0.032 (16.1) 0.032 (16.05)
CR5.employment -0.060 (6.2) -0.065 (6.48)
Ten 3 to 5 yrs*CR5 . -0.023 (5.11) -0.023 (5.09)
Ten 6 to 9 yrs*CR5. -0.039 (8.34) -0.038 (8.26)
Ten 10 plus*CR5 -0.018 (3.03) -0.018 (3.05)
Med. skill 0.018 (5.19) 0.049 (1.79)
High skill -0.007 (1.25) 0.039 (4.12)
Med. skill*CR5 -0.030 (4.64) -0.036 (4.50)
High skill*CR5 -0.056 (5.67) -0.022 (1.99)
Year dummies yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes
Year*skill yes yes
Sector(2 dig.)*skill X yes
Aux. Regression -0.009 12.17 -0.010 12.23
Observations 449551 449551
Individuals 83022 83022
Includes age and age squared as regressors
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Table 1.9: Reduced form estimates for SMP experiment 
absolute t-values in parenthesis 




Age squared -0.0007 (185.92)
Tenure 0.009 (38.33)
Tenure squared -0.0004 (29.71)
Med. skill 0.036 (26.26)
High skill 0.110 (57.88)
SMP affected (post92) -0.011 (5.37)
Med. skill* SMP 0.021 (8.58)
High skill*SMP 0.097 (34.95)
Indiv. fixed eff. yes
Year dummies 82-99 yes
Sector dummies yes
Observations 365228
Table 1.10: The effect of concentration on returns to skill, SMP experiment
absolute t-values in parenthesis
In real wages CR5 Output CR5 Output CR5 Employment CR5 Employ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First stage
SMPaffected (post92) -0.015 (1.52) -0.015 (1.52) -0.044 (5.03) -0.044 (5.03)
Second stage
Conc. -0.327 (1.85) -1.33 (3.91) 0.404 (5.38) -0.515 (5.57)
Med. skill*Conc. -1.115 (7.75) -0.404 (0.97) -0.928 (10.05) -0.084 (0.59)
High skill*Conc. -4.522 (24.82) -0.233 (0.42) -2.968 (26.82) 0.104 (0.55)
Individual fixed effects x yes x yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 364543 364543 364543 364543
First stage includes d± and d j .  Second stage also includes age and tenure, their squares and skill dummies.
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Table 1.11: Reduced form estimates for exchange rate experiment 
absolute t-values in parenthesis, clustered s.e.
In real wages Indiv fixed eff.
Constant 0.099 (0.74)
Age 0.064 (15.92)
Age squared -0.0007 (19.9)
Tenure 0.0049 (5.77)
Tenure squared -0.0002 (5.91)
Med. skill 0.028 (4.88)
High skill 0.093 (10.29)
Imp.penetr.96 -0.020 (1.27)
Med. skill*Imp.penetr.96 0.055 (5.38)
High skill*Imp.penetr.96 0.141 (9.42)
Individual fixed eff. yes
Year dum m ies yes
Sector dummies yes
Observations 415306
Table 1.12: The effect of concentration on returns to skill, exch. rate experiment
absolute t-values in parenthesis 
Instrumented var: CR5 Output CR5 Employment
 (!) ( ? ) _ __________
First stage
Imp.penetr.96 -0.075 (2.77) -0.037 (2.14)
Second stage
Conc. -0.412 (5.07) -0.852 (4.94)
Med. skill*Conc. -0.004 (0.21) -0.010 (0.41)
High skill*Conc. -0.071 (2.39) -0.071 (2.08)
Individual fixed effects yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
Sector dum m ies yes yes
Observations 174129 174129
Includes age and tenure, their squares and skill dummies.







Table 1.13: Quantile regressions with CR5 output 
absolute t-values in parenthesis 
































Table 1.14: Quantile regressions with CR5 employment 
absolute t-values in parenthesis-.
10th percentile 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile
0.127 (83.12) 0.132 (113.62) 0.140 (119.87) 0.158 (109.41) 0.182 (94.45)Med. skill 
High skiU 0.413 (202.4)
























Regressions include tenure, tenure squared, age and age squared
Chapter 2
E xecutive com pensation and  
product market com petition
2.1 Introduction1
A large amount of effort and literature has been devoted to understanding the determ­
inants of executive compensation. The availability of data and the belief that firms can 
greatly improve their performance by setting the right incentives has induced researchers 
to search for complex compensation packages in the spirit of principal-agent theory. In 
general, shareholders are considered in this literature as a risk neutral coordinated prin­
cipal and managers are considered risk averse agents (Holmstrom (1979) Mirrlees (1976) 
(1974)). The quantity of theoretical work devoted to the topic is extremely large, and 
there axe numerous articles aiming to test empirically the implications of these models 
(see Murphy 1999 for an extensive survey). However, in spite of all the existing work, 
there is still considerable controversy on the determinants of executive compensation 
and their magnitude although what seems to be an established fact is the increase over 
the past twenty years in performance pay sensitivities and in the use of stock options,
1This chapter is based on joint work with Vicente Cunat from Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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that dominate compensation packages for many executives (Hall and Liebman (1998), 
Murphy (1999)).
Our aim with this paper is to study the effects of product market competition on the 
explicit compensation packages that firms offer to their executives. This is a relevant 
question given the increase in product market competition through different channels 
(from deregulation to technological change and increased trade) over the past decades 
and because it provides a potential explanation to the increased reliance on performance 
related pay in executive compensation packages.
Product market competition will have an effect on managerial compensation through 
the following channels. In the first place competition changes the elasticity of the profits 
of the firm to increases in productivity. Therefore it changes the returns to effort of the 
executives of the firm (Schmidt (1997), Raith (forthcoming)) thus following a change in 
the competitive environment, firms may.decide to reoptimize their compensation pack­
ages. Secondly competition changes the risk and implicit incentives that the economic 
environment provides to managers and accordingly, it may change the optimal expli­
cit incentive package that firms offer to them (Aggarwal and Samwyck (1999), Schmidt 
(1997)). Finally and possibly departing from the standard principal-agent approach, 
changes in competition may alter the profit levels of the firm, the relative bargaining 
power and the incentives for managers to extract rents from the firm (Bebchuck, Fried 
& Walker (2002)).
To achieve our goal of measuring the net effect of competition through these channels 
we estimate individual compensation equations that take into account the theoretical 
structure of the incentive contracts (in particular the existence of a risk-return trade-off) 
and the fact that individuals may self-select into different sectors according to the degree 
of competition.
However, since our ultimate purpose is to isolate the causal effect of competition 
on the sensitivity of pay to performance, the crucial issue in the analysis will be the
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measure of competition used. Even though most economists may agree on a definition 
of a perfectly competitive market, or a monopoly, problems arise when trying to find 
a measure of the degree of competition that is unanimously accepted. We use two 
alternative measures of competition to overcome this problem.
First we use concentration ratios which is a standard measure used in the industrial 
organisation literature and allows for comparison with other empirical papers. However 
this measure can be criticised from a theoretical point of view (under certain paramet- 
risations of the product market it may not be a meaningful measure of competition) and 
from an econometric point of view since the degree of concentration may be correlated . 
with an omitted variable in the error term or it may be endogenous to the wage setting 
for managers. To account for these criticisms we develop most of the analysis using two 
important.deregulation waves in US financial markets as natural experiments. These de­
regulation episodes are exogenous and more uncontroversial sources of competition that 
affect particular sectors on particular sample years. We obtain a differences in differences 
estimator using these deregulatory episodes and check their robustness to different spe­
cifications. Our results show that a higher level of product market competition increases 
the performance pay sensitivity of executive compensation schemes.
The added value of our work is therefore to clarify the direct and indirect effects that 
competition has on the compensation packages offered to executives. This is a relatively 
unexplored question at an empirical level even though a number of theoretical papers 
have implications regarding this interaction. The consequences in terms of understanding 
executive compensation, the recent increased reliance on stock options and the increases 
in sensitivities and the wider implications on the increased variance of earnings are 
important implications of the paper.
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2.2 Theoretical background
The closest theoretical contributions to our empirical problem are the models by Schmidt 
(1997) and Raith (forthcoming). In Schmidt (1997) the explicit contract signed by a risk 
neutral principal (shareholders) and a risk averse agent (CEO, executive) is influenced 
by the implicit incentives given by the competitive environment of the firm. The con­
tract induces the manager to exert effort in cost cutting activities. Competition affects 
the contract through two channels. On the one hand, a higher level of competition will 
increase the marginal profit to cost cutting activities, (for instance if the elasticity of sub­
stitution between goods is higher) and therefore the contract will have steeper incentives 
to induce the manager to exert more effort as the profit of stealing market share from 
other firms increases. On the other hand a higher level of competition will reduce the 
average profits of the firm and therefore increase the likelihood of bankruptcy. If man­
agers are worried about this bankruptcy they will exert more effort, so there is less need 
for an explicit contract that induces effort and therefore one should expect a contract 
with flatter incentives. Overall, the effect of an increase in competition is ambiguous.
Raith (forthcoming) has a variation on this model that solves the ambiguity. By 
allowing entry and exit, endogenous exit guarantees that the average profits do not drop 
like in Schmidt's model, so the first effect dominates and we should expect steeper in­
centives associated to more competition due to more profitable market stealing activities.
The objective of our work is to have a clear measure of the total effect of a change in 
competition.
A decrease in competition may increase the explicit incentives provided in executive 
contracts to compensate for the reduction on incentives produced by a fall in the bank­
ruptcy risk, however this is not the only mechanism for this correlation. Bebchuk, Fried 
& Walker (2002) explore the evidence in existing literature for rent extracting activit­
ies in managerial compensation and they find a fair number of puzzles that cannot be 
explained using the standard principal agent theory and could be consistent with rent
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extraction explanations. In principle one could expect that if executives are risk averse, 
most of the rent extraction activities would be done through the fixed part of the com­
pensation. However, for ’’camouflage” reasons we may also observe some rent extraction 
in the variable part of managerial compensation. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) 
calculate a measure of ’’pay for luck” associated with rent extraction activities on the 
performance based part of the executive compensation packages. Moreover, they find 
that this pay for luck is more intense in firms with bad governance.
An important point when assessing the incentives implicit in a compensation package 
is. to assess whether the fixed part of the pay provides incentives.: In this-sense-the 
efficiency wages theory claims that this part should have a discipline effect. One of the 
various possible reasonings for this incentive is that the fear of losing their job would 
discipline managers and this discipline effect will be larger the larger the fixed pay that 
they receive. To capture these effects we will not only measure the interaction of the 
slope of the compensation packages with the competition measures but also the effect 
of competition on the fixed component of pay. Although we will interpret some of the 
results on the basis of rent extraction, some of them can equally be reinterpreted in terms 
of efficiency wages and voluntary rent sharing by the principal/employer. (See Shapiro 
and Stiglitz 1984).
The few empirical papers that relate product market competition and executive com­
pensation are mostly in the fine of Aggarwal and Samwyck (1999a) (Kedia (1996), Joh 
(1999)). These papers introduce explicitly strategic considerations and the structure 
of the product market in managerial compensation to address the relative performance 
evaluation puzzle (the fact that empirical studies seem not to find any role for relative 
performance evaluation in incentive contracts). In particular they argue that principals 
will commit to particular compensation structures to soften or increase the aggressive­
ness of their managers in the output market. This leads to an observed relationship
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between product market competition and rivals’ outcomes2. Their empirical analysis 
uses Execucomp data between 1993 and 1995. They claim to find support for the stra­
tegic complements model3. Furthermore they find that performance-pay sensitivity is 
decreasing in the degree of competition measured by this variable. Our work explicitly 
contradicts this result. The main reasons for this are the inclusion in this paper of a 
number of explicit control variables in the regressions and the use of a larger sample 
that covers years 1992 to 2000 -this actually makes most of the difference. We also use 
two alternative measures of competition, one of which we argue is a true measure of 
competition (a sector deregulation) that is not contingent on the type of competition in 
place. As will be shown below we obtain similar results for both measures.
2.3 Specification and identification strategy
Our aim is to estimate the effect of product market competition on the sensitivity of 
performance related pay. For this purpose we posit a wage equation at the individual level 
to estimate the fixed component (Aifjt) and the variable component of compensation 
(Bfjt (Performancef j t), a function of performance). Total compensation for executive z, in 
firm / ,  in sector j  in year £, can be written as Wi fjt = Ai f j t+Hfj t  (Performance f j t ) +U{ f j t . 
The theoretical predictions outlined in the previous section imply that not only total pay
2 When the actions of the agents are strategic complements (prices in the Bertrand model) the prin­
cipal’s interest is to avoid aggressive price setting and hence they will not compensate managers by their 
relative performance. On the contrary, managers will be compensated by the own firm performance and 
the performance of the industry as a whole. As competition (defined by the elasticity of substitution 
between goods) increases, the weight given to the values of other firms in the compensation contract 
increases. W ith strategic substitutes (quantities in Cournot), principals will reward managers positively 
on own performance and negatively on industry performance. As competition increases,the weight given 
to the values of other firms in the compensation contract increases (becomes more negative) to induce 
them to behave more aggressively.
3 One limitation is that they proxy the elasticity of substitution, that is the measure of product 
market competition on which the theoretical analysis is based by a Herfindahl index which is a measure 
of concentration. This is a serious limitation in interpreting the results since concentration and the 
elasticity of substitution are positively correlated in standard models of competition like the Dixit Stiglitz 
model. A higher elasticity of substitution in standard models represents an increase in competition but 
leads to lower concentration, so the best measure to test their theoretical model is not the Herfindahl 
index.
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will depend on a number of individual and firm characteristics, but the sensitivity pay to 
performance itself will vary across firms and sectors with different features. We explicitly 
model the major determinants of these coefficients in our empirical analysis. These can 
be written as: A{ fjt = /(Competition/*, individual; fjt h  firm characteristics fjt) and Bfjt 
=  p( Competition/*, variance/). Assuming linear relationships4, then:
Wifjt = Aifjt + BfjtPerffjt  + Ufijt (2-1)
Aifjt =  ao +  aiCompetitiorijt +  a-2 varf +  azControlsifjt
B fj t = 60 +  biCompetitionjt +  62 varf
where the slope component depends itself on sector and firm characteristics. Given
the compensation structure assumed, the estimation of the compensation equation should 
include terms where the performance measures interact with competition, rents and other 
variables. The specification we will estimate is:
Wifjt =  ao +  aiCompetitiorijt +  ^2 varf +  azControlsifjt (2.2)
+boPerffjt +  biCompetitiorijtPerffjt +  b2varjPerffjt +  Ufijt
uifjt = I ; +  +  €it (2-3)
Where Perffjt is performance, varf is the variance of the performance measure,
4 Even though the compensation package of many executives may contain complex formulae, we are 
imposing linearity and implicitly estimating a simple compensation package that has a fixed element 
and a variable one related to the firm 's own profit. This is obviously a simplifying assumption, but our 
approach is sufficiently flexible to capture most of the effects that we are interested in while keeping the 
results interpretable. Moreover it seems that the non-discretionary component of executive compens­
ation, usually follows simple formulas. And there are theoretical results on the linearity of incentives 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)).
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Competitionjt is the relevant competition measure, dt are time dummies, rji and 5j are 
individual and sector permanent unobserved components and ea is a white noise.
The specifications are fixed effects regression of the levels of different compensation 
measures on levels of performance measures (we later use the logarithm of compensation 
as dependent variable as a robustness check). It therefore estimates the sensitivity of 
pay to performance (Murphy (1999)). The main coefficient of interest is b\ , i.e. how 
the performance pay sensitivity B  changes with the level of competition in the sector. 
This captures the net effect of competition from the different channels outlined in the 
previous section.
The estimation must account for other sources of variation of the performance pay 
sensitivity that might be correlated with the level of competition and hence bias the 
coefficient. We explicitly introduce the variance of performance, since in the standard 
principal agent model the limiting factor to a very steep incentive contract is the risk 
aversion of the agent and the fact that the returns of the firm depend not only on her 
effort, but also on other random factors (therefore one expects 63 to be negative5). In fact 
omitting the variance term biases the estimate of the performance sensitivity towards 
zero. We also account explicitly for the size of the firm (to isolate the firm size effect).
The level of variation of competition is at a sector level, and we identify b\ by com­
paring two individuals working in firms with the same level of performance in sectors 
with different levels of competition. Now one must take into account any other biases 
arising from the correlation between any permanent unobserved component of the wage 
equation and the included regressors.
First of all we account for permanent unobserved differences between sectors. If the 
sector fixed effects 6j are correlated with CompetitionjtPerffjt for instance because 
highly competitive sectors pay higher wages regardless of the level of performance, this
5 This effect may however be less clear when we introduce measures of granted options in our com­
pensation package, as the valuation of these options depends positively on the volatility of the underlying 
shares
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will bias the results. Given that our interest variable (i.e. competition) is a sector 
characteristic, our main specification will include sector fixed effects Sj. If the above spe­
cification is correct, then provided Cov((CompetitionjtPerffjt) , r =  0 the coefficient 
of interest will be unbiased. However there are reasons to expect that is not true, in 
particular if managers select themselves towards sectors with lower levels of competition 
that have higher rents and pay higher wages. In that case &i will underestimate the 
effect of competition on performance pay sensitivities (so this bias goes in our favour). 
In the sample, 2.4% of the individuals actually change firms at least once, and only one 
third of these are within sector changes. Note that given that we are dealing with the 
market for executives in the top 1500 firms in the US, there are strong reasons to believe 
that the labour market for executives is not restricted to the sector, but that there is 
considerable flexibility for managers to migrate between sectors6.
The second strategy used is therefore to control additionally for individual fixed 
effects. The cost of this strategy is that there may not be enough individual variation to 
capture the effects and that the loss in efficiency from including individual fixed effects 
is large. The average number of observations per executive is just 3.8 and individual 
fixed effects implicitly mean losing one degree of freedom per individual. The advantage 
though is that movers from one sector to another provide useful variation to identify 
the effect of competition since our measure of concentration only varies by sector (the 
experiments will have time series variation) and hence they allow us to compare the same 
individual in sectors with different levels of competition7. Furthermore, it is still possible. 
that individuals self select towards particular firms within their sector according to their 
skills in a systematic way. Individual fixed effects deal with these issues.
The above comments concerned the model specification. However, the most import­
6Furthermore in the section that uses concentration ratios sectors are defined at 5 digit NAICS level, 
which is a quite narrow definition of sector, so sector changes are frequent and if these changes are 
correlated with 77* this will bias the results.
7 The results go through when we look at stayers only. Some results for stayers are shown later on on 
the robustness checks section.
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ant aspect of the analysis probably concerns the measure of product market competition 
used. We pursue two different strategies. The first is to use concentration ratios for the 
four largest firms in the sector at NAICS 5 digit level obtained from the US census of 
manufacturers for 1997. The variation in concentration is purely cross-sectional and we 
use this measure to start with because it is a standard measure of competition used in 
previous studies. However, the use of concentration ratios may be subject to a number 
of criticisms. First, under some parametrisations of competition, concentration is a very 
imperfect measure of the competitiveness of the sector. Furthermore there are measure­
ment issues on how these ratios should be measured. Second, concentration may be a 
response to the way in which compensation is set in the sector and hence be endogenous, 
or it may be correlated with some omitted variable.
To address these issues we use an alternative measure of changes in competition 
that exploits the two deregulation Acts that were passed in the US in the nineties to 
deregulate the financial services. These axe explained in the next section.
2.3.1 T w o quasi-natural experim en ts: F inancia l d eregu la tion  in  th e  
90’s
The decade of the 1990s is thought of as the major deregulation period for the financial 
sector in the United States. Two major acts were implemented that were designed to 
foster competition in the financial sector.
The first one was the 1994 Riegle-Neal interstate banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act that repealed two previous amendments that curtailed interstate banking. It implied 
that banks were allowed to own and operate branches in different states thus generating 
an increase in product market competition. Prior to that there where restrictions for 
banks to operate across borders (although there were limited agreements between some 
states). While the empirical literature on the impact of these reforms is still limited, 
there seems to be a consensus between practitioners and academics on the increase
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of competition that it generated and the pressure on inefficient banks that held local 
monopolies before, e.g. ’’The lobbying force behind banking restrictions is widely known 
to be the preservation of local monopolies or oligopolies for community banks” (Kane 
1996 commenting on Golenbe 1994 (in italics)). In addition, studies on similar reforms 
(the bilateral state agreements) for earlier periods seem to find a considerable impact on 
the sector8. The fact that this is the most wide-ranging reform of the kind for the US 
since it affects the whole country indicates that the impact of the deregulation was very 
large. This is the first natural experiment used for the 1994 turning period. We compare 
the years., before 1994 (period 1992. and. 1994) to those after 1994 .(1995 to. 1996).The, 
treatment sector is the banking sector (SIC code at two digits is 60).
The second major reform to the financial industry regulation was brought about in 
1999 with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also known as the financial services modernisa­
tion act. This repealed previous legislation (dating from the great Depression in the 
1930s) that imposed barriers separating traditional banking, insurance and securities - 
underwriting into three distinct industries which in practice meant that banks and in­
vestment firms were not competing with each other. The effect on the financial services 
industry was considered as rather dramatic: ’’Since congress passed [...] the Gramm- 
Leach-Bliley act the financial services industry has undergone a dramatic change as it 
explores developing the best mix of products and services that can be offered to cus­
tomers. [...] investors, institutions and companies are quickly benefiting form enhanced 
organizational agility and greater competition in the industry. Allan E. Sorcher (Vice- 
President of the Securities Industry Association).
Thus our second test period are the years between 1997 and 1999 versus year 2000. 
The treatment group here is made by firms in sectors with SIC codes 60 to 64 and 67. 
They constitute natural experiments that affect only particular industries after a given
8Nichols and Hendrickson show the impact of previous deregulation waves from 1929 to 1989 using 
Canadian banks as a benchmark for US reforms and viceversa. The freedom to establish new branches 
seems to have contributed to higher levels of efficiency.
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year and therefore can be used to identify the effects of competition.
Exploiting this variation we implement a differences in differences estimation of the 
effect of the increase in competition in the US financial sector following the two legis­
lation pieces. These deregulations constitute our preferred specification (relative to the 
one using concentration ratios) because they exploit a clear measure of an increase in 
competition. The estimated compensation equation now is:
Wifjt =  <*>0 + aiDEREGjt 4- a2 varf +  ^  azControlsifjt (2.4)
+boPerffjt +  biDEREGjtPerffjt + b2varjPerffjt +  Ufijt
uifjt =  Vi 4” 8j +  tSj 4- dt 4- tit (2-5)
The deregulation indicator DEREGjt takes value one for the treated sectors (banking 
in the 1994 deregulation or financial services in the 1999) in the treatment period (post 
1994 and post 1999 respectively). As before, results will be presented with sector and 
both sector 6j and individual 7]{ fixed effects. Now, given the effect of the deregulations 
arises over time, it is important to ensure that we are not just capturing the fact that 
different sectors have different trends in performance pay. To control for this possibility, 
sector specific time trends are introduced t5j. This will capture any differing time trends 
by sector.
In addition to the basic specifications with the natural experiments we do a number 
of robustness checks.
The first robustness check is to run the analysis only on the services industry (SIC 
codes 60 to 81). This is a much closer comparison group than the one used before, and 
one would expect that the performance pay sensitivities evolve similarly. By taking the 
rest of services as a benchmark we are possibly able to more closely identify the effect
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of the deregulation (although the inclusion of a sector trend accounted to a large extend 
for these potential between sector differences).
The second check is to use the logarithm of total compensation instead of its level as 
a dependent variable.
The third check is to introduce explicitly a measure of rents in the regression. The 
reason for this is that in addition to these pure competition effects we also expect that 
rent extraction activities may affect the compensation package offered to executives. In 
principle higher rents should increase the fixed component of the compensation and leave 
the variable part unaffected. That is the way in which risk averse managers can obtain 
the highest utility for a given amount of rent extraction. However, if they intend to 
camouflage this rent extraction as a provision of incentives they may decide to extract 
rents also in the variable part of the compensation package. This effect goes in the 
same direction as the one predicted by the implicit incentives of the risk of the firm 
going bankrupt, i.e. it would tend to reduce the sensitivity of pay to performance as 
competition increases (rents fall). As will be seen below, the results indicate that the 
sensitivity increases with competition, so if anything omitting rents would increase that 
coefficient. In addition to this, the risk of using the rents measure is that it may be 
endogenous if we think that the level of managerial pay affects rents. The support for 
this is rather limited (managerial pay is a tiny fraction of rents). As we will see measure 
of rents used has an almost negligible effect on the coefficient of interest indicating that 
it is to a large extent orthogonal to our problem and hence leaving it out does not have 
any major implications. Finally, the results are presented on stayers exclusively.
2.4 D ata description
To develop the analysis outlined above we use the Standard&Poor’s Execucomp dataset.
This is a panel dataset that covers up to the top 5 executives (ranked by salary and 
bonus) of the top firms in the US economy (it includes all of the S&;P 1500, and a
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few other large firms). We use yearly data from 1992 to 2000. It records exhaustive 
data on executive's compensation schemes as well as some individual characteristics9. 
The individual level data on compensation includes yearly wage, bonus, stock options 
and other compensation. The data also contain information on firm characteristics and 
performance that will be used in the analysis such as total assets, sales, earnings before 
interest and taxes (our accounting profits measure), total market return (dividend plus 
appreciation) of holding all stock during the year. The full sample contains around 95000 
observations that correspond to 2 2 0 0 0  individuals.
To construct the competition variables we obtained concentration ratios from the 
1997 US Economic Census (published by US Census) at different levels (the share of 
production of the top four, eight, twenty and fifty firms in a given sector). These measures 
are computed at the NAICS 5 digit level and we use the top four concentration ratio 
throughout since at this high level of disaggregation it is the magnitude with more 
variation. The top four concentration ratio is the proportion of total sector revenue 
accounted for by the largest four firms in the sector. The average concentration ratio in 
the sample is 30%.
We also use an alternative competition measure that comes from 2 deregulation 
episodes in the banking and financial sectors. The Riegle-Neal interstate banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act, published in 1994 increased interstate competition between 
commercial banks, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also known as the financial services 
modernisation act meant a drastic liberalisation of financial services in 1999. Both of 
them affect particular sectors in particular periods of time, so we can use them as natural 
experiments following a differences in differences procedure. To avoid the interference 
between both natural experiments we use the period 1993-1994 as the control sample 
for the first experiment (banking sector) and 1995-1996 as the treatment period. For
9There is also a limited amount of individual characteristics. We will use gender. Age and tenure are 
only a vailable for a very limited number of observations, and the criteria of selection are not clear, so 
we decided not to include these.
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the second experiment (financial services sector) we will use 1997-1999 as control sample 
and 1999-2000 as treatment period.
With these data a number of econometric specifications were evaluated and the results 
are described below. The aim is to evaluate the effect of competition on variations in the 
variable component of the compensation scheme. For this purpose we use as dependent 
variables three different magnitudes that capture this variable component. First we used 
total executive compensation earned by the executive in a given year including the profit 
from exercising stock options in that year (and excluding options granted). Second, we 
use salary plus bonus (to abstract form the impact of stock options)Finally we used 
the Black-Sholes value of options granted10.
We then evaluate the effect of accounting and market returns separately on these 
compensation measures. All variables are at constant 1996 prices. Even though corporate 
finance would predict that market returns are the relevant magnitude in this respect, 
previous research points to the fact that accounting profits are also relevant (Bushman 
and Smith 2001).
Accounting returns are measured as earnings before interest and taxes and market
10 A comment is in order on the use of stock options granted as a dependent variable. Stock options 
are an increasingly important component of executive compensation. However, given their magnitude 
and volatility, it is problematic to analyse them jointly with other compensation items. It is important 
when dealing with stock options to value them adequately, especially given that granting stock options 
is at the same time a reward for performance and an incentive device in itself.
There are two main ways to deal with options in this environment. One possibility is to consider the 
value of the options granted as a sum of money given to the executive. This possibility is particularly 
attractive if executives already hold a portfolio of the firm's shares and can rebalance it to keep an 
optimal exposure to the firm's risk or if they can trade on derivatives to achieve the same goal. However 
if such portfolio cannot "absorb” the amount of stock options granted and there is not a liquid market 
for such options this approach does not take into account that the number of options granted, not only 
has some intrinsic value but also this value is sensitive to the firm's performance. In this latter case it is 
also true that using the Black-Scholes formula to value these options may overstate their value, as it is 
not taking into account the illiquidity of these options and the limited diversification strategies available 
(Hall and Murphy 2000).
Another possibility would be to calculate the aggregate sensitivity of the value of all granted options 
to firm performance (overall delta) and consider them as an incentive contract. This strategy has 
two limitations: a practical limitation, as with the available data it is hard to measure this aggregate 
sensitivity and a limitation related to the extent to which executives can ”undo” this incentive contract by 
rebalancing their portfolios. Throughout this paper we take a pragmatic approach, showing regressions 
explaining total compensation (including options executed) and options granted (at B&S value).
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returns are total market returns (dividend plus appreciation) of holding the stock during 
the year.
Since risk must be accounted for when estimating compensation sensitivities the 
variance of the return is computed over the sample period. The relevant risk measure 
is the variance of performance since that is the risk faced by the variable component of 
pay11. We compute a variable that is the sample cumulative density of the variance of 
the returns of the firm. This is a measure of the relative position of the firm variance 
with respect to the variance of returns of other firms that smooths the measure of the 
variance such that it contains no outliers. This is our risk measure throughout the paper. -
The robustness checks include a measure of the rents available to the firm to account 
for the feasibility of rent extraction. Given the available data this is defined as a markup 
measure computed as profits before interest, taxes and extraordinary items over sales12.
The size of the firm is also controlled for by the logarithm of assets.
We also include as explanatory variables gender and whether the individual is the 
company's CEO. All regressions include year dummies to account for the cyclicality of 
compensation.
A main concern in the analysis was that many of the dependent and independent 
variables used typically have very large outliers. This is problematic when running or­
dinary least-squares-type regressions. To deal with this issue we restricted somewhat 
the sample and dropped the top outliers13 of options granted and total compensation.
The results are not sensitive to the exact cut-off point chosen. It is only the inclusion of
11 In principle managers could have a well diversified port-folio in which case the relevant measure of 
risk would be the covariance of performance with the stock market divided by the varaince of market 
returns (the betas). In practice manager’s human capital and assets are heavily invested in the firm and 
the variance of risk is a more relevant risk measure.
12Because of data limitations we cannot deduce the true cost of capital.
13 The sample was restricted by excluding from the analysis executives with very large outliers of 
either total compensation or options granted. The 99% cutoff point for total compensation the sample 
was 14887, but the maximum value was 655717 (respectively 11001 and 557529 for granted options) -the 
minimum in either case being zero. The enormous weight of these variables in a least squares framework 
led us to drop variables with total compensation greater than 30000 and options granted greater than 
24000 (these values were chosen at above the 99% cutoff point to include roughly 0.3% of the sample).
In total this amounts to 528 observations, i.e, 0.6% of the total sample.
CHAPTER 2. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITIONS7
very large option grants or total compensation that alters the results. Previous analysis 
using median regressions to minimise the impact of outliers was consistent with these 
results. However the impossibility to account for individual fixed effects in those regres­
sions (and the relevance of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity that is confirmed 
by the results) is what lead us to have least squares regressions without outliers as our 
preferred specification.
2.5 Results
In this section we present the results obtained for the determinants of managerial com­
pensation, in particular of total compensation (including options executed) and stock 
options granted. We estimate equation (2.1) and present the sensitivity analysis and 
robustness checks progressively.
2.5.1 A nalysis using  con cen tra tion  ratios
The results in this section use as competition measure concentration ratios by sector.
These are at highly disaggregated sector levels for 1997.
Tables 2.2 to 2.4 present results using accounting returns as the measure of perform­
ance for the equation on Total Compensation, Salary plus bonus and Options granted 
respectively. Tables 2.5 and 2.7 use market returns as measure of performance. Columns 
1 and 2 contain sector fixed effects only. Column 3 contains individual fixed effects in 
addition to the sector dummies.
As is well known in this setting it is crucial to control for the fact that the level of 
compensation will depend on the risk associated to the contract, to the performance of 
the company. Hence we introduce the variance of the relevant performance measure in 
the regressions in column 2 of all tables. When this is interacted with the performance 
measure in levels we find that the sensitivity of pay to performance is decreasing in the 
variance of the firm. Again, this is true for accounting profits and market returns.
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To summarise the results, the performance pay sensitivity is increasing in the per­
formance measure and levels off after some point (has a very smooth hump shape). 
Concerning the effect of product market competition on incentives provided we find that 
the estimated coefficient bi on the interaction between concentration and returns is neg­
ative and significant in most specifications. This indicates that more competitive sectors 
provide steeper incentives to their managers and hence that the incentive provision effect 
dominates the market discipline effect in net terms. Let’s see now in more detail the 
results obtained.
On the effect of competition on the sensitivity of total compensation to accounting 
profits (table 2.2) the first thing to note is that the estimate changes substantially from 
the sector effects to the individual fixed effects model (indicating selection on unobserv­
ables for that magnitude), actually more than doubling the estimated sensitivity. This 
suggests a negative correlation between the individual fixed effect and accounting returns 
(the same qualitative results apply to the salary plus bonus specification). In the fixed 
effects specification an increase in a million dollars in accounting returns increases total 
compensation by 5702 dollars. The effect of competition on this sensitivity is to increase 
it by 5% if one goes from a concentration ratio of one -where the four largest firms dom­
inate the whole market- to a highly competitive sector (with close to zero CR4). The 
increase in sensitivity of salary plus bonus due to competition is around 2% and that of 
stock options is 11%14.
Concerning the sensitivity of total compensation to market returns with minimal 
concentration, it around 1300 dollars for every extra million dollars in market returns. 
This is reduced by 3% if we consider a monopoly in the sector fixed effects specification 
(column 2). The average market return is around 700 million dollars, that gives a variable 
pay at mean market return of 910 thousand dollars per annum. In a monopolistic sector 
this is reduced by 27300 dollars. In the individual fixed effects regression the sensitivity
14 All effects in what follows are computed at the median where the effect of the variance term of the 
performance measure is negligible with respect to the coefficient on performance in levels.
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of pay to performance is very similar (indicating no selection on unobservables with 
respect to market returns). However significance is lost for the effect of product market 
competition.
The effect of competition on stock options granted is substantial. In all tables we 
find that only when we introduce individual fixed effects the effect of product market 
competition becomes significant suggesting a negative correlation between the compet­
ition/performance interaction and the fixed effect. In the individual fixed effects spe­
cification concentration reduces the sensitivity by 11% in the accounting and 20% in the 
market returns cases.
The size of the firm (measured by the log of assets) affects positively both total 
compensation and options granted. It is interesting to note that the estimate of that 
effect changes substantially (it double or triples) when we allow for individual fixed 
effects. This suggests a negative correlation between the individual fixed effect and the 
size of the firm.
Finally we controlled for gender and whether the individual was the CEO of the 
company. Men represent 96% of the sample and they earn significantly more than women 
(around 250 thousand dollars more on average). CEOs also earn more than non-CEOs by 
whichever measure we measure compensation. In the individual fixed effects specification 
(that estimates the impact of being a CEO exclusively through changers of CEO status) 
the effect is around 200 thousand dollars total compensation and 350 thousand dollars 
more options granted for CEOs.
2 .5 .2  A  natural experim ent: D eregu la tion  in  th e  9 0 ’s
The previous section showed that competition measured by concentration ratios tends to 
increase the steepness of pay-performance contracts offered to executives. An extensive 
set of controls and fixed effects regressions were used to control for as many observable 
and unobservable factors as possible. However, as was mentioned before, concentration
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ratios may be objected to on the grounds that they are an imperfect measure of com­
petition or that they may be correlated with some omitted variable leading to omitted 
variable bias. This section uses two quasi- natural experiments to address these problems 
and confirm the results.
Given that these deregulation processes only affected particular industries in given 
periods, the identification strategy is based on a differences in differences estimation. 
Control variables identical to the ones used in the previous section are included in the 
regressions. To avoid spurious results that could be driven by the fact that different 
sectors are subject to different trends independently from the experiment we also include 
sector specific time trends for all sectors.
The results can be seen in tables 2.8 to 2.12. Estimates are shown for total com­
pensation (columns 1 and 4), salary plus bonus (columns 2 and 5) and options granted 
(columns 3 and 6). Columns 4 to 6 include: individual fixed effects. The variables FIN 
and FIN94 take, ,value:l in the treatment periods for the sectors that experienced dereg­
ulation and 0 for the control sample and the pre-treatment period. FIN94 corresponds 
to the effect of the Riegle-Neal interstate banking and Branching Efficiency Act between 
1994 and 1997 and FIN corresponds to the effect of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act from 
1999 to 2000. These same variables also interact with the performance levels of firms to 
see the effect of deregulation on the pay-performance slope.
In all specifications we find that after the deregulation, the slope of performance re­
lated pay becomes steeper. The coefficient is both quantitatively important and statist­
ically significant. The positive sign shows how the pay-performance sensitivity increased 
after deregulation happened, thus confirming our results of section (2.5.1). Whether we 
look at total compensation, salary plus bonus or options granted, and whether we use 
accounting profits or market returns as our performance measure the result seems to 
be confirmed. This is true including individual fixed effects and a sector specific trend 
in the regressions (only the specification for options granted loses significance when we
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introduce individual fixed effects). Quantitatively the effect is also very large, for ex­
ample, table 2.8 shows that the market pay performance sensitivity is 31% higher in the 
treated (banking) sector after the deregulation than before. Table 2.9 shows that the 
pay performance sensitivity to accounting returns increases by 12% post deregulation.
Similar results are shown in tables 2.9 and 2.11 for the 1999 deregulation of financial 
services. The sensitivity of total compensation to market returns is increased by 15% in 
the financial services sectors after deregulation. That of salary and bonus increased by 
11% and that of options granted by 42%. For accounting profits the effects are 9%, 13% 
and 13% respectively.- Higher levels ofxompetitiomare-therefore: here-again associated— 
with steeper incentive schemes.
Note also that in most specifications there is a negative and significant'effect of 
the deregulation on the level (i.e. non performance based) part of the compensation 
package. This may be due to the fact that the deregulation lowered profits and reduced 
the possibility of rent extraction. It therefore provides indirect supporting evidence that 
the experiments are actually capturing an increase in product market competition since 
this is the effect one would expect.
Robustness checks of these basic specifications are presented on tables 2.10 and 2.13. 
These are for total compensation as dependent variable and market returns as perform­
ance measure (so it should be compared to column 4 of the corresponding deregulation 
table with market returns as performance measure). The first column of tables 2.10 and 
2.13 restricts the analysis to the services industries (including financial and other services 
instead of taking as benchmark all other sectors of the economy). By taking sectors that 
are closer to the deregulated industries the benchmark is stricter (although the inclusion 
of a sector trend deals with this in a parametric way). The results are almost unchanged 
with respect to the previous analysis (only the sensitivity to market returns is somewhat 
reduced).
The second column takes the logarithm of the dependent variable and results are
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qualitatively unchanged.
The third column introduces a measure of rents (computed as net income over sales).
As we mentioned before the fact that profits may fall as competition increases implies 
that performance pay sensitivities may be reduced (because of reduced return to effort 
form the fall in profits or because reduced rent extraction). To address to what extent 
this mechanism plays a role we introduce explicitly a measure of rents in column 3. Our 
coefficient of interest is again robust to introducing rents which indicates that omitting 
this variable does not affect the results.
Finally, the fourth column restricts the analysis to stayers. This restricts the identific­
ation of the effect to workers who were in the deregulated industries prior to deregulation 
and that underwent it. In the specification with movers, the effect was also identified 
through workers who moved into the deregulated sectors after deregulation. If these 
changes are correlated with some unobserved characteristic, the coefficient will not be 
capturing the causal effect of competition on performance pay sensitivities. Again, the 
results on the variable of interest are unchanged.
The results are robust to all these checks and the overall evidence from these exper­
iments indicates that the increase in competition reduced the fixed component of pay 
and increased the sensitivity of the variable component.
2.6 Conclusions
The determinants of managerial compensation have received a lot of attention and faced 
heated debate but little is known about how these are affected by the degree of product 
market competition that firms face. The competitive environment generates implicit 
incentives that determine the design of compensation packages and hence alter the need 
for and magnitude of explicit incentives. In this paper we draw together the main theories 
explaining managerial compensation and the impact of product market competition on 
compensation packages and evaluate empirically its effect.
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Our results show that the net effect of product market competition is to increase 
the performance pay sensitivity, indicating that as competition increases managers will 
be faced with steeper explicit incentives. This is true after controlling for the implicit 
risk in the economic environment faced by the manager. The results are also robust to 
different measures of product market competition. In particular, we use two deregulation 
experiences as a natural experiment in which a dramatic increase of the competition 
levels “happened for a subsample of firms. The results using this measure axe highly 
significant and robust to a number of different specifications. Furthermore they do not 
differ qualitatively from the ones using a standard concentration ratio index.
The results therefore indicate that increased product market competition leads to a 
higher reliance on performance related pay. Thus it provides a potential explanation for 
the trend over the past decades of an increased used of these compensation mechanisms.
It also indicates that the dispersion of earnings in the economy is likely to increase as 
product markets become more competitive; and hence this can be an additional explan­
ation for the recent increase in earnings inequality. Direct tests of these issues are left 
for future research.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximu
Salary 95545 305.17 207.77 250 0 4065.1
Bonus 95545 237.26 500.29 108 0 14276
Total comp. 95545 1158.02 2173.68 512.0 0 29988.38
Salary+bonus 95545 542.44 620.96 370.8 0 15251
Options granted 80766 640.26 1679.23 139.7 0 23991.26
Cone, ratio top4 86131 0.30 0.15 0.28 0.007 0.89
CR4*mkt. ret. 73420 24818.8 217942.3 1689.6 -5995770 7680000
CR4*acc.prof 85765 102.54 421.84 16.6 -3180.04 11643.2
Acc. profits (million US dollars) 95170 293.40 978.92 65.5 -9026 27493
Acc. profits sqd. (million US dollars) 95170 995935.1 1.05e+07 6193.6 3.95e-06 6.52e+0*
Market returns (10,000s US dollars) 81540 70479.8 548955 7110.3 -1.09e+07 2.08e+0'
Market returns sqd (10,000s US doll.) 81540 3.06e+ll 5.53e+12 5.13e+08 0 4.31e+b
Var. (cdf) profits 95514 0.51 0.28 0.5 0 1
Var. (cdf) mkt.ret. 93336 0.50 0.28 0.5 0 1
Rents 95067 -.09 6.11 0.054 -670.36 232.7
In assets 95247 7.08 1.77 6.9 -3.07 13.26
CEO 95549 0.13 0.34 0 0 1
male 95549 0.96 0.18 1 0 1
Var .acc. prof* acc. prof 95144 249.40 962.87 25.03 -9026 27448.03
Var. mkt.ret.*mkt.ret. 81025 65017.7 542141.3 1622.6 -1.09e+07 2.07e+0'
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Table 2.2: Effect of acc. profits and concentration on total compensation
(1) (2) (3)
Total Comp. Total Comp. Total Comp.
Acc. profits 0.5704*** 2.0769*** 5.7121***
(29.20) (13.97) (21.73)
Acc. profits squd. -2.4e-6* 2.0e-6 2.5e-6*
(1.91) (1.52) (1.69)
CR4*acc. prof. -0.3642*** -0.3213*** -0.2895***
(8.76) (7.74) (4.06)
In assets 342.2036*** 197.8142*** 533.5037***
(59.28) (22.16) (29.68)




Variance prof. 871.35*** -200.84
(20.49) (1.03)
Var. prof*acc. -1.56*** -5 14***
(10.27) (19.04)
Constant -1,983*** : -1 421*** -2,465
(33.91) ; (22.18) (1.10)
Time dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Individual effects no no yes
Observations 85765 85739 85739
Number of sect. 333 333
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.13
Number of indiv. 19138
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%..
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Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%..
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Table 2.4: Effect of acc. profits and concentration on options granted 
(1) (2) (3)
Options grant. Options grant. Options grant.
Acc. profits 0.1071*** -0.2642** 1.2875***
(6.15) (2.07) (5.40)
Acc. profits squd. 7.3e-6*** 6.9e-6*** 4.4e-6***
(6.54) (5.97) (3.24)
CR4*acc. prof. -0.0648* -0.0548 -0.1478**
(1.79) (1.52) (2.34)
In assets 242.9377*** 142.3704*** 355.9343***
(46.69) (17.65) (20.87)




Variance prof. 672.2337*** -421.3920**
(17.87) (2.44)
Vax. prof*acc. prof 0.3814*** -1.0211***
"(2.91) (4.13)
Constant -1,612.96*** -1,214.43*** -1,721.26
(29.85) (20.48) (0.70)
Time dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Individual effects no no yes
Observations 72482 72456 72456
Number of sectors 333 333 333
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.08
Number of indiv. 19104
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 2.5: Effect of market returns and concentration on total compensation
(1) (2) (3)
Total Comp. Total Comp. Total Comp.
Market return 0.0006*** 0.0136*** 0.0132***
(14.54) (34.10) (32.54)
Market ret. squd. 3.5e-12* 1.8e-ll*** 2.2e-ll***
(1.92) (10.03) (11.15)
CR4*market ret. -0.0006*** -0.0003*** - 0.0000
(6.47) (3.02) (0.00)
In assets 477.7028*** 317.5006*** 675.3671***
(79.47) (36.18) (28.43)




Variance*market ret. -0.0134*** -0.0132***
(32.78) (31.78)
Variance market 1,000.7254*** -40.4610
(22.25) (0.17)
Constant '-3,066.92*** -2,457103*** -3,498.35
(49.24) (37.06) (1.26)
Time dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Individual effects no no yes
Observations 73370 72904 72904
Number of sectors 331 327
R-squared 0.17 0.19 0.12
Number of individuals 18422
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 2.6: Effect of market returns and concentration on salary plus bonus
(1) (2) (3)
Salary+bonus Salaxy+bonus Salary-fbonus
Market return 0.0001*** 0.0024*** 0.0023***
(12.57) (24.69) (31.52)
Market ret. squd. -1.3e-12*** 1.2e-12*** 3.0e-12***
(2.87) (2.65) (8.29)
CR4*market ret. -0.0001*** -0.00005** -0.000008
(4.55) (2.10) (0.43)
In assets 173.0780*** 159.0564*** 45.6089***
(117.67) (73.79) (10.62)












Constant -973.8*** -921.6*** 122.6
(63.90) (56.60) (0.24)
Tim e dum m ies . yes yes yes
Sector dum m ies yes yes yes
Individual effects no no yes
Observations 73370 72904 72904
Number of sectors 331 327
R-squared 0.30 0.31 0.19
Number of indiv. 18422
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
significant, at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 2.7: Effect of market returns and concentration on options granted
(1) (2) (4)
Options grant. Options grant. Options grant.
Market return 0.0000 0.0023*** 0.0015***
(1.29) (6.73) (4.31)
Market ret. squd. 2.3e-ll*** 2.6e-ll*** 1.9e-ll***
(15.11) (17.35) (10.00)
CR4*market ret. 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0003***
(0.13) (0.66) (2.92)
In assets 287.1187*** 133.8204*** 355.3578***
(55.90) (17.94) (16.74)




Variance*market ret. -0.0023*** -0.0014***
(6.64) (3.80)
Variance market 1,020.4509*** 483.3271**
(26.91) (2.32)
Constant -1,039.07*** -1,385.13*** -1,938.96
(20.18) • ■ (24.18) (0.77)
Time dummies yes • yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Individual effects no no yes
Observations 63872 63408 63408
Number of sectors 331 327
R-squared 0.11 0.13 0.07
Number of indiv. 18388
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 2.8: Deregulation of the banking sector 1994, market returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total comp. Salary+bon. Options gr.. Total comp. Salary+bon. Options gi
Market return 0.0061*** 0.0018*** -0.0018*** 0.0070*** 0.0020*** -0.0003
(10.99) (10.52) (3.76) (11.77) (16.07) (0.47)
Market ret. squd. -4.4e-ll** -1.9e-ll*** -5.6e-ll*** 5.2e-ll*** 2.3e-12 -1.2e-ll
(2.37) (3.59) (3.65) (2.96) (0.62) (0.71)
fin94 -561.92*** -164.92*** -220.08** -504.36*** -94.70*** -163.60
(4.19) (4.00) (2.04) (4.50) (4.01) (1.57)
fin94Xmktret 0.0022*** 0.0011*** 0.0004*** 0.0022*** 0.0007*** - 0.0000
(11.86) (19.79) (2.73) (10.29) (14.93) (0.16)
Variance*mk. ret. -0.0052*** -0.0016*** 0.0022*** -0.0065*** -0.002*** 0.0005
(8.84) (9.13) (4.55) (10.45) (14.97) (0.74)
Variance market 783.29*** 113.88*** 686.30*** 533.57** 488.65*** 219.87
(21.35) (10.09) (22.64) (2.32) (10.12) (0.92)
In assets 162.41*** 122.58*** 24.28*** 350.98*** 34.67*** 29.93
(22.61) (55.48) (4.06) (12.04) (5.65) (1.02)
ceo 1,174.55*** 553.19*** 536.59*** 137.13*** 180.97*** 109.17***
(59.38) (90.93) (34.82) (3.51) (22.05) (3.13)
Male 136.73*** 72.53*** 8.44
(3.23) (5.57) (0.22)
Constant -127,635*** -63,847*** -153,660*** -143,329 -44,782 -6,714
(8.87) (14.42) (12.85) (0.83) (1.23) (0.02)
Observations 39484 39484 33844 39484 39484 33844
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Indiv. effectc. no no no yes yes yes
Number of sic2 61 61 61 61 61 61
R-squared 0.21 0.34 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.03
Number of indiv. 14161 14161 12975 14161 14161 12975
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%..
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Table 2.9: Deregulation of the banking sector 1994, accounting profits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total comp. Sal+bonus Options gr. Total comp. Sal+bonus Options gr.
Acc. profits 1.3980*** 0.4828*** -0.3659*** 3.8495*** 1.6770*** 0.8158***
(8.92) (10.55) (2.89) (12.20) (27.16) (2.76)
Acc. profits squd. l.le-6 -3.5e-6*** 1.3e-7 0.00002*** 4.7e-6*** 2.6e-6
(0.56) (6.28) (0.08) (7.49) (8.19) (0.84)
fin94 -212.49* -107.50*** -196.20** -247.13*** -67.32*** -166.19**
(1.95) (3.38) (2.29) (2.60) (3.62) (2.02)
fm94Xpre 0.4960*** 0.2293*** 0.1024*** 0.4773*** 0.1209*** 0.0514
(11.43) (18.10) (3.05) (9.78) (12.66) (1.24)
Variance prof. 722.66*** 116.23*** 528.60*** 232.07 290.75*** 259.84
(19.50) (10.74) (17.28) (1.14) (7.33) (1.36)
Var. prof*acc. prof -1.1117*** -0.3753*** 0.4404*** -3.6427*** -1.5984*** -0.7951***
(6.95) (8.03) (3.39) (11.30) (25.34) (2.62)
In assets 117.4362*** 90.8302*** 33.8528*** 213.9012*** 4.0159 28.3626
(15.54) (41.16) (5.33) (10.36) (0.99) (1.44)
ceo 1,180.88*** 543.83*** 534.34*** 73.38** 150.00*** 139.65***







Constant -25,306** -36,689*** -109,613*** -115,975 -34,735 -39,312
(2-31) (11.49) (11.68) (0.86) (1.32) (0.21)
T im e dum m ies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual effects no no no yes yes yes
Observations 50977 50977 41777 50977 50977 41777
Number of sect. 62 62 62 62 62 62
R-squared 0.18 0.33 0.08 0.07 0.20 0.04
Number of indiv. 15436 15436 13952 15436 15436 13952
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%..
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Table 2.10: Deregulation of the banking sector 1994, robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fin. and services sec. In Tot.Comp. Rents Stayers
Market return 0.0071*** 4.64e-6*** 0.0070*** 0.0069***
(4.42) (20.02) (11.68) (11.55)
Market ret. squd. 1.5e-10** 5.7e-15 4.4e-ll** 5 le-n***
(2.57) (0.72) (2.39) (2.89)
fin94 -505.3621*** -0.1083** -508.0139*** -530.6380***
(3.50) (2.15) (4.52) (4.74)
fin94Xmktret 0.0018*** 1.95e-7** 0.0022*** 0.0022***
(6.50) (2.54) (10.21) (10.20)
Variance*market ret. -0.0064*** -0.0000*** -0.0065*** -0.0064***
(3.72) (18.80) (10.41) (10.19)
Variance market 643.4061 0.1743*' 510.5187**"
(1.31) (1.68) (2.22)
In assets 637.31*** 0.2093*** 349.27*** 374.37***
(9.51) (15.94) (11.92) (11.66)
ceo .287.72*** 0.1293*** 136.31*** 124.44***





Constant -340,736*** -251*** -144,791 -329,757***
(3.88) (3.23) (0.84) (24.57)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes
Sector trend yes yes yes yes
Individual effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 9247 39445 39418 39484
Number of indiv 3474 14147 14154
R-squared 0.15 0.17 0.09 0.08
Number of stayers 14449
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%..
Notes: The reference estimation is column 4 of Table 2.8: (1) is computed on service industries (SIC 60 to 81) (2) has ln(tot.comp.) 
as dep. variable (3) includes rents in the specification (4) is computed on workers within the same firm
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Table 2.11: Deregulation of the financial sector 1999, market returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total comp. Sal+bonus Options gr. Total comp. Sal+bonus Options gr.
Market return 0.0137*** 0.0025*** 0.0029*** 0.0103*** 0.0018*** 0.0007
(25.91) (19.93) (6.59) (19.39) (20.10) (1.53)
Market ret. sq. 1.9e-ll*** 1.0e-12** 1.9e-ll*** l.le-11*** 2.2e-12*** 1.5e-ll***
(9.63) (2.22) (11.72) (5.31) (6.03) (7.24)
fin -793.2*** -175.5*** -326.2*** -635.4*** -147.8*** -237.5**
(5.87) (5.55) (2.93) (5.42) (7.57) (2.32)
finXmktret 0.0015*** 0.0002*** 0.0002** 0.0016*** 0.0002*** 0.0003***
(12.76) (8.35) (2.06) (14.11) (10.39) (2.83)
Var.*mark. ret. -0.0136*** -0.0024*** -0.0029*** -0.0104*** -0.0018*** -0.0007
(25.28) (19.30) (6.42) (19.28) (19.75) (1.43)
Variance mark. 1,622.8*** 44.8*** 1,873.5*** -578.6 744.8*** -960.6**
(25.22) (2.98) (34.51) (1.05) (8.13) (2.02)
In assets 342.9069*** 195.0105*** 110.8193*** 1,100.0066*** 74.4715*** 584.2***
(27.08) (65.79) (10.33) (24.98) (10.15) (14.62)
ceo 1,529.1*** 631.8*** , 980.5*** 194.4*** 268.3*** 316.4***





Constant -497,822**.*' -110,447*** -321,563*** -62,499 -45,489 -176,154
(19.54) (18.52) (15.28) (0.07) (0.32) (0.29)
T im e dum mies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual eff. no no no yes yes yes
Observations 41486 41486 36662 41486 41486 36662
Number of sic2 62 62 62 62 62 62
R-squared 0.21 0.33 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.06
Number of indiv. 14943 14943 14898 14943 14943 14898
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 2.12: Deregulation of the financial sector 1999, accounting profits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total comp. Sal+bonus Options gr. Total comp. Sal+bonus Options gr.
Acc. profits 1.1834*** 0.4525*** -0.9696*** 5.4825*** 1.367*** 1.0060**
(5.67) (9.36) (5.38) (12.48) (18.99) (2.45)
Acc. profits sq. -0.00001*** -3.9e-6*** -2.3e-6* 1.3e-6 -1.6e-6*** 7.2e-6***
(6.70) (11.26) (1.66) (0.76) (5.53) (4.05)
fin -53.3 -96.9*** -212.1* -123.8 -47.21*** -164.2
(0.41) (3.19) (1.91) (1.09) (2.53) (1.63)
finXpre 0.4277*** 0.1888*** 0.1313*** 0.4839*** 0.07*** 0.1317***
(9.97) (18.99) (3.73) (11.02) (10.17) (3.19)
Variance prof. 1,089.1*** 133.2*** 1,170.5*** -1,038.9** -473.3*** -1,671.8***
(15.88) (8.38) (19.29) (2.55) (7.09) (4.63)
Var. pr*acc.pr. - -0.6677*** -0.3087*** - 1.1542*** -5.3795*** ~ -1.299** -1.0225**-
(3.13) (6.24) (6.25) (11.70) (17.24) (2.37)
In assets 263.0*** 131.8*** 172.2*** 906.3*** 34.51*** 598.6***
(17.37) (37.54) (12.72) (24.56) (5.7) (16.89)
ceo 1,519.7*** 627.1*** 991.0*** 197.1*** 252.5*** 390.5***
(48.61) (86.50) (38.33) (3.15) (24.63) (7.28)
Male 253.1560*** 75.8750*** 10.3479
(4.77) (6.17),.. (0.21)
Constant -373,684*** -73,268*** -341,964*** -423,541 -195,686 45,479
(15.27) (12.91) (16.40) (0.50) (1.40) (0.04)
Timfi dum m ies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual eff. no no no yes yes yes
Observations 44167 44167 38746 44167 38746 38746
Number of sic2 62 62 62 62 62 62
R-squared 0.20 0.34 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.06
Number of ind. 15480 15432 15432 15480 15480 15432
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% +
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Table 2.13: Deregulation of the financial sector 1999, robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fin. and services sec. In Tot.Comp. Rents Stayers
Market return 0.0117*** 4.64e-6*** 0.0102*** 0.0105***
(10.64) (27.28) (19.09) (19.77)
Market ret. squd. 2.7e-ll*** 3.7e-16 1.2e-ll*** l.le-11***
(8.10) (0.53) (5.53) (5.12)
fin -674.0828*** -0.2743*** -638.7240*** -616.1032***
(4.05) (7.31) (5.42) (5.28)
finXmktret 0.0017*** 1.95e-7*** 0.0016*** 0.0016***
(13.42) (5.27) (14.07) (14.07)
Variance*market ret. -0.0120*** -0.0000*** -0.0103*** -0.0106***
(10.84) (26.90) (18.91) (19.66)
Variance market 704.8854 -0.2098 - -581.6126
(0.49) (1.15) (1.06)
In assets 1,027.3077*** 0.4299*** 1,114.5571*** 1,216.1255***
(12.50) (30.41) (24.91) (25.88)
ceo 139.5992 0.1673*** 194.4852*** 130.9413*





Constant -2,093,703.1*** -99.0 -65,368.8 -724,942.3***
(8.90) (0.36) (0.08) (30.08)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Sector dum m ies yes yes yes yes
Sector trend yes yes yes yes
Individual effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 11092 41403 41425 41486
Number of individuals 4127 14925 14933
R-squared 0.13 0.19 0.11 0.11
Number of stayers 15280
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%..
Notes: The reference estimation is column 4 Table 2.11: (1) is computed on service industries (SIC 60 to 81) (2) has ln(tot.comp.) 
asdep.variable (3) includes rents in the specification (4) is computed on workers within the same firm
C hapter 3
The hidden costs o f fixed term  
contracts: th e im pact on work 
accidents
3.1 Introduction
What are the consequences of allowing for different contractual arrangements within the 
labour market on productivity and workers’ welfare? Different arrangements for labour 
market institutions and the types of contracts allowed in an economy may have differ­
ent consequences in terms of labour market efficiency and productivity. It is therefore 
important to take these consequences into account in order to devise the optimal design 
for a labour market. Different types of contracts have been shown to differ in the wages 
they offer1 and in the training provided by employers2. However, there is little evidence 
on other consequences of the incentives generated by the different types of contracts such
1 Jimeno and Toharia (1993) show that Spanish workers on temporary contracts receive a lower pay 
than their permanent counterparts
2 Booth et al. (2001) find that the probability of receiving on-the-job training for workers in some 
type of FTC with respect to their permanent counterparts is 12% lower for male and 7% lower for female 
workers.
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as their impact on productivity and workers welfare.
In this paper I develop the idea that different types of employment contracts provide 
different incentives to both the worker and the firm and hence result in different labour 
market outcomes. More precisely I focus on the differential impact of the type of con­
tract on work accident rates for fixed term contract (FTC) versus indefinite or permanent 
contract (IC) workers. In a market where firms can chose between fixed term and per­
manent contracts for their workers, theory predicts that workers on fixed term contracts 
(characterised by a shorter duration and where rehiring is uncertain) will have a lower 
investment in specific human capital than their colleagues on permanent contracts. In 
addition FTC workers may also exert more effort on the job to raise their rehiring prob­
abilities. The direct consequence of both a lower investment in human capital and higher 
. effort is that FTC workers will have a higher probability of having an accident at the 
workplace. ■
In many countries there is no difference between the types of contracts legally allowed, 
or these axe very similar, and it is therefore difficult to assess the actual impact of 
those arrangements (since there is no counterfactual available). This is why Spain is 
an ideal scenario to study these issues since it has a dual system in which temporary 
and permanent contracts are very different in terms of job protection. Furthermore a 
-substantial part of the Spanish workforce (31% in 2000) is on fixed term contracts, and 
its accident rate has fluctuated substantially in the past 20 years. Spain has the highest 
work accident rate in the European Union, and while the European Union average in 
1998 was 4.09 accidents per 100 workers, the Spanish incidence rate was 7.07 accidents 
per 100 workers3. Concerning the different incidence of accidents between FTC and IC 
workers, in 1999 the incidence of work accidents for FTC workers was 13 % while that 
of IC was 4.1%. The increase in work accidents has gone parallel to that in fixed term
3 These are harmonised data from the ESAW (European Statistics on Accidents at Work) study run 
by the EU Commission and correspond to accidetns at work resulting in more tha n 3 days of absence 
and fatal accidents at work. For reference see Dupre (2001).
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contracts (figures 1 and 4) .This paper attempts to explain what part of this very large 
difference is due to a pure contractual effect.
There are other elements that create a differential in the accident rates of temporary 
and permanent contract workers that do not result strictly from a contractual effect. 
First, there may be some type of selection that results in FTC workers being more 
or less accident prone independently of the contract type. For instance if employers 
systematically hire the low ability workers under FTC. This would result in a higher 
accident rate for workers that is not a result of a contractual effect. Second, fixed term 
contract workers may systematically misreport the true accident rate. As a result of 
moral hazard, workers on FTC may report accidents more frequently than IC workers. 
On the other hand, having had an accident may be a bad signal to your current employer, 
who is also a potential future employer, and to other potential employers. In that case 
FTC workers have an incentive to under-report their accidents in order to have a higher 
probability of having their contracts renewed. For these reasons FTC may alter the 
reporting incentives and this will also reflect in differential accident rates.
In this paper I analyse two panels of sectoral work accidents between 1988 and 1998 
for 32 industrial branches and apply two different identification strategies to distinguish 
the pure contractual effect from the selection and reporting biases. The first identification 
strategy is a difference estimator while the second exploits accidents on the way to work 
to identify the pure contractual effect.
In what follows I assess what fraction of the raw difference in accident probabilities 
between fixed term and permanent workers is due to the pure contractual effect derived 
from the duality of contracts, and see if after controlling for all the elements that may 
affect that gap a differential between FTC and IC accident rates persists. If this is so, 
one can conclude that temporary workers not only earn lower wages (Jimeno and Toharia 
(1993)) but they also have a higher accident risk4. This would be consistent with the
4 A potential explanation to the difference in accident rates would be that FTC workers are system­
atically assigned to dangerous tasks. If this were the only explanation then the incidence for IC workers
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theory and empirical analysis developed by Hamermesh (1999) where increasing wage 
inequality is accompanied by increasing inequality in work disamenities including risk of 
work injury.
The next section describes what determines the different accident rates between con­
tracts. Section 3 outlines the econometric specification. Section 4 describes the data used 
and the identification strategies. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 concludes.
3.2 Reasons for a differential in accident rates between  
FTC and IC workers
From the existing theory we can select three different sets of reasons why there may 
be a systematic difference between the accident rate of fixed term workers and that of 
permanent workers.
Firstly investments in specific human capital depend on the expected return of the 
investment. For workers with short duration contracts the incentives of the employer and 
the worker to invest in specific human capital are lower than for identical workers with 
longer contract durations. These lower investments create a differential in human capital 
that may lead to systematically higher accident rates for those with temporary contracts. 
In this framework specific human capital would include not only on-the-job training to 
learn to do the job better, but also investment/training in health and safety (that are 
typically done by the employer). As far as related evidence on this is concerned Booth 
et al.(2002) find on UK data that temporary workers receive less on-the-job training 
than permanent workers. Furthermore there is a related literature in the medical and 
epidemiology fields on the impact of contract precariousness on health. Benavides et al. 
(2000) and Benavides and Benach (1999) find that job dissatisfaction, fatigue, backache 
and muscular pains are positively associated with precarious employment. This seems to
should have been falling over time (unless risk in the economy had increased dramatically). Figure 4 
shows that it has remained stable while that of FTC workers is much higher and increased over time.
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indicate that investments made by employers in health and safety measures are lower for 
FTC workers5. These differential investments in human capital arise from the difference 
in contract durations, and hence a lot will hinge on the probability that a fixed term 
worker is rehired on a permanent basis. If the worker is relatively certain that he will 
be rehired then there should not be much difference between the two types of contract, 
but when rehiring probabilities are low the mentioned effect will be fully at work. Gtiell 
and Petrongolo (2000) find that in Spain the probability of conversion of a fixed term 
contract into a permanent one went down from almost 20% in 1987 to 7% in 19966. 
Booth et al.(2001) find for the: UK that on the job training is lower for FTC workers. In 
fact previous studies have shown that fixed term contracts are used by firms as a flexible 
mechanism to adjust employment to fluctuations in the business cycle rather than using 
them as a worker screening or testing device (see Blanchard and Landier (2001)). It is 
also possible that the fact that FTC workers are less protected by trade unions reduces 
their bargaining power enabling employers to reduce their investment in safety measure 
and training for those workers. This would reinforce the mentioned effect of having a 
fixed term contract on accident rates through human capital differences.
Secondly a stream of literature has analysed the moral hazard effects in relation to 
work accidents. Fortin et al. (1999) analyse the relationship between workers compens­
ation (WC) and the probability of reporting accidents and incorporate the interaction 
between WC and unemployment benefit. They argue that if WC is more generous than 
unemployment benefit (UB), those workers who are close to being laid off will ‘try to 
benefit from WC as much as they can. This applies straightforwardly to the case of
5 Amuedo-Dorantes (2002) finds in a study for Spain in 1997 that workers on FTC have worse working 
conditions than IC workers. She then studies the impact of the type of contract on the accident probability 
after controlling for these working conditions and finds a negligible effect. Unfortunately that study does 
not attempt to control for the moral hazard, reporting effects and selection on ability biases as I do in 
this paper. This residual contractual effect is likely to be a combination of all these reasons plus the pure 
contractual effect.
6 They explain that in their sample from the Spanish Labour Force survey, a third of fixed term 
contracts terminate with a new FTC, a third terminate in unemployment or inactivity and 11% are 
renewed to a permanent basis. 20% of the spells they observe are censored.
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FTC, and workers who know their contract is close to expiry will report more since they 
are entitled to WC (and maybe not to UB). This is referred to as ex ante moral hazard. 
There is also a form of ex post moral hazard given by those who have injuries that are 
difficult to diagnose. These people will claim WC and exaggerate their state. A related 
reporting effect is outlined in Boone and Van Ours (2002) that find in a cross-country 
analysis of fluctuation in accident rates that work accidents are counter-cyclical. In the 
analysis below I condition explicitly for the sectoral unemployment rate.
In Spain, a FTC worker who has an accident is entitled to 75% of his previous wage as 
worker compensation. This may last for a maximum of 12 months (plus six if those extra 
six months lead to recovery). To be entitled to benefit the worker must have made social 
contributions for at least 12 months in the previous 6 years (6 months in the previous 4 
years before the 1992 reform). The amount of unemployment benefit received is 70% of 
the previous wage (80% before 1992) for the first six months subject to a maximum and 
a minimum cap.
Within this system, a moral hazard problem of the ex ante type may appear especially 
for young workers on FTC who are not entitled to unemployment benefit because they 
have not been contributing long enough.
A third source of hazard for the temporary workers is that if the probability of 
being rehired , is increasing in effort,, then FTC workers will exert more effort on the 
job. Intensity of work (or faster pace to impress the employer) will increase accident 
probabilities. Jimeno and Toharia (1996) find evidence that this is happening in Spain 
but do not make the link to the accident rate7. Descriptive studies on health at the 
workplace also find that FTC workers are less absent from work than permanent workers 
(Benavides et al. (2000)). At the same time, and following this argument, a systematic 
under-reporting of accidents might appear since if having had an accident is a negative
7 In the empirical analysis they proxy effort with absenteeism but the data are such that one cannot 
distinguish absences due to illness and those due to accidents. They run a probit of the probability 
of being absent form work controlling for different measures of sectoral/occupational accident rates to 
separate absences due to accidents from the absenteeism effect.
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signal for the employer and reduces (re)employment probabilities, FTC workers will tend 
to under-report accidents. So the reporting effect may go either way. In our estimation 
the net reporting effect will be dealt with using accidents on the way to work.
In addition to the human capital and reporting effects, the difference in accident 
rates between the two types of contracts may be the result of some type of selection on 
who holds a fixed term contract. If it is “bad” workers who are systematically hired on 
temporary contracts, then the gap is just a result of some unobserved difference in the 
quality/ability of workers. The analysis in this paper provides a way to control for this.
It must also be noted that_there are no systematic institutional differences in the 
treatment of FTC and IC workers. Health and safety regulations treat both types of 
workers equally8. Furthermore the reporting procedure of work accidents, the fact that 
firms are not penalised for housing a lot of accidents (no experience rating) and that it 
is insurance companies who pay the workers compensation implies that there is close to 
100% notification and that there are no differences in the behaviour of workers due to 
different incentives provided by the legislation.
Finally, in the empirical analysis other mechanisms must be controlled for. Workers 
on FTC will typically have less tenure and if experience is acquired with tenure then 
FTC workers will have more accidents just through this compositional effect. The em­
pirical analysis will account for these and other observable differences (see table 3.1) to 
disentangle what is the proportion of the actual raw difference in accident probabilities 
that is exclusively due to the type of contract. -
8The adoption of the EC 91/383 directive on health and safety for FTC workers in the Spanish 
legislation (in the Ley de Prevencion de Riesgos Laborales in 1995, article 28) has established equal 
treatment for both types of workers. Nevertheless, the ban on dangerous jobs for FTC workers has only 
been adopted for workers hired through temporary work agencies since 1999 (RD 216/1999).
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3.3 Econom etric specification
The probability of an accident can be written as a function a of a series of covariates 
as y*jt = Pr(yijt =  1) =  F(Xijt,(3). At the individual level we would observe yijt =  1 
if F(Xijt, P) > z* and yijt = 0 otherwise. Aggregating all the individuals in a sector 
j  yields the proportion of the rijt individuals in sector j  who had an accident in time 
t. This observed proportion Pjt is an estimate of the population quantity 7r^, which is 
determined by F(Xjt,/3).  A standard econometric technique to apply to these data is 
the minimum chi-square logit estimator9. Assuming a logistic distribution for F allows 
us to work with the transformation::
= (3.1)
This is estimated by weighted least squares and :pfodiices the minimum chi-squared 
logit estimates of ft. Marginal effects are computed'as: M a.effect = (3*P(1 — P), where 
P  is the average sample probability of an accident.
My analysis is based on computing the sample probabilities of having an accident in a 
given sector and year. This is regressed using the minimum chi-squared logit method on 
a series of covariates that account for the business cycle, sectoral variables and individual 
characteristics. The standard errors are computed using the White covariance matrix. 
The individual level regression would be a limited dependent variable regression of:
yijt =  1 if ot +  X lij tP1 +  Zjt(3 2 +  7 iF T C i j t  +  7 2 ^  +  7 3 djj 4 - £ijt > 0 (3.2)
yijt =  0 otherwise
Where Xij t are individual characteristics, Zjt are sectoral variables, FTCijt  is a dummy 
variable of whether the individual is on fixed term contracts, dtt and djj are a set of time
9See Amemiya, T. (1981) for a complete analysis.
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and sector dummies. Since I have data for the proportions Pcjt of accidents by industrial 
branch and type of contract, equation (3.2) can be naturally specified in the grouped 
logit framework as:
n^(i— ^p~) =  a  +  z'cjtfi l +  Z'jtP 2 + l \F T C cjt +  l 2dtt +  l$djj +  +ecjt (3.3) J- *cjt
Where xcjt are the mean values of individual characteristics by type of contract, sector 
and time. Note that it is possible in this framework to identify the coefficients of equation 
(3.3) . The gap between the accident rates of the two types of workers will be captured 
by the coefficient 7 1#
Similarly, if instead using Pcjt, Pjt is used (accident probabilities by branch j  and 
time £), then the equation to be estimated becomes:
ln( — 7 p “ ) — a +  x'jtPi +  ZjtP 2 +  7\FTCjt +  7 2  dtt + Jsdjj +  £jt (3.4)
Where FTCjt is the proportion of workers in sector j  at time t that have a fixed term 
contract.
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) are the basis of the empirical analysis.
3.4 D ata and identification strategies
I use the work accidents data published by the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs in the Estadistica de Accidentes de Trabajo (E.A.T.). In Spain all salaried workers 
must be insured against work accidents by law. The employer can choose whether to use 
public insurance with the national social security or to use a private insurance company 
(Mutuas de Accidentes laborales) and the premium paid depends on the wage of the 
worker regardless of the type of contract. In the event that an accident occurs there 
is an obligation to declare it, fill in a report and pass it to the insurance company and
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the Public Administration. Prom those reports10 aggregate statistics on the number of 
accidents according to different classifications are published in the E.A.T.
I use two different classifications from the E.A.T., and for each of them I have a 
different identification strategy. The aim is to have a measure for the pure contractual 
effect net of all compositional effects including the accident proneness and reporting 
biases.
Firstly I use the number of work accidents by year, industrial branch and type of 
contract occurred in the period 1989-1998 to estimate equation (3.3). I identify the effect 
of temporary contracts using a difference estimator on the effect of holding a temporary 
contract. The problem with this estimator is that if there is a selection bias into FTC 
as a function of ability, accident proneness or any other unobserved variable, then the 
contract coefficient will be capturing this. The problem arises only if the selection is 
done through the unobserved characteristics. ■= •, :
To assess to what extent this coefficient captures the effect of ability or other types 
of systematic differences -like under or over-reporting- between workers in either type 
of contract I use another dataset, namely the total number of accidents by industrial 
branch. These data are split into two groups: accidents occurred at the workplace and 
accidents on the way to work. The identification strategy here relies on the assumption 
that the individual probability of having an accident on the way to work is. independent 
of the type of contract held, but will depend on the accident proneness of workers. On 
the one hand, both the probability of having a serious or a fatal accident on the way 
to work and the probability of having an accident at work will depend on the accident 
proneness of the individual. Hence, introducing the probability of having a serious or a 
fatal accident in the estimation of equation (3.4) will capture the accident proneness and 
the contract coefficient will then be net of the ability/selection bias related to accident 
proneness. On the other hand, if there is a systematic reporting difference between the
10 Partes de accidentes laborales
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two groups (temporary and permanent), this should be captured by the variation in light 
accidents on the way to work. But light accidents also capture the accident proneness 
differential mentioned before (since one can misreport light accidents but not serious 
or fatal accidents). So including total accidents on the way to work (light, serious and 
deadly) in the regression will capture both the selection bias due to differences in accident 
proneness and due to systematic misreporting differences of workers on either type of 
contract
Figure 3.2 presents evidence for the validity of the identification strategy. If acci­
dents on the way to work capture the changes in the accident proneness composition of ~ 
both groups, then the ratio of accidents on the way to work to accidents at the work­
place should be stable over time, everything else equal. Changes in that ratio should 
only be due to factors that affect differentially both magnitudes, like the changes in the 
proportion of people holding fixed term contracts.- The main characteristic of the 1984 
reform -a major reform of the Spanish .employment legislation- was that it introduced 
fixed term contracts as a standard contract that could be used under a large number of 
circumstances (before that date they were seldom used and restricted to specific cases). 
So we should expect that before the reform this accident type ratio is stable and that if 
fixed term contracts are indeed relevant the ratio will fall as the proportion of FTC in 
the economy increases. This is indeed what happens in figure 3.2. After the introduction 
of fixed term contracts in 1984 the rise in the proportion of workers under FTC is accom­
panied by a fall in the ratio of accidents11. Further, Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of 
travel time to work for both types of workers12. These are virtually identical supporting 
the idea that accidents on the way to work and type of contract are independent. This 
confirms the validity of the use of accidents on the way to work as a way to identify the
11 Figure 3 shows the evolution of the total number of accidents at work and on the way to work. 
Both series are smooth and confirm that the big fall in the accident type ratio is capturing a progressive 
change in the risk of work accidents that is due to the widespread use of fixed term contracts and is not 
a measurement problem
12In the Canaries between 1996-2000, 61% of accidents on the way to work were caused by vehicles, 
the next larger category being falls (13%) (data provided by the Labour Agency)
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pure contractual effect, since the variation in compositional changes will be captured by 
the accidents on the way to work. Thus I estimate equations 3.3 and 3.4 using two dif­
ferent panels of work accidents by branch. The following section describes the covariates 
used.
3 .4 .1  D eterm in an ts o f  th e  injury probab ility
The difference in accident rates of FTC and IC workers could arise from other differences 
that have nothing to do with the contract. The most immediate one is that workers on 
fixed term contracts have shorter tenure and since the probability of an accident is 
decreasing in tenure and experience, FTC contracts will show a higher incidence just 
from this fact. But many other elements have an impact on injury probabilities. The 
determinants of injury probabilities fall into two categories: that of sectoral or aggregate 
data, i.e. how sectoral economic conditions, affect injury probabilities, and then the 
individual characteristics of the worker. In theformer category I will include the following 
variables: sectoral unemployment rates and the growth rate of sectoral valued added as 
indicators of the business cycle; the sector to which the worker belongs; the sectoral 
vacancy rate as a proxy for the degree of expertise of those entering the labour force 
(when the vacancy rate is high it should mean that all the experts in the workforce have 
been employed and hence that the new recruits will have less expertise); year dummies 
to account for other macroeconomic effects that may not be captured in the previous 
variables and a sectoral trend in the first set of regressions.
The other relevant set of factors are individual characteristics. Among these I include: 
the type of contract; the age, gender and tenure distributions and the proportion of 
people that work overtime hours in the sector as a proxy for work intensity computed 
from the EPA. Finally, in the second set of results I include the probability of having an 
accident on the way to work. Tables 3.1,3.2 and 3.3 contain the descriptive statistics of 
the variables used and the detail of how these are built can be found in the appendix.
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3.5 R esults
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To analyse the effect of FTC on the probability of work accidents I run the minimum 
chi-squared logit method on two sets of data. First, I use the data of work accidents at 
the workplace by branch and type of contract from 1989 to 1998. The covariates used in 
the estimation are as described in the previous section. The contract effect is captured 
by a dummy variable that indicates if the workers were on FTC.
The results are presented in Table 3.5 .The sample raw differential in accident prob­
abilities is of about 7 percentage points. FTC workers have an accident probability of 
11.6% while for IC workers it is 4.5%.
Without introducing any other covariates, the effect of FTC is to increase by 5.8 
percentage points the probability of having an accident. After introducing the set of 
controls, sectoral and time dummies the contract effect still survives and indicates that 
having a FTC increases the probability of accident by 7.2 percentage points. One might 
think that the coefficient may be biased if temporary workers are systematically of a 
different quality than permanent workers. In that case this coefficient will be capturing 
that selection13.
The behaviour of the rest of covariates is as follows. The coefficients on the tenure 
distribution confirm that the accident probability is higher for people with short tenure 
and reaches a maximum for those between 6 months to 1 year of tenure. The results for 
the age distribution show that the age groups with more accidents are old workers (above 
55) and those between 25 and 35. This may capture a number of effects like how careful 
these groups are at the workplace. Concerning gender differences, male workers have 
more accidents. Finally, the coefficient on the proportion of workers who did overtime 
hours, that was used as a measure of work intensity, is negative and significant. This
13 Observed differences in the selection are controlled for in the regressors. If there are any unobserved 
differences determining whether the worker holds a FTC then this would result in omitted variable 
bias. The second specification in table 5 excludes as covariates the individual characteristics. The FTC  
coefficient changes considerably when one omits these variables indicating that selection into either type 
of contract is correlated with the observable characteristics.
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is probably because the probability of having an accident for a low tenure worker is 
higher than that of an experienced worker even when the latter works overtime. In 
sectors that prefer to make their workers work extra hours instead of hiring new workers 
the accident rate will be lower. Finally, branch and year dummies as well as a sector 
trend were included. Sector dummies were highly significant confirming the idea that the 
risk differential between sectors is important and must be accounted for in the analysis. 
When these dummies were included the sectoral variables lost significance although they 
kept the expected sign: the unemployment rate has a negative impact on accidents, 
indicating that when unemployment is high there axe fewer accidents because activity is 
low, remaining workers are of higher ability or because reporting is higher as in Boone 
and Van Ours (2002)). Vacancies and the growth rate of value added have a positive 
effect on accidents.
The results confirm the idea that there is a contractual effect at work and it appears 
to be very large. But as mentioned above if FTC. workers are systematically selected 
according to some unobserved elements (such as ability), then the reported coefficient 
may be capturing that systematic difference and hence biased. To check that there is no 
underlying characteristic of fixed term contract workers biasing the results, I exploit the 
second dataset.
The second set of data records total accidents at the workplace by branch between 
1988 and 1998. A grouped logit regression is run on the same set of industry variables 
as before. Now the contract effect is captured by the proportion of FTC workers in 
the branch. Note that most of the accidents are fight (the probability of having a fight 
accident at the workplace is 5%, that of a serious accident is 0.1% an that of a deadly 
accident is 0.001%), and hence the probabilities of serious and fatal accidents are too 
small to run the analysis for the different types of accidents.
Table 3.6 shows the results for accidents occurred at the workplace. After controlling 
for all covariates, the marginal effect of an increase in the proportion of temporary
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contracts of one percent is 0.038 (though with a t-value of only 1.3).
At this point and as mentioned above, a potential problem with the estimation of 
the FTC effect must be dealt with. If there is some type of selection process by which 
FTC workers are of lower ability and hence have more accidents -and the selection is 
not constant across sectors-, then the FTC coefficient will be capturing this. The other 
problem is that FTC workers may consistently over-report accidents (because of the 
moral hazard reasons mentioned before) or under-report them, if they want to make 
sure they are reemployed and want to avoid the stigma of looking like a “bad worker”.
The identification strategy used for these data exploits accidents on the way to work 
and is based on the assumption that the true probability of having an accident on the 
way to work is independent of the contract held. Hence using the proportion of serious 
and fatal accidents on the way to work as a regressor should control for the variation of 
accidents at the workplace that are due to variations in the quality of workers hired and 
hence the FTC coefficient will be free from the quality composition problem.
I also assume that the tendency to over/under report an accident for an individual 
should be the same whether the accident occurs at work or on the way to work since 
the compensation received in either case is the same (in Spain accidents on the way to 
work are considered by law as work accidents). Hence variations in the reporting bias 
because of changes in the composition of the workforce will be captured by variations in 
accidents on the way to work. In this case it is light accidents on the way to work that 
enable the identification since only for this type of accidents workers can misreport the 
true state. Serious and fatal accidents axe harder or impossible to misreport, so serious 
and fatal accidents will capture the “ability” or accident proneness element of the bias 
while light accidents will capture both the accident proneness and the reporting effects.
So including the proportion of serious and fatal accidents occurred on the way to 
work as a regressor in the workplace accidents regression should eliminate the system­
atic differences between the two groups and we are left with a pure contractual effect
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that includes the human capital, increased effort and reporting effects. Then using the 
proportion of all types of accidents on the way to work also captures the variation in 
systematic reporting differences or other aspects that can be manipulated by the worker.
After introducing the proportion of serious and fatal accidents on the way to work 
and hence controlling for systematic differences in accident proneness the contractual 
effect survives and is about 7.4 percentage points (Table 3.7). Further, controlling for 
all types of systematic differences including reporting biases preserves the positive effect 
of fixed term contracts on the probability of accidents and yields a marginal effect of 
0.051 (Table ??)14. That is, after cleaning the contract coefficient of the selection and 
reporting biases the contractual effect results in an increase of 5 points in the accident 
probability, i.e. it roughly doubles that probability..
3.6 Conclusion
This paper assesses whether there is a systematic difference between the accident rates of 
fixed term and permanent contracts workers that is not just the result of a compositional 
effect. A pure contractual differential may arise because the nature of the temporary 
contract, namely its short duration, reduces the incentives to invest in specific human 
capital and hence reduces the expertise of the worker leading to a higher accident rate. 
It may also increase effort exerted thus resulting in more accidents. On the other hand 
there may be a systematic selection of workers into either type of contract due to ability 
or systematic reporting differences that might explain why fixed term contract workers 
have more accidents. I try to separate the different effects and see if after controlling for 
all relevant elements, a contractual effect subsists.
I use a sectoral panel with 32 industrial branches over 11 years. The results indicate 
that there is a contractual effect at work that explains a very large part of the raw
14 In any case note the increase in the R2 in the first specification from table 6 to tables 7 and 8 
indicates that accidents on the way to work are capturing a variation that explains a lot of the changes 
in workplace accidents. Also, the associated coefficients are positive and higly significant.
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differential (around 70%). This effect subsists after I control for all observables plus the 
ability and reporting biases using accidents on the way to work. I claim that the resulting 
difference of 5 percentage points in accident probabilities is due to different investments 
in human capital (including safety training/measures) and different effort levels exerted 
on the job.
The consequences of these results in terms of social cost and productivity are evident. 
Workers on temporary contracts suffer from higher job insecurity both in terms of lower 
wages and higher accident risk. On the labour demand side, there are negative effects 
of allowing.employers to use FTC to adjust employment_to the.business cycle at low 
cost: temporary contracts imply lower human capital accumulation and potentially lower 
productivity. A policy implication of these results would be to try to limit the use of FTC 
to cases where it is really necessary and bring in labour market flexibility using another 
type of institution that does not have this negative feature. Or set up the conditions so 
that more FTC are transformed into permanent contracts and the mechanisms through 
which the pure contractual effect appears are no longer present.
3.7 Appendix: Construction of th e variables
A) Sectors: I had to homogenise the industrial classifications CNAE74, CNAE 92 and 
the sectors as defined in the EAT (which groups the CNAE subsectors -2digits- into 44 
industrial groups). This forced me to group further some categories and I ended up with 
32 “branches” or ’’sectors” that represent all areas of activity.
B) Work accidents: three different panels of sectoral accidents were used. These 
were obtained from the Estadistica de Accidentes de Trabajo (E.A.T.) provided by the 
Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos sociales (M.T.A.S.). These axe public data that are 
provided in paper format. The series are constructed from the aggregation of individual 
records and are provided by the M.T.A.S. The series used here were: 1) Total number of 
accidents at the workplace per industrial branch, year and type of contract (fixed-term
CHAPTER 3. THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FIXED TERM CONTRACTS 124
or permanent); 2) Total number of accidents at the workplace per industrial branch, 
year and seriousness of the accident; 3) Total number of accidents occurred on the way 
to work (in itinere) per industrial branch, year and seriousness of the accident. This is 
divided into light, serious and fatal accidents. All accidents refer to accidents leading to 
at least one day of absence from work.
C) Employment by sector and other covariates: To obtain the risk of having an 
accident I built the series of the population at risk (employment) per sector (and type 
of contract where relevant) from the second quarter of the Spanish labour force survey 
(E.P.A., I.N.E.). The covariates on individual characteristics were also obtained from 
the E.P.A. These are constructed as the proportions per sector, year (and contract were 
relevant) of individuals with the relevant characteristic. These were:
- Age, job tenure and gender distributions
- Overtime hours worked: proportion of employed who worked more than fourty 
hours in the reference week.
D) Sectoral variables
- Proportion of fixed term contracts in the sector. Source: 2nd quarter 1987-1998, 
EPAINE
- Unemployment: The unemployment rate in the sector is the number unemployed 
workers who previously held a job in the sector over the number of active workers in the 
sector. Source: 2nd quarter 1987-1998, EPA INE
- Vacancies: number of vacancies in the sector posted in the national employment 
institute (INEM). Source: I.N.E.M. vacancies publication.
- Gross value added (sector): I had quarterly GVA for agriculture, industry, con­
struction, services (market and non market). The series were transformed to constant 
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3.8 Figures and tables
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Figure 3.2: Validity of the identification strategy
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statistical break, the solid line assumes that the increase in work accidents in 1988 is the 
same as that in 1987 and plots the ratio after this based on tha t figure. Also note that 
the FTC rate data before 1987 are an extrapolation: before 1984 FTCs were restricted 
to seasonal contracts and I assume they grow linearly after tha t (no data are available 
from EPA on FTC before 1987).
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Source: own elaboration from E.A.T. and E.P.A.











Time spen t to  arrive to  work
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Fixed term contract Permanent contract
mean std. dev mean std. dev.
Accident probability 0.116 0.105 0.0457 0.043
Tenure: < 2 months 0.353 0.127 0.016 0.012
2 months to 6 months 0.296 0.057 0.024 0.014
6 months to 1 year 0.251 0.844 0.076 0.032
1 year to 3 years 0.075 0.058 0.104 0.036
3 years to 10 years 0.0199 0.024 0.283 0.046
more than 10 years 0.0046 0.009 0.498 0.103
Age: < 25 0.415 0.132 0.099 0.062
26 to 35 0.310 0.077 0.282 0.055
36 to 45 0.153 0.055 0.286 0.056
46 to 55 0.088 0.049 0.216 0.056
more than 55 0.034 0.030 0.116 0.044
overtime 0.115 0.081 0.102 0.077
Male 0.622 0.262 0.675 0.209
Training contract 0.029 0.021 ,0 o
Seasonal contract 0.111 0.128 0 ' 0
Other FTC contract 0.859 0.121 0 - 0
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of accidents by seriousness 
(at the workplace/on the way to work)
mean std. dev.
Accident probability (yearly)
light, at the workplace 0.0509 0.0460
serious, at the workplace 0.00096 0.00073
deadly, at the workplace 0.000097 0.0011
total at the workplace 0.052 0.0467
light, on the way to work 0.00313 0.00199
serious, on the way to work 0.00020 0.00011
deadly, on the way to work 0.00003 0.000026
Covariates
Tenure (proportion): < 2 months 0.097 0.045
2 months to 6 months 0.089 0.034
6 months to 1 year 0.121 0.042
1 year to 3 years 0.101 0.036
3 years to 10 years 0.217 0.042
more than 10 years 0.377 0.110
Age (proportion): < 25 0.169 0.061
26 to 35 0.342 0.062
36 to 45 0.247 0.044
46 to 55 0.195 0.039
more than 55 0.122 0.065
Overtime (>40 hours per week) 0.198 0.141
Male 0.666 0.208
Training contract 0.007 0.005
Seasonal contract 0.029 0.030
Other FTC contract 0.198 0.0.096
Source: E.P.A and E.A.T, see Appendix for description
Table 3.3: Sectoral variables
Mean Std. Dev.
Proportion of FTC 0.232 0.092
Prop, first time unemployed 0.251 0.047
Sector Unempl. rate 0.136 0.055
Gross value added growth rate 0.029 0.039
Vacancies 30399 28886
Source: various sources, see Appendix for description
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Table 3.4: Probability of accidents at the workplace by type of contract 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Constant -4.879** (0.084) -137.665**(28.89) -159.46** (29.32)
FTC dummy 1.032**W (0.114) 0.838**^  (0.0256) 1 464**(3) (0.270)
U rate X -0.669 (0.709) -0.307 (0.615)
GVA growth rate X 0.189 (0.496) 0.210 (0.365)
Vacancies X -5.59e-07(1.58e-06) 6.23e-08 (1.21e-06)
Male X X 0.355*(0.210)
Tenure distribution: 2-6 m. X X 0.485 (0.350)
6m to lyr X X 1.568** (0.231)
lyr to 3yr X X 1.125** (0.432)
3 to 10 years X X 0.651 (0.495)
more than 10 years X X 1.191** (0.385)
Age distribution:26 to 35 X X 1.330** (0.304)
36 to 45 X X 0.139 (0.279)
46 to 55 X X 0.054 (0.388)
more than 55 X X 2.852** (0.604)
Overtime X X -1.189** (0.393)
Year dummies X yes yes
Sector dummies X yes yes
Sector trend X yes yes
Observations 640 640 640
R2 0.212 0.944 0.957
** indicates 5% significance, * 10% significance; std. errors in parenthesis 
Marginal effects: (1) 0.058 (2) 0.041 (3)0.072
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Table 3.5: Probability of accidents at the workplace 
Coefficient Coefficient
Constant -5.094** (0.417) -5.813** (1.113)
Proportion of FTC 1.847**W (0.679) 0.762^ (0.587)
U rate X -0.357 (0.666)
GVA growth rate X -0.051 (0.3324)
Vacancies X 1.75e-06* (9.06e-07)
Male X -0.222 (0.243)
Tenure distribution: 2-6 m. X 1.361 (1.408)
6m to lyr X 3.307** (0.917)
lyr to 3yr X 2.849** (0.956)
3 to 10 years X 0.512 (1.00)
more tham 10. years X 2.120** (0.838)
Age distribution:26 to 35 X -0.702 (0.758)
36 to 45 X 1.130 (0.801)
46 to 55 X 0.165 (1.058)
more than 55 X -0.443 (1.325)
Overtime X -1.708** (0.511)
Year dum m ies X yes
Sector dummies X yes
Observations 352 352
R2 0.033 0.970
** indicates 5% significance, * 10% significance; std. errors in parenthesis 
Marginal effects: (1) 0.091 (2) 0.038
Table 3.6: Probability of accidents at the workplace, control for quality
Coefficient Coefficient
Constant -5.495** (0.118) -7.369** (0.877)
Proportion of FTC 1.872**W (0.495) 1.501**(2> (0.482)
Prop, ser.+fat. ac. to work 1795.01** (110.0) 814.33** (72.7)
Set of controls x yes
Year dummies x yes
Sector dummies x yes
Observations 352 352
R2 0.386 0.979
** indicates 5% significance, * 10% significance; std. errors in parenthesis 
Marginal effects: (1) 0.092 (2) 0.074
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Prop, total acc. to work
Set of controls
Year dummies
Sector dum m ies
Observations
R2
-5.366** (0.122) -7.718** (-0.640)
1.533**W (0.555) 1.043**(2) (0.396)






** indicates 5% significance, * 10% significance; std. errors in parenthesis 
Marginal effects: (1) 0.075 (2) 0.051
C hapter 4
U nem ploym ent duration, 
unem ploym ent benefit and  
household income: th e Spanish  
case
4.1 Introduction
How does the income available to an unemployed person affect his/her probability of 
becoming employed? The level of household income and of unemployment benefit are 
very important in determining unemployment behaviour. However, even though this 
seems a crucial question, no paper has addressed it directly for the case of Spain. This 
paper addresses the following two questions: what is the effect of the level of household 
income on the incentives of an unemployed person to find a job and whether unemploy­
ment benefit levels actually have an impact on the probability of an unemployed person 
obtaining a job in Spain. In Spain, the effect of unemployment benefit has only been 
analysed comparing those who are actually receiving unemployment benefit and those
133
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who are not. But the impact of the different levels of unemployment benefit on the 
exit rates has not been analysed explicitly. More importantly, the effect of household 
income (defined as the income brought to the household by the other members), has 
traditionally been thought to be very large due to the existence of strong family ties, as 
in other Mediterranean countries. Nevertheless the actual impact of household income 
on the behaviour of the Spanish unemployed remains largely unexplored.
The reason why these questions have not been tackled directly until now is that 
Spanish micro-datasets like the Spanish labour force survey (EPA) and others do not in­
clude data on income variables. Only the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares 
(ECPF), a family expenditure survey, contains the data that we are interested in, namely 
income data and information on the structure of the household. But this richness in the 
dataset, comes at the expense of having an imperfect measure of unemployment dura­
tion. Indeed, in the ECPF the full duration of the unemployment spell is not available 
because the exact moment of entry and exit are not observed. Instead we have discrete 
records, separated in time and limited information on the individual between the spells. 
And the interviews are three months apart from each other, so grouping the data would 
result in a considerable loss in precision. In this paper I develop a hazard model that 
accounts for these limitations and allows to use the panel to analyse the transitions to 
employment in Spain. Hence I provide a way to extract optimally the information on 
flows contained in a dataset which measures stocks at different points in time.
The empirical literature on unemployment duration in Spain has failed to address 
the differential impact of unemployment benefit and of other sources of income, such as 
household income, on unemployment duration. The added value of this paper is precisely 
to take these sources of income into account explicitly and assess to what extent they 
affect the behaviour of the unemployed. In particular I study to what extent household 
support is important in explaining long unemployment durations, as it is argued for many 
Mediterranean countries (Bentolila and Ichino (2000)). I can assess the actual impact
CHAPTER 4. UNEMPLOYMENT, BENEFIT AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME 135
of the level of household support on behaviour. In addition, household income, together 
with information on the household structure, is considered to be vital in the study of 
female unemployment insofar as they capture the division of labour in the household. 
I am able to study this explicitly with the ECPF while much of this information was 
missing in previous studies.
Concerning the level of benefits, existing studies do not specify the level of the benefits 
itself and only use a dummy variable for benefit receipt. They find that benefit recipients 
have lower hazard rates (Arellano (1997), Garcia Perez (1997)) and that the hazard 
increases when the time of benefit exhaustion is closer (Ahn (1995)) In this paper I 
analyse the effect of the level of unemployment benefit received explicitly, and hence I 
am in a position to provide an elasticity of duration to unemployment benefits for Spain.
The next section outlines the main theoretical drivers , of the behavior of the unem­
ployed that constitute the background to the empirical analysis. Section three describes 
the data and provides the detail of how maximum likelihood estimation is used to deal 
with the sampling structure of the dataset. Section four presents the results and section 
five concludes.
4.2 Theoretical background
This paper assesses empirically two aspects of job search. The first one is the effect of the 
level of unemployment benefit on the likelihood of exiting unemployment. The second 
is how family income affects these exit rates. The theoretical model underlying our 
empirical estimation is that of Mortensen (1977). Mortensen provides a dynamic search 
model where individuals chose their optimal search strategy given the benefit system and 
the probability of layoff when employed. In the model, unemployed individuals receive
1Cebrian et al. (1996) find that benefit recepients are more likely to exit unemployment, but this 
is mostly due to the sample selection present in their dataset (they use administrative records of the 
unemployment insurance system, and these only sample those who register and hence are entitled to 
benefit).
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employment offers with some probability for a certain wage and in the face of each offer 
they decide whether to take up the job or to keep on searching. A dynamic optimisation 
programme is solved where individual utility is a function of leisure and consumption. 
Consumption is defined as the goods purchased with the income received (this can be, 
depending on the state, unemployment benefit, the wage or, as in our case, household 
income). Individuals will accept the offer it they prefer the offered wage to continuing 
in unemployment. The wage that leaves them indifferent between the two alternatives is 
the reservation wage. Wage offers follow a certain distribution, known to the individuals. 
Thus the probability of exiting unemployment (the hazard, rate) is just the product of the 
probability of receiving an offer and the probability that the offer exceeds the reservation 
wage.
The reservation wage is a function of the income received by the individual while 
unemployed -like unemployment benefit-, the rate of arrival of the offers, the search cost 
and the wage distribution.
Mortensen shows that unemployment benefit has two effects: a disincentive effect, 
whereby the hazard rate is reduced by increasing the value of being unemployed; and 
an entitlement effect, that provides a higher value to employment to those who axe not 
receiving any unemployment benefit or who axe near unemployment benefit exhaustion.
However, Mortensen’s model does not include other sources of income available to the 
individual such as income earned by other household members. So, what is the expected 
effect of household income on exit rates? We can think of different effects. The first one 
is a pure income effect. The higher the ’’household income” that is at the disposal of the 
individual the lesser the pressure to find work because the utility from leisure is higher 
since he has some level of consumption. So in the trade off between staying unemployed 
and searching harder to find a job, a higher household income reduces the incentives to 
search2.
2 There is also a second order effect in the sense that if the individual is receiving unemployment 
benefit and has some level of household income, an increase in the level of unemployment benefit will
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Additionally, there is a differential predicted effect of household income on men and 
women that is due to the division of labour within the household. In the traditional 
model of division of labour and specialisation in the household, women are said to be 
responsible for the household duties. Given this structure, female search intensity will 
in general be lower than that of males because their ” leisure” time is devoted both to 
search and to fulfilling those household duties. But at the same time they will be more 
sensitive to differences in the level of income in the household. In the extreme model men 
axe expected to work regardless of the income earned by other members while women 
will only work when household income is very low.. Thus, the higher the earnings of her - 
partner, the lower the probability that she looks for a job. Notice though that by the 
same token, she is more likely to exit into inactivity. So we would expect that household 
income is more significant for women than for men. This is somewhat related to the 
added- worker effect literature that claims that when the income of the household drops, 
the wife has a greater incentive to look for work3.- But instead of identifying out of time 
series variation in household income -as in the standard added worker effect literature- 
I study whether there is a cross sectional difference for households with different levels 
of wealth4.
4.3 Econometric Specification
4.3 .1  T h e  dataset: E n cu esta  C ontinua  de P resu p u esto s  Fam iliares (E C P F )
The ECPF is a household expenditure survey designed to provide information on the 
source and level of the household income and expenditure, but it also contains a series 
of variables that allow us to undertake an analysis of labour market behaviour. 3200
increase utility by less than if no income was available, from the marginally decreasing utility of leisure, 
thus the negative effect on his search intensity will be lower.
3 Cullen and Gruber (2000) link the added worker effect to the receival of unemployment insurance 
by the husband by arguing that unemployment insurance actually crowds out the spousal labour supply.
4Prieto and Rodriguez (2000) study the added worker effect for the Spanish case. They find evidence 
of female labour participation being stimulated when their husband is unemployed.
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households are interviewed every quarter and l/8 th  of the sample is renewed every 
quarter. The sample used here covers the years 1985 to 1995.
One of the problems found with the data is that, although they contain a lot of in­
formation for the head of household (hoh), they have less information for the partner and 
the children. In particular there is no information on the activity status of dependents. 
Thus, I only include heads of household and partners in the analysis. Table 4.1 shows 
the information provided for each category:
Table 4.1: ECPF dataset
Hoh Partner Children
Sex yes yes yes
Age yes yes yes
Whether they received income in the last 3 months yes yes yes
Work Status in the last week yes yes no
Income data (wage, unemployment benefit, pension...)' yes yes yes
Education ' yes no , no
Activity group yes yes no
A further point related to the way the dataset is built concerns the definition of the 
heads of household. ’’Head of household” is the individual with the highest income5. 
Since the head of household dummy refers to the observation before the individual be­
comes unemployed, I consider it does not induce endogeneity problems. The case would 
be different and problems might arise, if I used later changes.
An important issue when using this dataset is the way the question on employment 
status is asked. The interviewees answer what their status was during the ’’reference 
week” (the week before the interview)6. This means that I only have information on the
5For this reason, in the panel we observe heads of household apparently ’’changing” sex and age from 
one interview to the next. This is because when the head of household dies or experiences a substantial 
loss of income, another member of the household takes their position. This was dealt with by tracking 
the head of household when they changed and recovering them from their new position when this was 
possible, and the same was done for the partners. This implies that our sample also includes all those 
individuals that went from a position of head of household to that of partner and vice versa.
6Status includes part time or full time employed, unemployed, retired, work on the household duties, 
other
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employment status of an individual at discrete points in time -during the week of the 
interview-, not the full duration of each spell nor the exact point in time when a transition 
occurred. Hence, what I observe for each individual is a series of observations on status, 
a sequence of employed/unemployed elements. However, I ignore what occurred between 
two elements of the sequence. This implies that if I observe an individual who reported 
to be employed in one interview and declares he is unemployed in the next (three months 
later), I don’t know the exact moment when he became unemployed. Similarly I do not 
know the exact moment when an individual who is unemployed in one interview and 
employed in the next exits unemployment. But as the interviews are three months apaxt 
in time, I will observe the same pattern of replies to the question on labour market status 
for individuals that have a difference in unemployment of up to six months minus two 
weeks.
Given the characteristics of the sample and the fact that I don’t know the exact 
moment when the individual entered or exited unemployment, standard survival estim­
ation procedures may not be used and I must instead adapt a likelihood function to the 
sampling of the data. This is done in the next section.
4 .3 .2  T h e  L ikelihood F unction
The sampling structure of the ECPF raises a number of issues that must be dealt with 
in the likelihood. The first problem is that the exact moments of entry and exit are 
unobserved, but I know within which three month bracket they occurred. This in not 
standard left or right censoring since I know entry times (and exit for those not truly 
censored) up to a three month error. This information needs to be exploited. Further­
more the only individuals for whom I observe a spell of unemployment are those who 
do not exit before their next interview, so very short spells (less than three months) 
will be under-represented and this must be accounted for. Similarly, since the probab­
ility of becoming unemployed varies within and across quarters and that I only observe
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durations at the end of each quarter, the likelihood will account for some form of stock 
sampling bias. This is not too problematic in my case because I am working at quarterly 
frequencies, but if this likelihood were to be applied to samples with lower frequencies of 
observations, it becomes more important to account for this. In what follows I derive the 
density function of uncompleted spell durations that applies to this type of sample. I do 
so thinking in terms of numbers and proportions of people to compute the appropriate 
probabilities.
Individuals are interviewed every quarter and declare their employment status in 
the week of the interview. The sample goes from the first quarter in 1985 to the last 
quarter of 1995. Let us take the sample of people that are employed in one interview, 
and unemployed in the following -that we observe ’’entering” unemployment. In the 
subsequent periods they may follow any pattern of unemployment to employment, and 
all these patterns are mutually exclusive. So I have a-number of individuals whose 
probability of becoming unemployed in any quarter varies over time (empirically, the 
inflow rate), and who subsequently have a probability distribution over the possible 
pattern of the spell (where patterns are mutually exclusive events and their probability 
sums to one). Furthermore, some individuals may enter and exit unemployment before 
the following interview, so the analysis must condition on entering unemployment and 
.remaining unemployed to the following interview. Finally, among all those entering 
unemployment during the time they are in the sample,there are two types of individuals: 
those who declare unemployment in all the interviews until their last period in the 
sample, at time k and those who declare employment at some point before they exit the 
sample (at time k\ < k). The probability of each duration pattern will be derived from 
this partitioning of the data.
Given the partitioning, I derive an expression for the probability of an unemployed 
individual exiting unemployment between the k\ — l  and kith interview given he declared 
being employed at t and unemployed at t + 1. That is he entered unemployment at t + v
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(0 < v < 1) and remained unemployed until t +1. The crucial thing to note is that v is 
unobserved, (in what follows I avoid individual subscripts for notational simplicity)
Let n(t, x)dt be the numbers entering unemployment between time t and time 
Now consider S(T — v,x) as the proportion of people entering unemployment at t+v, 
who are still unemployed at t +  T, i.e. at duration T  — v. This is the survival function.
Since I will parametrise the survival function, I define the hazard rate as 6{r\x). The 
survival function is then:
rT—v
S(T  — V] x) = exp{— / 0(t; x)dr}
Jo
Since v is the unobserved moment in which transitions occur I will integrate over it. 
Thus the number of people of type x entering unemployment between t and t + 1 (the 
following interview) is given by:
/ n(t +  v, x)dv
Jo
And the number of people entering unemployment between t and t + 1, and still 
unemployed at t +  1 is:
I n(t +  v , x)S( 1 — v; x)dv
Jo
The individuals are interviewed at t = 1,2,3, , maxQ , where maxQ is the number 
of quarters in the sample. So the total number of individuals entering unemployment 
between t =  1 and t =  maxQ is:
maxQ I
I  n(t +  v, x)S(l — V, x)dv 
Jo
To deal with the fact that a number of observations are censored, one must distinguish
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between the contributions of those who exit unemployment before they exit the sample 
and those who don’t. Thus the individual contributions to the likelihood may be written 
as follows.
Of the total number of individuals in the sample, the proportion who appear at t , 
are unemployed at t +1, are still unemployed at t -f- k\ — 1 but are employed at t +  k\ is:
Jo n(t + v,x) * [S(ki — 1 — v; x) — S(ki — V, x)]dv
This serves as the contribution to the likelihood of those who exit unemployment 
between t +  k\ — 1 and t +  k \ , conditional on having entered unemployment between t 
and t +  1. who become employed between 14- k\ — 1 and t + k±.
For censored spells:
/q1 n(t + v ,x )*  [£(& — v; x)]dv
E S a  Q  Jo  n (*  +  v >x ) S C1 ~  v i x ) d v
Here the numerator is the number of people who are employed at t who enter unemploy­
ment before t +  1 and remain unemployed until t + k\.
The contribution to the likelihood of a person entering unemployment between t and 
t +  1 is:
/ 01n(£ +  v , z ) * [ S ( / c i - l - v ; £ ) - S ( f c i - ' t ; ;  £)]<&; 
In jLi% — (X J In s~\ i
E S ?  f o  n (£ +  v ’ x ) s 0-  -  x ) d v  
+di\ J on ( ^ — v\x)\dv
ES=TQ f o  n(* + v ’ X ) S ( 1  ~  v '> x ) d v
where di is a categorical variable that equals one if the observation is not censored. 
Summing over all individuals gives the sample likelihood.
To proceed, it is necessary to assume some functional form for the hazard function. 
It can be shown that because I am integrating over v only an exponential hazard can
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be integrated analytically. But as the exponential hazard function is characterised by a 
constant hazard rate, and that it is well known that the probability of exiting unemploy­
ment varies with the length of the spells, it is more adequate to consider a more flexible 
function. Weibull and log-logistic hazards were considered and for both a numerical ap­
proximation of the integral is required. Since the log-logistic hazard is more flexible and 
actually it approximates better the actual empirical distributions obtained in previous 
work (see Arellano et al. (1998), Garcia Perez (1997)) I adopt that specification in the 
empirical analysis.
Log-logistic hazard and survival function: ~
=  / ( r c M r )0- 1 
’ ; 1 F f (x ) ( t )a
-  1 + ^ a.^r ja
We take f(x) = exp(x'{3) for log-linearity. The parameter a determines the type of 
time dependence of the hazard. If a  > 1 the hazard is first increasing and then decreasing 
reaching a maximum at t = [(a — l)/ f (x)]l/a. If a  < 1 the hazard is constantly decreasing 
from infinite at t = 0. If a =  1 it decreases from a non infinite magnitude.
Finally I have to deal with the inflow n(t, x). Since the availability of data implies that
I am using quarterly inflows, the term n(£, x) enters additively the log likelihood function 
and does not affect the estimation. Note that if the period between two interviews was 
longer, accounting explicitly for stock sampling bias would become more important.
Given all the above, maximum likelihood estimates may be obtained by maximising 
over the relevant parameters a and (5:
Max Y  In Li
P,ac
%
The main draw back of using a parametric form for the baseline hazard arises in the
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presence of unobserved heterogeneity. If there is some permanent unobserved component 
that is omitted and correlated with the probability of exiting unemployment the hazard 
rate will not be correctly estimated. An direct way to deal with this is done by the fact 
that I am controlling explicitly for previous wages which is possibly the best indicator 
of a worker’s ability and employability, and in addition I use a parametric hazard that 
mimics the non parametric hazards estimated in previous research with Spanish data.
4 .3 .3  E xp lan atory  variables
Among the explanatory variables I.will include the following:.:
a) individual characteristics: sex, age group, education, head of household or partner 
status.
b) household characteristics: number of children in the household below a certain 
age, number of other members in the household that are not working.
c) income variables: weekly unemployment benefit (see below), income of all the 
other members of the household. (Both in constant pesetas)
d) economy-wide determinants: year dummies (the dataset does not specify the region 
of the worker so it is impossible to control for local labour market conditions).
Because of the way the data axe recorded the construction of the weekly unem­
ployment benefit variable must be explained. The ECPF provides quarterly earnings 
by source. So I construct an estimate of the weekly unemployment benefit (in tens of 
thousand pesetas). For those unemployed without any benefit the value is very straight­
forwardly zero. For those who remain unemployed at two points and who receive only 
unemployment benefit in that interval, I take the value of the unemployment benefit 
between the two consecutive unemployed interviews, divided by the number of weeks 
in the interval (i.e. thirteen since we have quarters). For those who only have one ob­
served spell that were employed the period before the interview and received only wage, 
I assume that the wage did not change since the last observation and I compute the pro­
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portion of the time that the individual was unemployed and the proportion he worked. 
From that I obtain a measure for the weekly unemployment benefit of that person. After 
doing this, the only people for whom I do not have a valid value of the weekly unem­
ployment benefit are those who were inactive and start receiving unemployment benefit 
at some stage. Those amount in the sample to about 200 people that I lose due to this. 
Those are people that seem to go from inactivity to unemployment and suddenly start 
claiming benefit. This is a very peculiar group and therefore dropping them to reduce 
heterogeneity is a natural decision.
I use the quarterly inflow data from the official unemployment register provided by 
the Ministerio de trabajo y asuntos sociales (MTAS). The inflows axe computed using 
the registered unemployed and registered new contracts figures. In practice, given the 
likelihood function, the fact that I use quarterly inflows implies that those enter the 
likelihood additively and hence do not affect the coefficients.
The rest of the variables are defined in a straight forward manner. Household income 
is the income earned by other individuals in the household (also in tens of thousand 
pesetas) divided by the number of household members using an equivalence scale. I use 
the income corresponding to the last period that the person was unemployed to avoid 
possible endogeneity through an added worker effect. It gives a magnitude of the income 
available to each household member before the unemployment shock. I use the number 
of dependents in the household and split it between the number of children below six 
years of age and the number of other dependents. I also have the wage earned by the 
individual in the previous job, which captures other unobservables that determine the 
individual’s employability and expected wage.
I treat multiple spells of an individual as if they were of different individuals and I 
consider exits into either part-time or full-time employment, and following Narendrathan 
(1993) exits into inactivity are considered as censored as if I was computing a competing 
risks model. Although the main analysis focuses on transitions into employment, I also
CHAPTER 4. UNEMPLOYMENT, BENEFIT AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME 146
provide evidence on transitions to inactivity.
A number of limitations of the dataset must be mentioned and kept in mind when 
interpreting the results. The first is that there is no information on the duration of 
the entitlement to benefit. As Atkinson and Micklewright argue and as has been found 
in previous literature this is the time to exhaustion of the entitlement is often a key 
determinant in unemployment behaviour, often more that the level of benefits itself. 
I am unable to account for this fact with the available data. Furthermore, there is no 
difference between unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance in the dataset. 
So the variable unemployment benefit will include both. Finally, all I observe is whether 
the unemployed takes-up benefit rather than whether he is entitled. Given the high 
replacement ratios that characterise the Spanish system (70-80% at the beginning of the 
spell) compared to other countries, one expects that almost all entitled will claim benefit 
and hence it makes sense to talk about entitlement. Furthermore, from a practical point 
of view one can argue that what actually matters to assess the impact of unemployment 
benefit on duration are claimants.
4.4 R esults
I analyse the impact of both unemployment benefit and household income on the exit rate 
into employment in the ECPF. I take into account the gender differences in behaviour 
with respect to those variables given what was said before about the expected differential 
behaviour between men and women.
A look at the descriptive statistics shows that the groups of female heads and male 
non heads are rather small. 15% of females are heads and 4% of males are non heads. 
This is because the typical Spanish family structure conforms to the classic scheme where 
the male is the bread-winner and the female stays at home and takes care of the kids. 
Only 28% of female heads are single, so the single mother group is overall very small. 
Concerning men in the category of partners, they are mostly of middle age, that is that
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they probably are long term unemployed or in a precarious working condition (repeated 
fixed term contracts etc.) and that is why they are not in the position of household 
heads. As we will see in what follows, the results, just like these descriptive statistics 
reflect the importance of family structure and roles in determining behaviour.
Even though my main interest is in transitions to employment, it is important to 
analyse transitions to inactivity, in particular when we are looking at female behavior. 
All tables present results for the probability of an unemployed person becoming inactive. 
These are presented in a different column and actually reflect a model with competing 
risks of exiting unemployment into either of the two destinations.-; - '
Table 4.3 presents the results for the determinants of transitions to employment and 
inactivity in a pooled regression where we allow the coefficients on household income and 
unemployment benefit to differ by gender but the rest of the coefficients are constrained 
to be equal between groups.
Concerning the probability of exit into employment, the effect of household income7 is 
quite large and negative. That is, the higher the income the less likely that the individual 
exits unemployment into employment. As noted above, a number of different forces have 
an impact on that coefficient. One is that a higher family income induces a lower pressure 
to find work because the individual has already a basic income guaranteed. This effect is 
reinforced for the female non-head by the fact that she ’’specialises” in taking care of the 
household and hence her hazard rate is decreasing in household income. This provides 
some support to the argument that household income and family ties axe important in 
explaining unemployment duration in Spain.
To assess the impact of unemployment benefit on duration, I introduce separately a 
dummy variable for whether the individual is receiving benefit, the level of the benefit 
and previous wage. Note that previous studies have included the log of the replacement 
ratio directly (this is done later on) but this means that all individuals who are not
7 Computed as the income of other members of the household (divided by an equivalence scale) in the 
period before the person enters unemployment
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receiving benefit are dropped out. My specification exploits the information coming from 
individuals without any benefit, who represent 47% of the sample and allows for a non 
linearity in the effect of benefit. If the relationship was linear the dummy variable would 
not be significantly different from zero. I assume that any differential employability 
effects are captured by the previous wage and that it is not a result of unobserved 
characteristics. In practice, being entitled not only conveys information on the level 
of benefit received but implicitly captures the fact that the benefit will last for some 
time, so the expectations of the individual are different. Allowing for a different impact 
of entitlement (dummy) and the level of benefit goes some way in accounting for that. 
Finally note that unemployment benefit in Spain is computed using exogenous rules as 
a fixed proportion of previous wage subject to a maximum and a minimum cap (see 
appendix for details). The estimation includes previous wage as a regressor, but the non 
linearity of the benefit (through the caps, see appendix for description of the benefit 
rules) is what allows me to identify separately the effect, of previous wage from the effect 
of the level of benefits. Furthermore, note that the exogeneity of the rules precludes 
endogeneity problems.
The effect of weekly unemployment benefit shows that both entitlement and the level 
of benefits have a positive effect on durations, however the effect of the level rather small 
-it is close to 10% significance for males but insignificant for females. This result is 
present in the different models estimated: the effect of the levels is smaller than the 
effect of entitlement itself.
Concerning the shape of the hazard function, since a  is greater than one the hazard 
increases up to a maximum and then decreases, confirming the non-monotonicity that 
was expected. I will show gender specific hazard rates below.
One can then see the reflection of household structure through a number of coeffi­
cients., Males and heads of household are less likely to exit into inactivity and heads of 
household more likely to exit into employment. Household income deters transitions into
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employment but not into inactivity. The presence of younger children doesn’t appear 
to have an effect, but this is due as we will see to the fact that we are constraining the 
coefficients for males and females to be equal. We have a priori reasons to think that 
this is inappropriate.
All the estimations control for the level of previous wage, which captures the employ­
ability of the individual and his/her ability. As one would expect higher previous wage 
increases transitions into employment and reduces transitions into inactivity.
Finally, I find an inverse U-shape for the effect of age on transitions into employment 
and a U-Shape for its. impact on transitions into inactivity. - :
The analysis above restricted the coefficients on the rest of the covariates to be the 
same across groups. This is a restrictive assumption, so tables 4.4 and 4.5 show the 
results for females and males separately (note there is a substantial fall in sample size 
and hence also in significance).
First of all, note that a  is greater than one in both cases and it is larger for males. 
Figure 4.1 shows the hazard rate into employment for a representative male and female. 
Males have a systematically higher probability of becoming employed.
Table 4.4 presents the results on females and table 4.5 the results for males. For 
women I find a sizeable effect of household income in reducing exits into employment 
, but no effect on exits into inactivity. The main variable that is significant for female 
transitions from unemployment into inactivity is whether they are entitled to benefit (the 
level of benefit being unimportant). When they are, exit is delayed. Previous wage is also 
significant for transitions into inactivity and has the opposite sign than for transitions 
into employment possibly capturing the employability of workers and hence their labour 
market prospects.
The effect of household structure is apparent in the results. The presence of children 
below the age of six reduces employment prospects for unemployed females but increases 
them for unemployed males. This again confirms the fact that household structure is
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important in determining unemployment duration and the fact that there is some degree 
of division of labour within the household.
The results for the rest of covariates is as follows. Age is not significant for women. 
For males, an inverted U-shape for the effect of age is obtained, with the exit rate highest 
for the group aged 30 to 40. Education variables axe only available for heads of household. 
Columns 2 and 4 of table 4.5 allow us to compare results when education variables are 
included. The thrust of the results is unchanged, which is reassuring for the rest of the 
regressions. In any case, the inclusion of previous wage as a variable should capture most 
of the relevant information provided by the education variables......
To assess the differential effect of the different sources of income on the hazard rate, I 
look at how the hazard changes for the representative individual if first all unemployment 
benefit is withdrawn and then if all household income is withdrawn. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 
(for women, and men respectively) show that both benefits and income axe important, 
but that the effect of withdrawing all benefit is much bigger than that of income in both 
cases. The effect of household income is higher for women than for men.
To assess the effect of benefit on employment duration taking into account the non 
linearity described before I compute expected unemployment duration at different levels 
of benefit. This is presented in table 4.7. Expected unemployment duration for an 
individual who is not receiving benefits is 2 months, while if the same individual received 
the minimum amount of benefit possible he would have an expected duration of 7.4 
months8, and at median duration it is 8.7 months. So we see again that the biggest 
impact comes from being entitled. The sensitivity of duration conditional on entitlement 
being smaller.
Finally, to allow a comparison of these results with the international literature and 
provide compaxable elasticities I estimate the model on the logarithm of the replacement 
ratio and the logarithm of household income. By doing so I lose all those individuals
8This is expected duration computed for a male head of household, without children or dependents, 
aged 31 to 44, at median previous., wage.
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who axe not earning benefits or whose household income is zero. In particular, since only 
35% of women are receiving benefit, most women are lost due to this. Table 4.6 shows 
the results for this specification which is conditional on receiving benefit.
The estimated elasticity on benefit is 0.47 and that on the replacement ratio is 0.32. 
This compares to elasticities of benefit the order of 0.3 to 1 in international studies. 
The elasticity on household income is 0.05, although this is not significant. Note that 
omitting previous wage from the regressions biases the estimates towards zero indicating 
a positive correlation between ability/wage and the level of benefit. This supports the 
claim that previous, wage is a good indicator. oLthe employment prospects of individuals 
and validates the previous specifications with income variables in levels (to avoid losing 
individuals with values of zero in either household income or benefit).
4.5 Conclusion
This paper intended to clarify the nature of transitions from unemployment into employ­
ment in Spain. The existing empirical literature had not analysed the relative import­
ance of the different sources of income of the unemployed person, such as unemployment 
benefit or household income in determining the transitions to employment. This is a 
consequence of the lack of income data in most datasets. I used the ECPF, a household 
expenditure survey that includes data on the income of all household members in addi­
tion to family structure variables. The problem with the dataset is that it only provides 
an imperfect measure of unemployment duration, namely it only records the status of 
the individual in discrete points in time, but does not provide the exact moment of 
entry to or exit from unemployment. A method was developed to solve that problem 
by defining a likelihood function that takes into consideration that sampling structure. 
Thus I can assess to what extent it is true that family support is an explanation for the 
long unemployment durations in Spain and assess whether the levels of unemployment 
benefit have any influence at all on the exit rates.
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The maximum likelihood results provide a better picture of the nature of labour 
market transitions in Spain and confirm the idea that family structure and support are 
important determinants of the behaviour of the unemployed. There are significant effects 
of being head of household and male on the probability of an unemployed individual 
becoming employed or inactive. The presence of children of young age has opposite 
effects on men and women. Women axe less likely to work and men more likely when in 
the presence of children below six.
Concerning the relative effect of the different sources of income, I found evidence 
that the level of household income has a negative net effect on the probability of exiting 
unemployment into employment but no effect on exits into inactivity, but it is of a much 
smaller size than unemployment benefit. Regarding unemployment benefit, I found that 
especially entitlement but also the level of unemployment-benefit reduces the likelihood 
of exiting unemployment into employment. It is mainly entitlement that reduces the 
probability of exiting unemployment, with the actual elasticity of duration to benefit 
conditional on receiving benefits being 0.47.
4.6 A ppendix
4.6 .1  Sam ple se lection
My sample keeps every unemployment spell of individuals for whom we observe entry 
into unemployment. Out of those I drop those for whom I cannot compute weekly 
unemployment benefit (namely, those who start off earning benefit after having declared 
inactivity -249 individuals are dropped due to this).
Pattern %
Not receiving benefits (ub=0)
Two consecutive quarters in unemployment (ub=benefit received between the two periods) 




In the final sample, the computation of unemployment benefit comes from the above
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categories: 52% had no benefit, 17% comes from the employed/unemployed transitions, 
32% takes the benefit between two consecutive unemployed interviews.
4 .6 .2  T h e Spanish  U n em p lo y m en t ben efit sy stem
In Spain the Unemployment Insurance system has two components: an unemployment 
insurance system (UI), that is only awarded to those who have worked and contributed 
during their previous job; and an unemployment assistance system (UA). A reform of 
the 1984 system was implemented in 1992 that reduced eligibility to UI and enlarged it 
for UA.
Unemployment insurance system
It is mostly designed for those who have exhausted their UI and have to face family 
burdens. To be eligible for UA, in addition to having a number of dependants, per 
capita family income cannot exceed the minimum wage,.
The length of the entitlement period depends on how long the individual had been 
making social security contributions in the 6 years (4 years before 1992) previous to the 
beginning of the spell.
Workers having contributed less that 6 months are not entitled to UI but they could 
claim UA if they had contributed at least 3 months.
The amount of benefits is determined as a percentage of the average wage in the 
previous 12 months (6 months before 1992) of employment, before the beginning of the 
unemployment period. There are some upper and lower bounds on that quantity. The 
minimum amount is 75% of the minimum wage and the maximum is set at 170% of the 
minimum wage. If the unemployed has dependents, then the upper bound is increase to 
195% with one dependant and 220% with more than one.
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Duration of benefits (in months)




18-23 9 6 Amount of benefits
24-29 12 8 Period of benefits 1984 1992
30-35 15 10 1-6 80% 70%
36-41 18 12 7-12 70% 60%







The amount of UA is 75% of the minimum wage. Since 1989 the amount varies 
with the number of dependents for workers above 45 years, only if they had received UI 
for 24 months. In that case it 75% of the minimum wage (< 1 dependents), 100% (2 
dependents) and 125% (>3 dependents).
Workers aged 52 or more are eligible for UA until retirement.
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Duration of benefits





6-11 Age<45 18 21
Age>45 18 21
12-17 Age<45 ' 18 18
Age>45 18 24
>18 Age<45 18 24
Age>45 18 30
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4.7 Tables and figures
4.7 .1  Tables





Exits to employment 26.5% 47.7%
Censored 49.1% 45.7%
Exits to inactivity 24.4% 6.5%
Total 720 1145
Mean Mean
Entitled to benefit 0.352 (0.478) 0.546 (0.498)
Unemployment benefit 0.409 (0.655) 0.841 (1.026)
Household income 0.138 (0.093) 0.068 (0.064)
Previous wage 0.724 (0.890) 1.674 (1.174)
Children <6 0.465 (0.666) 0.439 (0.676)
Dependents 2.334 (1.415) 2.736 (1.503)
No studies* 0.314 (0.464)
Primary studies 0.506 (0.500)
Sec. Studies 0.155 (0.362)
University 0.023 (0.149)
31 to 44 0.532 (0.147) 0.401 (0.490)
45 to 59 0.22 (0.083) 0.023 (0.151)
more than 60 0.007 (0.362) 0.021 (0.143)
Head of household 0.155 (0.363) 0.958 (0.200)
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Male Entitled -1.5932*** -1.0762**
(6.30) (2.11)
Female Entitled -1.3759*** -2.6189***
(3.24) (5.26)
Male Unempl. benefit -0.1821 -0.0878
(1.61) (0.31)
Female Unempl. benefit -0.2636 0.0541
(0.88) (0.15)
Male household income -5.1539*** 2.2835
(3.60) (1.15)




Head of household 0.6629** -0.6724*
(2.34) (1.86)
Children <6 0.1103 -0.2604
(0.99) (1.58)




Aged 31 to 44 0.5054*** -0.7717***
(3.47) (3.33)
Aged 45 to 59 0.3234 -1.4701*
(0.74) (1.87)





Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4.4: Transitions to employment and inactivity, females 






Unempl. benefit -0.4460 0.2875
(1.28) (0.78)
household income -3.8408** -0.5103
(2.07) (0.26)
Previous wage 0.8071*** -0.6371***
(4.52) (3.29)
Head of household 0.0303 -0.5821
(0.08) (1.15)




Aged 31 to 44 0.1194 -0.4740
(0.44) (1.63)
Aged 45 to 59 -0.6860 -1.1874
(0.76) (1.24)





Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4.5: Transitions to employment and inactivity, males
Trans.to Empl. Trans.to Empl Trans.to Inact. Trans.to Inact
Males Male heads. Males Male heads
constant -0.6422 0.3077 -0.2190 -0.9098
(1.11) (0.78) (0.26) (1.30)
Entitled -1.6540*** -1.6608*** -1.0297* -0.9843*
(6.55) (6.49) (1.94) (1.83)
Unempl. benefit -0.1396 -0.1459 -0.2107 -0.2553
(1.25) (1.30) (0.73) (0.87)
household income -3.8428*** -4.0618*** 2.0418 3.3687
(2.68) (2.77) (1.02) (1.61)
Previous wage 0.3754*** 0.3690*** -0.0850 -0.0513
(4.54) (4.50) (0.69) (0.39)
Head of household 1.0076** -0.6220
(2.10) (1.03)
Children <6 0.3452** 0.2929** -0.4883 -0.4918
(2.46) (2.08) (1.57) (1.55)
Dependents 0.0038 0.0340 -0.1160 -0.1589
(0.07) (0.56) (1.16) (1.46)
Aged 31 to 44 0.7005*** 0.7031*** -1.8517*** -1.8602**
(3.89) (3.85) (3.54) (3.20)
Aged 45 to 59 0.8080 0.7343 -1.1496 -0.5096
(1.53) (1.32) (0.95) (0.42)
Aged >59 -0.1830 -0.1805 -0.9489 -1.0365
(0.34) (0.33) (0.84) (0.92)
Secondary studies 0.2805 -0.8029
(1.14) (1.19)
University studies -0.6105 -1.7960
(1.04) (1.38)
ALPHA 1.4415*** 1.4692*** 1.2887*** 1.4103***
(12.59) (12.49) (5.44) (5.57)
Observations 1145 1097 1145 1097
Abs. value of z stat. in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **at 5%; *** at 1%
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Table 4.6: Transitions to employment for entitled, elasticities
(1) (2)
Trans.to Empl all Trans.to Empl all
Constant -2.5181*** -2.6830***
(5.65) (6.01)




Ln unempl. Benefit -0.2404* -0.4788***
(1.70) (3.13)
Head of household 0.9828*** 0.6296***
(4.58) (2.77)




Aged 31 to 44 0.6588*** 0.5568***
(3.80) (3.14)
Aged 45 to 59 0.3919 0.1089
(0.75) (0.20)





Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4.7: Expected duration by level of benefit 




90th perc. benefit 10.249
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4.7.2 F igures




Computed for a representative individual in 1992 at mean benefit and household income and for the base categories








Computed for a representative individual in 1992 at mean benefit and household income and for the base categories
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Computed for a representative individual in 1992 at mean benefit and household income and for the base categories
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